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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. THH All. OF THIS THESIS
The purpose of this thesis is three-fold: (1) to
establish the fact that some human knowledge is iLTraediate
; (2)
to describe the nature of that knowledge: (3) to define the
limits of immediate knowledge.
1. UNITY IN REALISTIC VIEVS
An attempt wall be made to show that despite vast
differences in conclusions certain conflicting philosophical
schools of thought are in agreement on a sufficient number of
i
premises involved in the Question of immediate knowledge to make
i
j
inevitable the conclusion that the human mind has immediate
I
knowledge of extra-mental reality.
iUialysis and comparison of terminology will show that
i
I
disagreement in many cases is verbal or due to differences other
than those arising from the question of immediate knowledge.
This fact will become most conspicuous in the discussion of New^-
Realism and modern scholasticism, wherein agreement on the fun-
damental issue of this thesis might otherwise be clouded by
metaphysical and psychological differences. "The New-Scholastic
solution of the epistemological problem agrees very closely vdth
the ideas proposed in recent times by the various realist and -
objectivist schools."^
—
^ ^
Noel, Art. 1, 137.
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The unity of thought aiaong many realists on the prob-
lem of iinraediate knowledge will be shown to be separable from
their endless diversity of opinion on other philosophical
1 questions which might be construed as pertinent,
I
I
8. DIlTERSnCES ILT'ORTAi':!
For the sake of claritj'-, however, it will be necessary
I
not only to describe similarities but also to define differences
The problem at issue and the reasons for the conclusions drawn
are illumined by contrast as well as by comparison.
Therefore, it will be the purnose of this paper to
present alternative viev/s, although, naturally, no attempt will
be made either to record all argui.ients for imiaediate knowledge
or even perhaps a representative number of arguments presented
from opposing points of view.
3. VARIETY OF VIE’^VS
Critical examination of the various views wall be made
with the assistance of the v/ritings of the chief exponents and
I
opponents of the respective opinions. The complete thesis may
serve as a general survey of modern judgment on the problem of
'immediate knowledge.
1
I
4. Validity of laio^xEDaE is issue
»
i
! The first aim of this thesis, to prove that knowledge
‘is iranediate, serves as the fundamental tenet of a theory of
valid knowledge. Consequently, the aim here is not only to seek
a true theory of knov/ledge, but, beyond that, it is to emphasize
that a true theory of knov/ledge means a theory of true knov/ledge
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"Immediate knowledge of independent reality, then, would make
mediate knowledge of the same also possible; and it does not
appear what else could do it."^ Hence, theories of hypothetical
knowledge, however coherent, must be rejected.
It will be necessary to show that any theory which
excludes immediate knowledge cannot rise above a, relativism v/hict
is content with hypothetical knowledge, a relativism
.
which
would regard symbolic knowledge as a great privilege rather than
as the gross deception which it actually would be.
B. GOmJbaTIVE LhiilliOD
The method of comparison and contrast v/ill be used,
but not exclusively. The description of epistemological theories
will have to be supplemented, in several divisions of the thesis,
by application of the rules of normative science. Especially
will this be necessary in presenting the main position, the
position defended, the modern scholastic point of view, because
of the organic interrelatedness! among ' the various units of
the whole system. This means simply that the theory of knowledge
ought to conform in content to certain standards consistent
with the complete modern scholastic position.
T]ie theory of knowledge is fundaiaental
,
as Perry
recognized in discussing the ’^osition of scholasticism:
It is the scholastic theory of knowledge
with its metaphysical implications, v/hich
determines its orientation aiaong- the schools
of recent and contemporary philosophy.^
^Mackintosh, PK, 312.
Sperry, FRP, 204.

While no added weight will be given the proofs of the
modern scholastic point of view here by showing the hariaony of
belief in immediate knowledge with belief in a loving G-od, the
consistency of the two theories is indicative of the fact that
iraraediate knowledge might be confirmed by proof of the existence
of such a God.'^
1. TO CITE AUTHORITIES
A representative statement of the leading present day
theories Vv'ill be given with quotations from an exponent of each
point of view to be considered. No claim is made that the men
quoted are the best fitted to defend the school under consid-
eration at the time, but it is likely that each philosopher will
i
be the best authority on his ov/n view. No one can decide finall;r
i who best represents a school of thought, a true representative
'would have to represent diverse opinions, v/ith some of which he
'would not agree.
Lesser figures also will be studied for supplementary
opinions and for confirmation of conclusions reached in this
thesis from the premises of the principal thinkers quoted,
2, TTP^U OE ILI.IEDIiiCY
Various types of imLiediacy, psychological, epistemo-
logical, logical, immaterial, and physical, v/ill be considered.
The necessity for this procedure is not alone the fact that
philosophy has for its field everything that is knov^able but
” AddendT]m,169.
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also the fact that”p'an-isml’ of one form or another is an ines-
capable issue. ”Pan-isn” is a generic tern for netaphysicalnaiisms;
3. NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS
Negative implications of the various theories will be
presented because of the exhaustive character of contradiction.
Disproof of the negative implications of any strictly dualistic
system, it is evident, forms the basis of comparison of the
several points of view defenaing the coneept of irrjnediate knowl-
edge.
i. The negative implications of any point of view can
be used in support of an opposing position. Negative implica-
tions may be tested nomatively.
ii. Negative implications contain a pragmatic value
for investigation corresponding to the pragmatic value of the
view presented. The term pragmatic is used here as a synonym for
practical, or v/orkable ,or intelligible, i.e. as indicative of the
consistency of the view with generally acknowTedged facts.
a. Consequences, workability, intelligibility, it vdll
be generally agreed, are sound criteria of truth. Any sane
doctrine must vrark at least in a limited way. nven thinkers not
1
pragmatists must admit that pragraatism offers a minimum test of
itruth, although something beyond vrorkability may be needed for
complete demonstration. The point here made in choosing a method
of investigation is that consequences affect judgment: a theory
1
1
that vdll not work is valueless except as a refutation of the
oystem of which it is a stated conclusion or an inescapable
1
!
1
—
*-iri— ——

6implication,
b. It is the purpose of this thesis to prove that i
knowledge of truth is possible only if immediate knowledge is
5
possible. Relativism, then, must be proved to be a consequence
of opposing views. As was explained in the outline of purpose, !
assertionsnade v/ithout nroof will not he accepted. Hence, the
,
1
1
admission of relativism will not be accepted unless it is con- '
sistent v/ith the premises of which it claims to be a conclusion.
Likewise, any attempt to deny relativism will be subjected to
the same scrutiny.
G. PRESENTATION IS OBJECTIVE
The various points of view v/ill be presented as
objectively as possible for the writer. Inasmuch as this in-
troduction could not be v^rritten until the body of the thesis had
been developed, the v/riter has convictions which may be reflect-
ed in the presentation.
1. NE\V RlLaLISIi REJECTED
Strangely enough, hov/ever, the convictions, despite
what will be said later about hypothetict.l knov^leuge, are by no
means ne^es^r41ry-final
,
and the treatment may honestly be pre-
sented as an independent, rational investigation undertaken
without prejudice. Actually the reason for adoption of the
modern scholastic point of view was the failure of the New
Realism to account for certain facts of expeiience not directly
Sperry, PPT, 311-S15.
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related to epistemology. Coherence of the scholastic viev/
(is that not perhaps the ultimate relativistic ground?) in-
fluenced the belated change of opinion as to the most effective
defense of immediate knowledge,
2, CONCLUSION DIFFICULT
The final conclusion of this thesis is : objective tiut.
is at-ainable,
, it may occur to the reader that metaphysical
truth concerning the question cannot be reached. It may seem
that the issue is one that cannot be settled because the
position chosen has to be assumed.
For example, how can a relativist be convinced of
arguments about a reality which he maintains cannot be known
immediately? How can any one in step with the current view
that all is grov;ing be convinced of any final truth? On the
other hand, ,how can pan-ob jectivists be sv/ayed by the operations
of minds which are conceived not as subject but as aspects of
objects? "And such a thing is consciousness or mind,—a cross
section of the universe selected by the nervous system".
The final conclusion will be presented as the best,
in the v;riter’s opinion, but who is he to judge as final some-
thing which has not been compared with theories still to arise?
And v;ho will deny that there will be nev/ theories not previously
thought of? Surely no one who has seen the revival of original
thinking and the development of strikingly new theories during
the present century,
^Kolt, Art, L,354,
1

Is there any escape from such an overvvrhelming and
comprehensive concept as theoretical relativism and practical
absolutism? It must be admitted persuasion is a better instru-
ment than the syllogism.

CH/iPTER II
D2EINITI0W OR TERI.IS
%
The title of this thesis would seen to require two
unwarranted assunptions, namely, that there is iimediate
knowledge and that it can be studied soraehow completely out
: of relation to other knowledge. In presenting definitions of
the terns, however, neither assumption is necessary; these
1
1
ijdefinitions are given in popular, rather than strictly philoso-
I
jphical language to suggest what it is hoped will be described
land proved in the entire thesis.
The v^hole thesis is a definition of a theory of kno\/-
ledge and that definition unfolds itself in the pages following.
The title expresses merely the subject of consideration, and
iis a type entirely different from the contents of the thesis.
In asserting imiuediate knowledge to consist of the direct relatic
of the mind to an extramental object, thus giving objective
i truth, this v/riter is not losing sight of the fact that the
I
jmost absolute theory is in a certain sense hypothetical in that
complete proof is impossible and the problem by its very nature
transcends the power of demonstration.
It is obvious that the right to use such a title is at
1
j
issue as much as any point. The question of v/hether any object
ihas an independent and knov^^able essence is certainly at issue,
and certainly no one can deny the serious implications
I
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of an atterapt even to intimate that there is a limit to knowl-
edge of any kind.
Hence, the follov/ing definitions are made in vrork-
able, if not scientific language, and under the limitations im-
posed by the inadequacy of words.
ii. , I'hiTURiij
1. DENOISS LuiliH^ING
j
Nature, as used in the title, denotes meaning. This
i
I
definition is chosen as the primary one because nature is syn-
onymous with meaning in any theory of knowledge while it is also
synonymous. with substance and objective reality only in a liruite
field. ^ The fact that in this thesis essence, or nature, v;ill
be proved to be something indepenaent of meaning will not alter
its use here. Actually the natuj-e of iiniaediate knowledge is
subjective because knowledge is subjective, but it can be con-
ceived as objective. Distinctions would be endless, however, if
v/e v/ere to consider the objectivity of immeaiate knowledge as
such.
2 . IlIPLIES END
In a secondary sense, nature denotes the being re-
lated to its end; in this thesis the relation between subject
Belief in non-mental universals is necessary
for belief in essences. Only in realistic
theories has objective essence a meaning,
while in any view essence, regarded as some-
thing in consciousness, is referred to as
the "meaning” of an object.
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and object and its status, i.e,, as a relation of numerical
identity, duality, or union.
It is unuer this secondary aspect that the existence
of imnediate knov;ledge must be considered. Definition of any-
' thing claimed to be actual consists in part of the assertion
i
of real or possible existence, and requires proof at least of
the possibility of a specific meaning.
i
' By nature then is meant- the meaning of what shall be
.
j
tentatively assumed and later demonstrated, in other vrords a
! definition of immediate knov/ledge as a fact in the scheme of all
I reality.
B. LII.ilTS
1 . OBJECTS CLA8SIEIED
Limits here implies primarily that the types of
reality which may be objects of imiaediate knowledge are members
of a particular class. In this sense limits implies that not
all knowleage is immediate, nor is all reality knov/able im-
jmediately.
2. DIVI3IBILIT"i BdPLIED
Limits has a connotation of divisibility. It is not
to be maintained in this thesis that immediate knowledge occurs
- without reflective knowledp-e. The issue is restricted to the
I
I
nature of the object loiown, its relation to the knower, and its
!
i status in extranental reality,
i
j
By limits then is meant the extent of immediate
I
j
knowledgeand its status in epistemological inquiry.
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C
. BliEDIATS
1 . DENOTES DIRECTNESS
Inmediate is here used to denote directness. It
denotes that the knower and the external. object are in direct
union, but it is not an exhaustive account of the knowledge
process. Iroraediate is a particularizing and particular term
used to restrict the investigation of knowledge to that, if any,
between the knowing mind and objects not in the mind but knovm
writhout the mediation of inference. It is not essential that
raind and object be metaphysically one, but only that the knowTi
object and existing object be one.^
i. Immediate is used in opposition to mediate, or
inferred, or indirect.
ii. The connotation of time, or lack of it, is an
unimportant implicate. Presence or absence of previous similar
knowledge is not considered, liemory is a process of mediation
between the present and non-existent past. iUiticipation is a
mediate process between the present and non-existent future.
The precise issue is the relation of the knower and known at
each moment of knowing. Time continues.
2. IQ\'0\iTLEDaE INCOlvIF'LETS
A relation of immediacy need not give completeness
of knowledge or aco^uaintance. This thesis seeks to prove that
what is yielded to the mind by the relation, however inexhaust-
ive, is nevertheless not false, and is sufficient to constitute
"^Poland, TT, 78. Also, cf. post, 169,
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D . KhlOWLEDGE
ioiowledge is sonething primordial, indefinable ex-
cept in terns of itself. To attempt to define knov;ledge in
terns of something else must end in defining something that is
not knoviTledge,
1 . PEKCEFTUaL KEOVvLEDGE
Perceptual knowleage may be defined as apprehension
of the objects of sense. ^ Sense knowledge consists in the union
and co-ordination of several sensory impressions contained in
one total representation v/hich, in the true and fullest sense
of the word, is the perception of an object.'^
2 . GONGEPTUifL KInIOWLEDGE
Gonceptual knowledge is the mind’s knowledge of its
object. In this thesis the limitation of immediacy has been
imposed on mind’s object. The issue is v/hether this immediate
object is an idea, a state of consciousness, or an external
ob j ect
.
3. EaLSE keov/ledge
There may be criticism of the use of such a term as
erroneous knowledge on the ground that knowledge to be knowledge
must be correct. The use is made for clarity. Strictly speak-
ing all knovvledge is true as distinguished froijj opinion, doubt,
error, and faith, but language imposes limitations. Thus to say
^Brightman, ITP, 309.
^lercier, MSP, I, 169.
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that 4 and 2 are 5 is incorrect addition is not accurate,
strictly speaking; it is not addition at all, but addition and
subtraction (of 1). Similarly the truth of knowledge Liay be
questioned without, quibbling over the use of a word. Immediate
knowledge cannot be false for if it were it would not be direct
knowledge. On the other hand the question of truth involves
demonstration—a mediate process of judg^ient.
E. OUTLINE OE QUESTION
Having distinguished our definition of terms of the
thesis from definition of the thesis, which constitutes the main
body of this paper, it is now necessary to outline the exact
question to be studied in the light of given meanings.
1. II.1IEUL.TE KiNiOVfLEDGE OCCURS
Existence of immediate knowledge, i.e. of the direct
presence of the known object to the knowing mind, is the first
point to be proved.
2 . llEDIi.TE KKO\/LEDah;
The presence of mediate knowledge, i.e. knov/ledge
about the object due to the psychological structure of the
.X
human mind, will be considered only incidentally. Consequently,
knowledge by judgirent in the formal sense is not at issue. The
aim is to prove metaphysically valid such a statement as "That
object is a green tree" and mean precisely that independently
of mind and its creations a green tree exists and when it is
knovm. it is known directly by a mind: the essence green tree
is one in mind and object, and the fact of knowledge makes no
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difference in the ontological status of the tree which is the
saiie before and after it is knovm.
Briefly, the objective, extra-nental validity of the
definition of the mind's object is the only acceptable proof of
the iniLiediate presence of an extra-mental object to a mind.
3 . PROCllSS INVOLVED
The psychological process, involving as it does
mediacy in the sense that knov;ledge is based on previous ex-
perience and iroriediacy in the sense that knowledge is spon-
taneous, is not an obstacle because it has no direct relation
to the epistemological question.^
i. The irrational identification of the mind with
I
I
matter will have to be considered in sunmary of objections to
certain systems, but, as will be developed, only for the purpose
of reconciling immediate knowledge v/ith metaphysical dualism.
Metaphysical dualism means simply that reality consists of mind
and matter, different entities.^
a. A superficial examination of the question v/ould
indicate that metaphysical monism offers the only possible form
of proof of immediacy in knowledge. Metaphysical monism implies
epistemological monism. The mind and object, from a monistic
point of view, are one. But this avoids the very pertinent
7question of which one they are.
b. Metaphysical dualism need not be interpreted as
uRyan, 1, 244,
^Brightman, ITF, 222-224.
"^Lovejoy. Art 1, 590.
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1
the opposite of netaphysical inonisn, which holes that the mind
and body are composed of the same material. Dualism of mind and
body need not deny the unity of body and mind, nor exclude sub-
stantial unity from man.®
j
ii. Metaphysical monism is rejected because of its
I
implications
;
experience reveals differences, betvveen mind and
jmatter. Freedom is unintelligible in a :.v monistic world,
i
•Although the theory v/ould substantiate a theory of direct knov/1-
edge, certain other facts v/ould be unexplained. It is the spirit^
1
of this investigation to reject any evidence which fails to
I
justify itself after investigation of its implications. Meta-
physical monism does not account for differences betvreen mind
and body."
4 . REIm^TION biTUDIFD
The problem to be attacked is: In an act of knowl-
'edge, when I say "That object is a green tree," what is the
relation of the knower and known? Mhy is it incorrect to say
"That object is my idea of a gi’een tree?"
i
I
i. The question is: Is my knowledge of the tree
[direct, indirect, or illusory? Do I actually take that tree
I
' into my mind? Can I validly assert I know that tree and not
I I
[merely an idea, representation, or copy of it?
I
ii. Direct knowledge can be defended.
by proving that there is in the tree an essence which is
the object of^the mind. Psychological analysis, in introspection.
'Ofurner, IIP, 358.
^Leighton, MAC, 363.
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vdll show that many objects as individuals are not directly I
I
known by the mind. Psychological, mediae y, which is caused by
I
the tirae element and brain processes, makes the reference of the
|
known essence to the particular object apparently indirect.
Nevertheless, when the act of knowledge is completed
the object known is the tree-in-itself
,
as it is such independ-
ently of the mind knowing it. No deduction is made from the
idea of the tree; rather tne knowledge of the individual is just
as true as the knov^ledge of the essence existing in every member
I
of the class, but it occurs later. i
iii. It would be absurd even to attempt to solve the
I
question of thing-in-itself apart from mind. Consequently, it
I
is not pertinent here to attempt a futile description of what a
tree night know itself to be in some non-cognitive sort of i
10
awareness.
iv. The aim of this thesis is to prove that knowledge,
of an object reveals the essence, the metaphysical status of
that object in itself, as opposed to the primary use of the tern
nature in the title of this thesis, which has the connotation of
meaning, a subjective fact. In other words, what the object
means to the mind on reflection has no necessary connection with
what the object is. Pragmatism, in its highest form, and
theories based on rational coherence as the criterion of truth
ignore the objective nature of entities. This is the root of
subjectivism.
10
Drake, ITP,29.
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Objects do not have a metaphysical relation totally
opposed to the mental organization of the kno\/ledge derived i
from them. If such were the situation, knowledge would be
impossible. But extreme epistemological dualism offers no valic
explanation of the world, despite its poetic interpretation of
mental life as an harmonious accompaniment to the symphony of
reality.
V. finally, no claim is made that knowledge of thin^tls
is exhaustive. Vdiatever is known is laiovai according to the
capacity of the know-er. This is not a retreat; it is the basis
for use of the word "limits” in the title of the thesis.
vi. The present v/riter, thanks, to Dr. Brightman’s
helpful and kindly criticism^^ takes this opportunity to attempt
to clarify several paragraphs. Before so doing, however, he
must insist that this thesis does not attempt to prove the
theory of the hew Realism. The present WTiter is not a pan-
objectivist, and he does not consider knowledge simply an aspect
of objects knovm. His vie\? is that interaction may be "blind",
that in dualistic theories it is blind, and thut all the dualist
claims to know is the ideas which emerge as conscious sparks of
the interlocking .machinery of reality. Interaction is unsatis-
factory as an explanation for the reason ti.at a completely in-
teracting universe would not necessarily conform to the defi-
nition of the universe which LUST exist if it is to make place
11
Dr. Brightman’s report as first reader of this
thesis
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for a moral order as v/ell as for physical, economic, social, and
aesthetic organization. The difference betv/een simple interaction
and direct comrr.unication is the same difference as betT/een organ'
ized activity and intelligent cooperation. The former class in
each part may be lacking intrinsic values, although necessarily
possessing certain instrumental values, v/hile the latter class
in each part of the comparison requires exclusion of all inter-
mediary data in the absorption of a direct union. The entire fi^ld
of immediate objects is not kno^/n at once; neither is co(5peratio|).
effected between one subject and the entire universe directly.
Each phenomenon exemplifying the theory of directness, or absolu|tj.e-
ly meaningful interaction, does so in virtue of the relation of
any one unit v;ith any other, thereby affecting the I'/hole
.
In kno\7ledge
,
the direct union is not far different f ro|(i
the ” intuit ion"’ of Bergson. Man, made up of mind and body,
becomes part of reality. The difference is that Bergson sees in
intuition the v/hole truth, ’’hile the present '^vriter regards
the direct presence of the object to the mind as the first step
in the metaphysic of knov/ledge
.
In a constantly changing world ,v/here in change sometimes
is regarded as the really fundamental reality, each thought
affects the whole being of the subject.
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Readers of this thesis must get the concept not so
much of completely integrated experience as the ultimate
reality, hut of, a completely integrated universe in which ex-
perience is intergrated v;ith all else. This need hot mean
metaphysical monism, which this waiter regards as untenable,
but an integration of dissimilar units into an objective,
unified whole. Identity is not essential to unity, nor is
similarity of essence a basis for inclusion, of necessity, of
objects within the sane class.
h'ith this clear concept of a universe completelj?-
integrated, abstracting for the sake of clarity, as well as
because of its irrelevance, from all thought of time, we can
nov/ proceed to the explanation of certain language used in this
thesis
.
12
a. Direct union aoes not imply metaphysical identity.
Consciousness is a function of the soul of man, but it cannot
operate except through the activity of senses.
By direct union is meant simply that the mind and
object become assimilated one to the other in the sense that the
essence of the object (essence being only a v/ord to stand for
tliat reality which is produced. .by the sum of the matter and forr,.
of the object) is iaentical with the concept (concept being a
word to stand for that mental jimEmoiL v;hich we characterize
as knowledge.)
In every object there is a soLiething which is what
'^^Gf. ants
,
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and 76

the object is. The "doorness" in every door is the same,
although the color, size, weight, and every other property may
differ from door to door. Now this '’doorness" is the direct
object of the mind. The properties of any door by this combi-
nation, their Juxtaposition, or however else, are combined in
the production of an objective reality knovm as door which is
something more than the sum of the parts and properties. It is
’’door” before it is ”a door.” Doorness is a real being; it is
the essence of the object. This essence in the thing and in
the mind are the same.
In dualistic theory, the object is a term of a
Judgment, but the term expresses an idea. In the theory here
offered, the essence experienced and immediately knovm is the
objective essence. Since, hov/ever, knowing is actively in the
subject, and to exclude all implication that the objective
essence is only causally related to the subject whose iuea of
the object is the result of self-experience, we say that the
objective essence is in the mind. This is union. We think the
subject of the Judgment is not an idea but an objective reality.
Unless the objective essence, whose existence in-
dependently of knowing is claimed in metaphysics, is v;hat is
known directly, the theory here becomes only a form of represent!
ative idealism or personalistic idealism. Hatter and fona are
objective realities, and essence is a product of matter and form,
That essence is independent of its relatedness to anything and
the relation does not modify it. As we said in aur definition
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of nature, essence is a v/ord used to express meaning in any
theory of knowledge, but in a realistic view meaning is not the
subjective understanding of an object that is only one aspect-
meaning in the sense of essence, is what the object means to
itself, its own self-integrity, regardless of its ever being
knovm by anyone.
The word tree is not a symbol for an idea; it is a
symbol for a real object v/hich is independent of anyone’s ex-
perience of it and even of the properties which make it up, ex-
ce'nt of the essential notes of matter and form, V/hether it is
called a tree, a sombrero, a baseball, or what-not, that w^ord is
human expression of an actual reality which is vvhat it is in-
dependently of vdiat v/e call it or v/hether or not we experience
it. The present WTiter freely admits that the necessity of
using language betrays the pure order in which objects and
subjects are related, but at a level far below the level of
language there is an intimate inter-connection .of objects
and in this reality subjects are among the objects which is
the initial step in metaphysics and the last in epistemology.
To this extent then we can agree with the Hev/
Realist: ’’Cognition belongs to the sar:ie v/orld as that of its
objects. It has its place in the order of nature.”-^ V/e need
not agree, however, that ’’there is nothing transcendental
about it,^^
l^Holt, m, 475
ISLoc. cit.
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.
b. The assertion that "The statement that ’the
essence of the green tree is one in mind and object’ v/ould be
true also of the most mediate and indirect Imowledge, if it
were veridical"^'^ is correct, and its truth is unquestionable
from the standpoint of its source. The fact of the matter is,
however, that the statement expi esses a dualist’s conception
of "veridical" v/hich is not acceptable to any realist who shuns
dualism, "Veridical" can never mean more than "workable" in a
dualistic view, but "veridical" to the adherent of direct
realism means absolutely, objectively, and uncondi tiona^lly true.
In the first place, dualists make their first error
in denying essence, except insofar as objective relativists
claim the relation of an object to a subject at a particular
standpoint gives essence. But even this essence is subjective,
and it has no truly objective status,
, If the pragmatic
test be taken as the ultimate, instead of as the mininun, then
it is true that dualism offers a satisfactory explanation. The
present v/riter does not believe in relativism; he believes
knowledge is of absolute fact.
Secondly, while knowledge reaches beyond the content
of experience, as idealists say,^^the type of knowledge ideal-
ists feel they have is far different from that claimed by
direct realists. V/hat reality is beyond experience for the
idealists is determined entirely by inference, and the attempt
ci*tBrightman’ s Reports
l^Loc. cit.
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I
to prove the result of inference conforras to reality as it is
is a task far beyond the powers of this student; it is a task
I
far greater than the comparatively simple explanation that what
I
I we know is known directly of reality. Unless we know directly,
it seems we might as well join those who assert we know nothing
beyond ourselves. And this road can lead nowhere but to
solipsism.
c. Unless the mind in knowing is joined directly
I with its object, and unless that object is an extra-mental
being independent of the knowing mind, knowledge can never get
beyond self-consciousness. Philosophers may amuse themselves
with highly decorated explanations, nay show that there is no
practical difference inasmuch as "v;orkability’’ is the ultimate
i
need of the human mind, may regard the unknov/n as the will of
God, as the mystical cause of sensations and ideas, or may
I
indulge in whatever other mental gyriinastics nay please them; but
I
i in the last analysis, and v/hen equivocation ends, the fact
1
i
remains that the dualist knows one world, his own, and lives in
I
another, the realist*. s •
I
Dualism has meaning only insofar aS it claims that
we knov/ experience from which we infer that something else
exists. Liberal dualists regard the inferred existents as
causally related to experience, and nay go so far as to assert
that what we know may resei.ible reality. But w^hen it comes to
explaining illusions of sense, dreams, and other unusual facts,
recourse is had to the convenient doctrine that we know things

as we are
,
not as they are. Man is not a unit made up o£ mat-
ter and form having two aspects of the same being.
The dualist is not unlike the theatre-goer v;ho reads th i
play but does not look at the sho\/. His ’’knowledge"’ of v;hat hap
is indirect, although it may be close to the fact; the direct
realist takes a seat and sees the play.
F . TITLP] RL-STATED
On the basis of the above definitions and explanations,
the title of this thesis may now be re-stated as follo\;s: The
human mind knov/s objects directly, but the knowledge is incom-
plete because of the limitations of human nature. Further, in
an act of knowing there is a union of the mind and extra-mental
reality, no;t a union of mind and symbol, or image, or appearance
The term union here is used to denote not a substantial
unity of oneness, indivisibility, for then some form of pan-ism
would be inescapable, but rather to denote unmediated by con-
sciousness if consciousness be defined as that Trom which the na'
of an object is inferred. This meaning is one of three possible
interpretations of unity, and will be developed in detail in the
16
chapters on the scholastic position.
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CHi^^'TER III
SOLIPSISI.
SolipsisLi, the ];]y5iJthesiSv-:. that the ”1*' alone exists,
is the first state of the reflective mind when it has recognized
the contrast betv^een consciousness and non-conscious objects.^
A. CONDITION OF LIND
Solipsism is best described as an attitude, of the
mind, not a theory of. knov/ledge.
1. FICTITIOUS v/ORLD
The solipsist alone can refute his position. No
amount of argument by fellow-selves, believed not to exist, can
convince the solipsist that he is knowing anything other than
his ovm personal experience.
i. Solipsism is -r-oat^4- in the belief that one’s ovm
experience is all there is. To be intelligible, to render the
solipsist himself a certain manner of..continuing existence, his
experience creates a fictitious v/orld in v/hich his experience
becomes highly organized,
ii. Assumption of some not-self is necessary for
refutation of solipsism, and this assui.iption can be Liade only by
the solipsist.
2 . POSITION IRREFUTi.BLE
The position is irrefutable. To consider all ex-
perience as one's ovra consciousness is a conviction v/hich ex-
^ Stace, TKE, 66,
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plains everything that can he explained in a relatively satis-
factory way.
i. Nothing that I experience can reach my conscious-'
I
ness except through my experience of it. I an conscious only ‘
of ny own experience. Consequently, assumption of the exist-
j
ence of other beings may be unv/arranted.
ii. Sven if I v/ere to assume the existence of other
j
i
beings, conscious and non-conscious
,
arguments presented to the
|
other supnosed conscious beings concerning the existence of non-
|
conscious beings would convince only me unless by some as yet ^
I
unknown manner of knov/ing I could prove the -existence of those
other conscious beings. Otherwise, I am simply making an
I
assumption.
Yet through it all runs the fact that all arguments,
all objects, all other beings are real-to-me only as a part of my
experience, I can never escape my own mind or knov; vdthout it.
l.Iy mind is an active agent without v/hich I can know nothing.
Therefore, everything I know is simply the content of my mind.
B. oOLIPBIoL
fortunately for philosophy, solipsists are few, and
none lives according to his convictions. The position is dis-
cussed here because it v/ill be found later to be a consistent
implicate of any system of knowledge which denies the innediate
presence of extra-mental reality to the mind.
1. CONDITION Of i IND
Although it v/as stated above^that solipsism is a con-
^Gf. ante, 26.
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dition of the mind and irrefutable, certain considerations can
be advanced to remove the condition and provide a basis for the
emergence of the isolated Naturally the emergence must be i
'
I
solipsistic in form, i.e,, the afflicted one must first consider
j
that the arguraents advanced may be only products of his ovm mind ,
Perhaps, indeed, will is more effective than reasoning in the
emergence
.
2 . KNOhThlDGE itiL8E
The point here, hov/ever, is that the immediate
I
knowledge which the solipsist maintains he has is not true
knov/ledge in the strictly philosophical sense since it aoes not
conform to the simplest definition of truth that can be devised,
nar.iely, a true judgr/ient is one that corresponds to reality.^
i. Certainly the solipsist will claim to have imme-
diate knowledge because he believes nothing mediates between the
mind and object. Sensations as such are mental abstractions.
The body is an illusion of the type of all physical realit^^.
Yet there is no object, strictly speaking. ii.s Larshall says,
”The no\7 of consciousness is all that exists, whether of .e or
of the universe for me.”^
ii. In the sense in v/hich immediate knowledge is de-
fined for this thesis, however, the experience has no status as
such because there is no extra-mental reality.
G. DUALISi: II.iPLIES SOLIPSISia
Solipsism, therefore, is mentioned only because it
^Brightman, ITP, 55.
"p.Iarshail, GOII, 2.
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raay be shown to be a logical implicate of extreme dualism. It
is irrefutable by nature because the arguments against it are
to the solipsist only figments of his ovra. experience.
Despite its unassailable position, however, solipsism
is far from the goal of any philosopher worthy of the name. It
is the negation of speculation, and no more eloquent refutation
of a system of thought is possible than demonstration that the
principles lead to solipsism, acknov;ledged or implied.
5>vlpern, NiiP, 196.
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GliriPTJiR IV
i:ONl;iLI AND DlL.Liai
The difficulties of defining the two general divi-
sions of thought, idealisn and realism, are so obvious as to
make an apology here unnecessary. The nuraerous sub-divisions of
each of the general views have in common only the fundamental
implication of the title of each respective classification;
idealism emphasizes mind; realism emphasizes matter.^
Actually certain forms of idealism have more in
common epistemologically with certain foims of realism than with
other forms of idealism. For example, idealistic dualism
(personalism) and critical realism have more in common in
epistemological theory than idealistic dualism and absolute
idealism. Likewise, New- Realism has more in common with abso-
lute idealism, which is its metaphysical antithesis, than with
critical realism. In each case judgment must be passed not on
i
the epistemological viev/ so much as the metaphysical view to
make a proper classification.
The four general epistemological positions are:
Idealistic monism, idealistic dualism, realistic monisi.i., real-
istic dualism. Since this inquiry is concerned with the questio^i
of immediate knowledge, and monism by definition implies that
knowledge is iramediate, we shall consider first the tv;o forms of
monism. Then we shall examine briefly the two forms of dualism.
"^Brightman, ITP, 230-2151.
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idealistic and realistic. The position to be defended lies
|
sonewhere between extreme dualism and extreme nonisriii Other '
theories also occupy nosit ions not readily identifiable with
I
extreme monism or extreme dualism. Thus, critical realism con-
siders universals real but knov/ledge relative to the perceiver’s
standpoint. Therefore, it is better consiaered under the study
2
of ’ . relativism.
Although this thesis seeks to prove that objective
reality is known directly and would seem to necessitate in-
clusion of this theory under realistic monism, there are suf-
ficient differences between the view here defended and the state-'
ments of the accepted school of realistic monists(New Realism)
to warrant separate treatment with a clear statement of dif-
ferences.
The present wTiter is doing no more than has been
done before in taking exception to certain phases of the neo-
r?
realistic doctrine and accepting other phases.*^ New Sealisn has
much in common vath Scholasticism.^ llany of the doctrines of
leading realistic schools, including besides the New Realism,
Critical Realism, and the view of critical realistic monists
offered by Macintosh, have much in common v/ith the position here
defended.'^
*
Hence, our first survey of the field will follow the
division outlined above. This treatise will be followed by a
’2cf. post, 57 ff,
^E.g.
,
Macintosh, PK, passim,
^i-ercier, MSP, II, 485.
^Macintosh, op. cit., passim.
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study of relative and a statenent of the ;:3cholastic position in
detail. The points of agree.ient betv/een the position defended
and other views will be stated. The concluding cnapter v/ill
contain a sui.imary of the chief points proved and a clear state-
ment of the probable nature and limits of immediate knowleage.
A. IDEALIoTIG IIOIIISI.
The terminology adopted for this treatment is con-
j
sistent with the definition of the view as "epistemological
I
monism and idealism.
j
I
The view is that the real object and the perceived
object are, at the moment of perception numerically one, and the
real object cannot exist at other moments independently of
perception.
It would seem from study of the definition that the
words in it v/ere chosen v/ith a care motivated by an unphilo-
sophical purpose: the inclusion of an ambiguity consistent vdth
the tv/o foiTiis of idealistic monism which actually have been
advanced. At any rate the definition is ambiguous, and advocates
of each of the two viev/s therein defined can be found in
prominent places in philosophical thought.
Under one interpretation a known object is a percept
causally related to the concept; under the other interpretation
I
the concept containing the knowledge is the cause of the percept,
In the former, the object of knowledge is identified
^h'oodbridge. Art. 1, 70 '6 ,
!
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i
I
I with the percept, while in the latter case the object is an
I
ideal which causes the percept,
i
j
1. LY3TICAL IIvIPLICATIOh
The theory that the object is identified v;ith the
!
percept giving rise to an idea of it is a form of mysticism
because the relation between the percept and concept is traceabl'::
to a mystical stimulation of the senses by a non-existent world,
t
i. The only object of the mind is a percept whose
I
I
origin cannot be rationally explained.
ii. v/hat is not in consciousness does not exist. An
object known is simply the percept as it occurs in consciousness,
9
2 , iiLTERNATTVS VISV
* The alternative theory of idealistic monism, that the
I,
'percept is the result of an idea, is indistinguishable from
.1
j
solipsism in its extremest forra. Although mysticism is a nec-
I
essary implicate of either viev/— since the origin of either idea
i .
;'or percept as the start of knov/ledge is inexplicable in rational
j
I
ilform—the theory v/hich describes knowledge as a relation between
j
I
percept (as beginning) and idea (as end) leaves a path to an
1
j
I epistemological dualism which can be supported v/ith excellent
!
j
arguments. This is close to personalism which considers
philosophy an interpretation of experience, knowledge being
limited to self,*^
i. Only the persuasion used to change the views of
the solipsist can be employed effectively against the idealist
I
^Brightman
,
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who clings to the theory that ideas born mystically in the mind
give rise to percepts.
ii. This form of idealism is closely identified v/ith
several widely held views. The emphasis is on ideas v/hich are
taken to represent reality. The dualistic concept of corres-
pondence is rejected, however, in favor of identity. Reality is
composed of the ideas knovm.
3. IDEiiLISTIG MONISI.I
Idealistic monism in either form faces an insurmount-
able obstacle in the continued, existence of objects not constant-1-
ly perceived. The reply that God constantly perceives them seems;
to demand an unwarranted stretch of imagination. That God is th^
cause of the continued existence of unperceived objects may be
granted. That they exist because he perceives them--a sophisti-
cally devised play on words v/hich cannot be refuted in ordinary
logical language—also must be admitted. But the raison d’etre
of objects is the v/ill, not the experience of God.
Hence, idealistic monism must be rejected because it
fails to account for the existence of a physical world. It is
contrary to ordinary common sense, and perverts the purpose of
1
1
'
I
ijphilosophy by erecting a mental world which it is impossible to
escape once the will has been subaued by a mind that refuses to
face facts of ordinary experience. Idealistic monism makes
experience everything. It lacks the vision even of extreme
dualism which, while fleeing the world, nevertheless admits it

I!
!
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D
is there independently of the mind.
B. MONISH
1 . SEVEIUL NOM.IS
Realistic monisri has several foms ranging from
Drake’s critical realisra and its dualistic iraplications to the
New Realisra as propounded in the cooperative volurae published
twenty-four years ago. Our sketch here is far more limited than
that of a great philosopher who defends another system lying
9
between extreme dualism ana extreme monism.
2. Nl.IlllRIO.il'I NN¥ RNi'J.ISI!
American New Realism is the type of monism to be
considered here. The merabers of the school are not in complete
agreement, and there are serious differences over the question
of consciousness between the American and the British schools.
1
The British concept of av/areness as a mental act is rejected by
the Americans in favor of a behavioristic explanation.^-^
i. The New Realism holds firmly to the theory that
in knowledge the knowing subject and the known object are numer-
ically one, and it appears, as an ansv/er to Love joy’s question,^
'^No attempt is made here to offer an
exhaustive refutation of idealistic
monism. The basis of the theorj^ is
metaphysical. As in examination of
other theories not defended, reasons
for their rejection will be little more
than suggested. Since only one theory
of knowledge can be correct, proof of
the scholastic position will be taken
as an implicit refutation of other views.
gMacintosh, PK, passim.
j_QRogers, SAP, 440
llGf. ante, 15.
ii
1
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that they are the object. This unquestionably is due to the
disregard New Realists have for consciousness. "There is noth-
. 12ing transcendental or supernatural about it.”
I
ii. Knowing does not affect knov/n objects; they are
13
independent of being knov/n.
i iii. The New Realisn, by eliminating consciousness as
j
i
a synthesizing force and making analysis the ultimate goal of
iknovjledge, cannot escape materialism. Analysis, it is held,
14
;
reduces all complexities to neutral entities.
Ii
IV. There is no room in the New Realism for the notion
lb
of substance. V/hat is known is a group of qualities in time-
space.^^
3. 0PF03KD TO DUALISl*
New Realism is opposed to all forms of dualism,
metaphysical as well as epistemological. It fails utterly to
account for the evident differences between physical and mental
facts. Thus we read:
As for a dualism of the ordinary kind
which regards the world as maae up of
two ultimately separate and perfectly
heterogeneous entities—objects and
consciousness— it not only offers no
explanation of their interaction, but
by its very terms it makes of such in-
teraction something that is miraculous,
if not impossible.
l2Eolt,l]R, 475,111, 2.
l^Ibid, 472, I, 2.
:^^'Ibid, 24.
I^Ferry, Art. 1, 103
^^I-.ontague
,
mrt. 1, 254.
^^Tbid.
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i. New Realisn denies the subjectivity of con-
j
sciousness and its difference fron other objects, holding that
consciousness is on entity reducible like other entities to the
status of a neutral being interacting v/ith other subsi stents.
In thus inplicitly denying the difference between mind and phys-
ical things, New Realism must be placed in the category of
materialistic monism.
ii. In its ardor to escape the agnosticism of dualism
New Realism falls into tne materialism of pantheism, t'he plural
ism of neutral entities having no existential validity. Con-
sciousness is not different in status from any other being. It
ft
"I
W
is subject only to the "nethous of empiricism and naturalism.
I
j
Hence, we reject New Realism, although the rejection
1
jis made reluctantly. Nev»r Realism’s chief contentions: that
!
I
objects are independent of mind; that relations are external and
the relation of the object to the minu does not change the
object;^'^ that objects are directly presented; that naive real-
ism is close to the truth; indeed, virtually all of the program
and first platform are acceptable to the scholastic. As was
stated in the introduction, the conclusions closely approximate
those of the scholastic vievf, and the differences are fundamen-
tally in metaphysical theory.
IGperry, op. Qit., 147.
l^Spaulding, x^rt. 1, 167.
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But even in knowledge the difference betv/een objects
actually perceived and objects nerely inagined or dreamt is not
made clear. ^
That knowled;:’e is fundamentally direct; that things
are knov/n before ideas of then; th£t a knowing process is not
its ovm object; all these important facts are held jointly by
New Realists and scholastics. The differences vdll be brought
out as the paper progresses,
C. IDkiXIBTIC iilTD Rk.lLIoTIG DUALIBh
(That branch of critical realism which considers
I
I
"essences” as not mental and exennlified by Durant Drake as an
!
I
advocate and ii.rthur E. Lurphy as an interpreter will be consid-
I
ered at length in the cha.pter on the limits of immediate loiov^l-
I
edge. Critical realism in any form is reducible to dualism, but
j
the particular types of dualism considered here are the avov;ed
!
doctrines of absolute epistemological dualists. Realists and
idealists are considered jointly because the epistemological
doctrines are similar, although the metaphysical implications
are vastly different.)
1. TIIEOIiY OE INDIRECT IdlC^/LEDGE
Dualism nay be characterized as the epistemological
theory that objects are not knov\7n directly, but are known by
analysis of iueas. These ideas, if they are coherent or work-
able, correspond to reality.
SOHyan, ITF, 199.
I
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2.
INDEPENDENT jEG:ETENOE ADI.ITTED
Dualisn differs from idealistic monisia in that it
acknov/ledges that objects "can exist at other monents independ-
21
ently of any perception."
3.
03JjiCT3 NOT EXPERIENCED
Eliereas monism, both realistic and idealistic, main-
tains that the experienced object and the real object are nuiaer-
ically one, extreme dualisn maintains that the^'' are t\:o, althougl
the real object may be the cause of the experienced object.
4.
FIVE. RiXi.LIbTIG TIL^ORIES
There are many dualistic theories. Dualistic realism
alone has gained wide acceptance in -five different forms. 22 But
all agree that what we know is an idea; the mind never reaches
realiiy directly, but learns about reality from its experiences.
The idea 'is knovm first; the nature of the object is inferred,
knowledge is hypothetical, relative.
5.
SPENCER’S VIEi;S
Spencer’s "unknov/able" and objective reality are the
i
jsame. There is no need for extensive references in Mbstantiat ion
{cf the assertions here made. The classification of certain
!
I
epistemological dualists and their acceptance of the classifi-
1
ieation are ample proof that they confess to the belief that ob-
I
jljective reality as it is cannot be knovm. Experience is sub-
1
i
jjective, and ideas are the content of experience.
^pToodbridge
,
nrt. 1, 703,
.gprake, IT!P.^X67.-..182 ,

6. REJilCT DUALIEL
,
V/e therefore reject episteriological dualisra, either
realistic or idealistic, in our search for the nature and limits
of immediate knowledge. The limitation in dualism is the self
from which the dualist cannot escape, no matter how sure he is
that an objective world, independent of perception, exists.
D. I,:ONISTIC DUnLISll
Having rejected the ordinary forms of monism and
dualism, we turn now to a study of a realistic philosophy which
has rightly been called a "monistic dualism.
1. IvIETiiPKYSIC.JL DUiiLISM EVIDENT
Hetaphysical dualism is accepted as evident. The
identity of the object knovm and the real object v/ill be proved
as necessary if knowledge is to be true.
2. COIIPilEISON OEEERED
Hollowing an exposition of the main doctrines of the
scholastic position, a comparison with other theories will be
made
.
2b
V/alsh, Art.l, 55.

CliiLF'TIiR V
TKE LIIilTS OF Il liEDIATF KIIO\iIADGE
A. lilATHFi.IE LiOKIijI.i URTFNaBLF
Idealistic nonisn and realistic monisrii are unten-
able theories, the former leading to solipsism or agnosticism,
the latter to irrational materialism.
1 . IDEALISM ERRS
Idealism, monistic or dualistic, frankly adr;iits
that the knov/er can never reach beyond his mental content.
There can be no direct knov/ledge of a mina-independent reality
because in one case there is none and in the other it is un-
knowable. AS Nevi^ Realism has held, interaction becomes inex-
plicable and, even if it occured, it need have no meaning,
direction, or end.
2. ORIGIll OF IDEAS ilYSTERY
The two general forms of monistic idealism describ-
ed in this paper consider knowledge either the consciousness
of mysteriously received percepts or the causation of percepts
by mysteriously received ideas.
i. In one form the mind is a passive faculty whose
only function is to become av/are of certain percepts. The in-
dividual then acts as if the percepts had an objective basis.
ii. In the other form the subject is considered as
an active element in creation, a person v/hose mental operations
actually cause objects and the laws for the activity of those
objects.

3. iNlEUTRiiL ENTITIES VAGIIH:
Lonistic realism fails to account for self-identity
and consciousness. Neutral entities are ever elusive.
j
B, DUrJ.ISM UNSATISI'ACTORY
I
Dualism, whether idealistic or realistic, fails to
i
i
give a rational account of experienced objects. It is admitted
: that it explains experience, but it fails to explain the ex-
perienced, V/e are speaking here, of course, of epistemological
dualism in its extreme form. Dualism sets up a barrier betv/een
mind and extra-mental reality by supposing that all we know is
__
experience, as distinguished from extra-mental reality. It
accounts for error—for the inaccurate knowledge of things— but
it does not account for truth—the independence of objects and
our knovdedge of then,^
1. OBJECTIVITY QUESTIONED
The simple syllogism proving Socrates’ mortalit 3'-
has no metaphysical validity in any ultimately dualistic system.
While it is true that dualists act contrary to the inevitable
conclusions of their ovm premises, the reason is pragmatic, not
I
metaphysical.
i. Logical validity cannot be a test of metaphysical
structure unless metaphysical reality can be directly knovm.
It is manifestly impossible to demonstrate the ”mind-wise” struc-
ture of reality'-.
ii. The assumption that metaphysical truth in some
Hlontague, Art, 1,232,
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manner parallels logical truth, even analogously, is unv/arranted,
2. KLL DUaLISL: IDEaLI;:>TIC
Despite its denials realistic dualism is reducible
to some form of idealism because the existence of a physical
world cannot be demonstrated satisfactorily in any view v/hich
places an insumountable barrier between the mind and physical
nature
,
C. THE NEV;- iCHOLiiSTIC POSITION
The New- icholastic position, which it will be the
' purpose of the remainder of this thesis to defend, can be stated
‘briefly as follows; Ihiowledge of reality is imiaediate, it is
I
not mediate or inferential.
1. IDEAS APE ilE/djS
It is granted that ideas are the means to knowledge,
but knowledge is not of ideas. The distinction is betv/een the
ideas as id quod and id quo .
i. The mind is united to reality by ideas, but the
reality is known first (immediately) and the ideas only by re-
flection. That by which the mind is joined to reality is nothing?
more than a mediura. Nediuii, by definition, is a conjoiner; it
is not one of the terms of unity.
ii. To make the idea of the object the object of
the mind is to condemn Nev; icholasticism to a forra of represent-
' ative idealism an epistemological dualism not consistent v/ith
other phases of the New- ichol&stic view.
2.
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I To iiaintain that the object of
I
our intellect is the idea of
j
being which it forms in itself
is to deliver oneself bound hand
I
and foot to skepticism.^
In this thesis, however, the simple assertions of the scholastic
view will be given no more consideration than simple assertions
of other viev/s; they must be based on a relation to the premises
involved.
!
I
2. IDKi.S lKE signs
I
Ideas as a means to knowledge are not instruraents
I
in the ordinary sense. Such a meaning would make the ideas
Imown before the objects kno\m. Kence, for the sake of clarity,
many scholastics substitute the term sign for instrument and
make a three-fold distinction, viz,, natural signj^e. that which
I
by its nature is connected v/ith something else, as smoke is with
fire; arbitrary sign, i,e. that which is not connected by nature
I
with the object of which it is the sign but which is suggestive
of it, as AAIl suggests to mind the constitution; formal sign,
i.e. that which leads to a knowledge of the thing signified witb
out itself rising into consciousness. It is this third meaning
of sign which is applied to ideas.
Tlius does the modern scholastic justify the state-
ment that an idea can be id quo (that by which) an object is
known without being id quod (that which) is knovra. directly.
^I.Iaritain, ITP, 186.

3 ESSENCE KNO^oN
In an act of knowledge the essence of the object
known is united vath the knowing mind. The essence is the nature
the objective, ultimate being of the object, the ground for the
universal which can exist fomally only in the mind.
i. The first proposition to be seen here is that
universals have a foundation in things.
a. Universal iaeas exist fomally in the mind, but
i
'they have a foundation in things as the essence. Hence, while
we have direct knov/ledge of the essence (quiddity, v/hatness) of
the object, v/e know the individual object as such and in detail
only after knowing the essence. This limitation of direct
knowledge does not, however, render it valueless; rather the
implications of the view are vital to the theory of knowledge
I
for tvro reasons: (1) bliat is yielded in direct knowledge is the
nature of the external object as it is independently of the
knowing mind; (2) ihiov/ledge of individuals is valid only if the
I
foundation of the knov;ledge is due to an indestructible union
^
of mind and object through an unconscious^ medium. V^lien the in-
dividual is knov/n, it is knovm indirectly from the standpoint of
psychology, but directly from the point of view of epistemology.
This means only that the real tree known is known as it is.
Knowledge of the individual is said to be indirect, not in the
I
Idualistic sense, but in a nsychological sense.
I
j
b. Although there is apparently indirectness in
‘knowledge of individuals this does not affect the quality of the
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iknowledge. It is due to limitations of human nature. linowledge
of individuals is indirect only because of the psychological
structure of the mind. The result is the direct presence of the
object as conceived by common sense to the knowing mind. It is
a general belief of all modern scholastics that "whatever is
received is received according to the model of the receiver."
I
ii. The limitations of sense do not imply that v/hat
|the senses perceive is false. It means merely everything about
! an object is not perceived.
4. SOLhi KliOV.XEDGE Ih^FEREhTI^
|t
Objects of intellectual knowledge are contained in
objects of sensuous knowledge. Consequently it is evident that
I
knovvdedge of God, self, past, and future events, and abstract
'terms is inferential. There are no subjective fonris, such as
'Kant believed in."^ Such knowledge is arrived at by inference
from loiown truths based on experience of sensible things, and as
i
complexity is' ever more vulnerable than simplicity—throughout
creation so is knowledge indirectly acquired less certain than
i
direct knowledge, as experience will prove.
Even the slight indirection forced upon knov/ledge
of individuals, because of the complexities imposed by psychol-
ogical traits of the human personality, leads to error. Such
error can be avoided, however, upon satisfaction of all the
essential conditions of valid knov/ledge, namely, a knowing mind,
an object, and a proper relation betv\reen the The explana-
3i.'ercier, liSJ
.
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II, 455-456.
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B
tion of error is sinply that it is clue to absence of proper,
i.e. normal conditions or sufficient presence of objects knovm,
i. That knov/ledge of God is indirect is evident
from the various theories of His nature, and even concerning His
existence. The root of difference lies in inference from knovm
! facts. Negation and analogy have important places in description
I
'
,,of the nature of God.
[
I
ii. The nature of God is described in analogous and
I
negative terras, evidence that differences are based on the in-
' direct process of inferring.
i
I
Only the ontologists and mystics hold to a direct
1
{knowledge of God’s existence. The wealmess of the former con-
jsists in its appeal to an innate idea or an unwarranted trans-
ition from the ideal to the real order. The weakness of the
I
jmystics’ position consists in failure to recognize that the
{object— God— is explained as a cause of the state. This is
closely related to idealism. The conclusions of both mystics
and ontologists nay be correct, but the preraises do not v/arrant
i
the conclusions. Even if the conclusions were warranted, they
1
j
would be products of the mediate process of reasoning.
I
iii. Knowledge of self is indirect.
i
I a. The soul fundamentally is the substantial form
I
i of the complete person, body, mind, and will. Its essence is nc:
}
i
thought, but rather the pov/er of uniting with the body in con-
I
r*
' stituting the human being.
^
s
’S^ercier, I.isr, I, 261.
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b. Activity of the soul in thinking is dependent
;
upon internal or external sensible experience. Psychological
I
jprocesses are involved in brain and mind activity, and the mind
would be inactive v/ithout physical activity. The fact of proces£i
in perception and knowledge, however, has nothing to do with the
fact of knov/ledge and its directness.^
c. Agreement upon this point is universal, as far
as the purpose of this paper is concerned. Theories of parallel-'
ism, pre-established harmony, and idealism in the last named
of which the body is a datum of the self—agree with the functior.
al point of view except as to the nature of interaction. There
are many theories of interaction between mind and body, from the
extreme dualistic theory of Descartes, for whom soul and body
were separate, to the Behaviorism of Watson in which soul and
body are identical.
d. \/ithout first having a body the soul v/ould be
I
I incapable of thinking. It has the capability of thinking but
i
'requires sensible experience as a requisite for causing the
progress of this capability into actuality. In other v7ords the
I
j
capability for thought does not constitute thought. Vvhatever
j
determines the soul to thought about itself, and this is activity
'Of the brain and nervous system, servos as the basis for in-
ference of the nature of the soul. In other v/ords, the soul is
knovm by inference based on a study of psychological processes.
^Ryan
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Note 1: If the soul v^rere av/are of itself, if it
were possible for direct knowledge of the self as an object of
self, extreme dualism would be inescapable. The soul would be
no more than the content of consciousness at any given time.
It is difficult to see how anything else could be proved to have
reality, since the mediation of sensible processes would be un- -
necessary. Hov/ then could one assert that all reality was not
simply an expression of the nature of self known directly and
containing all reality? The distinction between such a conse-
quence, based on belief in direct knowledge of the self, and
solipsism is difficult, if at all possible, to see.
Note 2: A person is an individual comj)Osed of
body and soul and endowed with reason."^ Since the time of
Descartes, personality has been confused with self-consciousness
i|
This theory makes the unusual demand that we consiuer the person
either a thinking substance or a chain of thoughts. In the foiri^;
case, no explanation is given of interaction with body except as
a relation ofparallel entities. In the latter case, interaction
I
with the body is no more than a metaphorical term since the in-
jteraction is no more real than with any other corporeal matter.
i
I
iThus in sleep personality is gone. In death, personality
I
^
!
[survives, not because the soul is not intrinsically dependent
i
ion the body and therefore not affected by the dissolution of the
1
inody,® but because God continues nersonality in existence with-
ji
'out a body by some mysterious means.
VLlercier, I.ISP, I, 312,
Qlvlaher, PSY, 553.
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Note 3: The important agreement of all but be-
lavioristic thinkers, hov/ever, that there is physical and non-
physical, i.e. at least non-spatial, activity, affords a common
Dasis for analysis of the knowledge process.
Personality is a real thing; man is more than a
Machine reacting to environment, and consciousness is not simply
3ub-vocal mutterings, a phenomenon of certain beings. Sven
oehaviorists regard the theory that thought is. .a bodily function
IS a convenient assumption,® Bren to those who lean strongly toward:
psycliism, organism, and other theories of harmonious reality in
AThich non-living things have non-conscious "feelings" of one
another as vrell as of conscious things, human personality has a
special place elevated by reason of consciousness which has the
power of escaping the physical limitations which matter v/ould
Impose on matter.
iv, Khovrledge of past and future events is based on
memory stimulated by experience of a recent object, by absence
Df attention to a present object—as in reverie—or by the sub-
conscious aspect of the mind about whose nature, by definition,
we can know nothing. The real event of the past or future,
recollection of an object seen or to be seen, must be indirect
since' it is loiovm only through imperfect representation. In any
theory of knov/ledge what is not present cannot be perceived
directly. The truth of the contradictory of this proposition
would lead to absurd consequences, among them the greater re-
’^V/atson, P3B, 526.
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liability of absent than present objects of thought, or at least
equal status. It is not implied here that knov/ledge of past or
future events need be false or less accurate than of present
events. The point is that error may result more easily because
of the process of mediation involved. The process is not
epistemological but psychological. The truth of Napoleon’s
death is just as true as that this machine is a typewriter. The
’’immediate’' aspect is not affected, but knov;ledge about the type-
tvriter, direct and indirect knowledge, is less likely to be
erroneous than knov/ledge about Napoleon’s death. The fact that
the latter did not come under my observation makes this certainly
no more problem for me and my theory than for the extreme dualist
»vho also v/as deprived of the experience, iictually, finding the
ieath of Napoleon in self-experience seems to be quite an
achievement
.
V, Knowledge of abstract terras, e.g. love, duty,
3tc., as opposed to universals which are derived from things, is
indirect for reasons advanced in section iii. These terms denote
a temporal interpretation of given facts based on sensible object
'Jniversal terns as such, or rather the concepts which those terms
express, constitute the matter of direct knov/ledge. Abstract
lerms meant here are those expressing the result of reasoning
processes which may be highly involved and which nay be based
more in feeling than in intellection. This position is based on
;he theory that reasoning has an important role in practical
mowledge, that Intuition is at most an elementary prenoetic
iitate, and that only the mediation ofreason can supply the basis
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of aesthetic appreciation, moral conduct, and logical judgment.
Intuition as a criterion in practical or theoretical matter is
inadequate. "The New-Thomist, like the Wew-Realist
,
believes
that we apprehend universal values more by intellectual effort
than by mystical intuition.
. . The universal knovm directly by the intellect
when confronted by a sensible object is not vague. It is not a
picture, but it is not vague. It is clear to the mind, a definit
concept; e.g. man. On the other hand, the concept "all men" is
vague because it implies knowledge about men is to be asserted.
It is a universal, not in the sense that material conditions are
absent, but as a quantitative extension of the basis of the type
universal. For this reason, the concept man is not so vague as
I
the concept most men. lian is a concretP., individual entity,
realized in an individual object but conceivable as stripped of
.material conditions. The universal as such is the noumenon
which Plant maintained could not be knovm, although in some unex-
plained manner the forms for interpreting it could be known and
corresponded in some way to reality, The universal re and
in intellectu is identical, it is that to which the mind is joined
in knowledge. It exists as a universal ,that is, stripped of
material conditions—in the mind, but it has its foundation and
exists fundamentally in things.
’l^Evans, IIROK, 158, 159 .
^Aveling, GUI, 41, 42.

D.- 3IL3^L£ i’^PI^EKEKSION GIVES nilEDIATE laxfOWLEDGE
1, There are three acts of the mind: simple
i
I apprehension; judgraent; reasoning. Judgment and reasoning are
i
mediate processes expressed in one or more propositions. Truth
I
!
of judgment and reasoning does not affect the issue of this
I
thesis which is concerned vath the nature of the terr:is which
1
’ make up the propositions. It is our purpose to show that simple
i apprehension puts the mind into direct contact with the objects
i
of simple apprehension and that this relation is direct union.
Judgment about the object follows apprehension of it
It is usual to consider truth as a quality of a proposition
! only, but this would leave immediate knowledge neither true nor
I
false. It may be objected that the mind must either affirm or
deny the correctness of the apprehension as related to the
object, but this is to erect an insurmountable barrier of a
I
solipsistic tinge. Judgment of the correctness of identifica-
tion is a complicated process outside the simple question of
the validity of the concept as an expression of the real object.
2. NOT COMPLETE TRUTH
Simple apprehension never yielas complete truth.
O^uotations from authors not in general agreement, except on this
issue, best illustrate the scholastic position:

Apprehension is the act of the mind
so far as it neither affirms nor denies
but merely places an object before
consciousness The object before the
mind must be, of course, the object
before the mind; just as what a man
his eyes, that he sees,
though he should, by a mistake
sees, v/ith
even
in inference, proceed to naiiie it
vn?ongly.
IJote 1: iin immediate objection very probably will
be raised here that this proves v/e have real knowledge, i.e.
true knowledge, only by thinking about the given and inferring
its nature. This objection can be ansv/ered only recalling the
conditions of valid knowledge ,-^*^a knomng subject, a knowable
object, and the suitable disposition of the one to the other,
i.e. union.
Note 2: Simple apprehension is not divorced from
judgment in any actual manner. They are closely related. Any
judgraent given as an identification of only one term, and that
furnished by simple apprehension, is true when the conditions
for valid knowledge are fulfilled. Otherv/ise the concept of
iiimiediate knowledge as well as the concept of simple apprehensio
would be meaningless. Such an elementary judgiaent as This ob jec
is a tree is necessarily true if the conditions under which the
tree was experienced are normal. The tree is Imown as it is.
Objective evidence is furnished the mind. Yet on a dark night,
error could be made in identification, but the reason cannot be
assigned to the representative nature of our knov/ledge, but
I^Rickaby, YP, 16
AntQ f 46 >—

55
father to a...violation of the conditions. The simple apprehen-
sion in any event is correct; assigning existence is an act of
judgment, and to claim judgments of existence to be alv/ays
correct would be to attempt to disprove the actual experience
of every person. The scholastic position on simple apprehension
stated by Rickaby is clear. The real object is as it is pre-
sented to the mind. It is assimilated by simple apprehension.
ICnowledge of things v/hen it is of the
kind we call knowledge by acquaintance
is essentially simpler than any knowl-
edge of truths and logically independent
of knowledge of truths, though it would
be rash to assume that human beings ever,
in fact, have acquaintance vdth things
vdthout knowing some truth about them,^"^
So far as things are concerned, we may
know them or not knov; them, but there is
no positive state of mind which can be
described as erroneous Imowledge of things, so
rate,- as v;e confine ourselves
to knowledge by acquaintance.^^
E. IvIONISIvI iilTD DUALISI.l
1. MONISTIC ELSI.n5iIT
The monistic element in the scholastic position is
il
: limited to simple apprehension. That there are differences
I
I
;
among modern scholastics, vdth many inclining tov/ards represent-
ative idealism, cannot be denied, but the present writer has
chosen to follow the traditional view based in the teachings of
St, Thomas,
-Russell, FOP, 72.
-*-^Ibid, 186,
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LII.IITS ELj'HilSia^D
In this chapter, v;hich has sought to set forth
linits of inmediate knowledge, it is well, for a re-assertion
of the main position and to ansv/er possible charges that retreat
has been ordered, to quote an eminent scholastic authority at
length. After refuting idealism in all forms, he continues:
Philosophers believing in some sort of an
independent Hater ial World, v;ho maintain
that the mind can only attain to a knowl-
edge of such a v/orld mediately as an in-
ference from the ideas, or subjective
representations, of v/hich alone we are
immediately cognizant, have been styled
Representationalists
,
Realists
,
Hypo-
thetical Dualists or Cosmothetic Idealists
,
since they look on the external universe
as a necessary hyi^othesis to account for
the ideas of which we have an immediate
perception* All these authors err in the
one common but groundless assumption that
the human mind can immediately know nothing
but its own unextended states. Starting
with this false hypothesis, their theories
give no adequate account of our knowledge
of extension, and logically lead to sub-
jective idealism.
In complete opposition to all represent-
ationalists are to be foun(?j.,all the
leading scholastics-^ and modern,
and in this country during the past
hundred years, Reid, Stewart, and Hamilton--
ixll these philosophers. .hold that man, at
all events in some cognitive acts, apprehends
extended material reality. . , .Recently some
Nev/-Scholastic v/riters seem disposed to
abandon the fundamental scholastic position
and to adopt a theory of mediate perception;
whilst they would oppose idealism and justify
our belief in an external world by the
principle of causality.
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As the v7hole strean of modern sub-
jectivism has sprung from the Cartesian
assumption that the mind directly knows
only its own ideas, the new attempt does
not seem very hopeful. Respecting its
proofs of realism: (1) The principle
of causality, as derived by these v/riters
from analysis of ideas excluding all ex-
ternal experience, can never adequately,
prove that the cause of our sensations is
extra-mental. (2) Still less can it prove
the validity of cognition. . .that our
knowledge resembles, reflects, or reveals
the nature of such an external cause
Representational ism can never get beyond
the transfigured realism of Spencer, with
its theory of syiabolical knowledge involv-
ing fundamental agnosticism.^^
R. THE STATUS OF THE RELATIVE
1 . EXTRET.rE VIETVS
The extreme viev;s of the question of relativism
i
I
in knowledge have affected not only the epistemological question,
at issue, but have led often to metaphysical conclusions which
are contrary to even common sense, not to mention mature
judgment. Koderate idealism or dualistic realism are reasonable,
if not universally acceptable, but in many instances over- or
j
under-emphasis of the relative has caused alarming metaphysical
, conclusions.
I
i 2. PMYSICii \vORLD L.EIEGTSD
On the one hand, extreme idealism has led to a re-
jection of the world except when perceived. Verbal denial does
not alter the fact that esse is percipi means nothing more than
^l^Iaher, PSY, 102, 105, and 124.

58
i
* 1
\
1
i
!
j
j
j
j
i
that to be is to be perceived. V/hat is not perceived is not.
To refer to God as the perceiver in the absence of perceiving
hur.ians is to retreat fron the epistemological battleground and
to seek refuge in a village under the constant fire of. lack of
universal faith. In the last analysis, belief in God is a matte]
of faith, and even for those who believe in God it must seem un-
reasonable that He would ask non-believers to have faith that
He presumably non-existent—sustains the world when it is not
perceived.
How much mors reasonable to suggest ercioi is esse,
\.'ith the provision that valid knov/ledge necessarily be limited
to direct kno^/ledge and the proper use of data given in direct
knov/ledge. There appears ro be no need for mysticism in ordinary
life. Instead of explaining av/ay the v/orld, idealists and dual-
ists v/ould do v/ell to attempt to bring the \7orld to man, as a
17loving God presumably vrauld.
3. HELaTIVH STHHS3HD
The most extreme realistic epistemological monism
is the Ne\7 Healism, but even in this modern development consid-
eration has been given the relative in knov/ledge. Thus v/e find
"still further reflection on the phenomena of error leads to the
discovery of the element of relativity in all knowledge
.
4. 3GH0L..STIG SYoTEI- 3i^.TI3TYIHG
The position of scholasticism in modern consider-
ation of the relative in knov/ledge is a key to a satisfying
^^Gf. ur'^ddenduii, 170
.
iSKolt, rlR, 2.
r
1

philosophy.
i. Betv/een the two extremes of Kew Realism and
pessimistic dualism lies the scholastic theory that union of
object with mind is a unique union in which the object loses
nothing but gains the mind’s power of becoming: the object.
Identity is not the same as union; identity, at least nuiiierical
identity v/hich implies destruction of one thing in its becoming
the other, destroys the concept of union in favor of an impossib;:
unity. This is especially so in considering the identification
of an immaterial mind with material objects.
ii. On the other hand, artificial union, made only
of arbitrary association of one thing with another, does not
e
penetrate to essences and as a basis of knov/ledge cannot yield
i
'validity. No clearer statement of the unconvincing, opposite
I
position has been given since the tine of Gpencer when he said:
i
If X and Y are tv/o uniformly connected
properties in some outer object, while
IX and B are the effects which the 3?'
produce in consciousness; the sole need
is that IX and B and the relations between
them shall alv/ays answer to X and Y and
the relation between them thejLr total
dissimilarity is no disadvantage
a. Knowledge nay be relative in the sense that it
is not complete, without implying that v/hat is known is untrue.
In Ck)d alone exists perfect laiowledge because then the object of
^^Nontague, Art. 1, 264,
^^Spencer, FF, 72-73.

knov;ledge is identical v/itli the process. God is Pure ^^ct; there
is no potency in Hin, God’s ideas truly are the cause and sole
detemining principle of things, while our iaeas are deternined
by things.
b. What for Spencer is unknowable is unknowable
I
I
I
absolutely and completely, but is knowable relative to our cap-
acity, not to our ability-to-lcnow. How much can be knovm is
determined only by our capacity to grasp, but v/hatever it is it
is true of reality as it is.
c. The menace of disguised Spencerian thought in
modern philosophical schools has been frequently cited. Typical
is this statement:
A deeply rooted prejudice which involves
the far-reaching assuraption that knowledge
is essentially relative, and as such
essentially modifiable, has come to color
all speculation on the knowledge problem
even where it has not shaped our views
concerning the nature of knowledge itself.
Besides idealisia, extreme epistemological dualism,
pragmatism, and all other popular theories that knowleage is
only a form of self experience which may not correspond essentia]
ly with reality, buG only harmoniously if it corresponds at all,
a new view of the problem has been given under the captivating
title of Objective Helativism, Dewey recognized that monism
land dualism in their usual fonas do not exhaust the possibilities
I
j
-
^ ^^Ryan, ^«.rt. 2, 19 •
‘^Dewey, RP, 112, lib. i*lso, Cf. Dewey, RF, 124*
O’
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”If a man wants to knov/ something the last thing he does is I
merely to contemplate He proceeds to something, to bring
some energy to bear up on the substance to see how it reacts
—
Probably not being familiar with the scholastic mean, he seems
to align himself with the school of objective relativists.
Objective Relativism is Professor j-irthur E, Kurphy of Brown
University. A keen student of the new physics and its philo-
sophical implications. Professor llurphy has written at length
on the relativity of the objective, basing his theory on the
I
thoughts of Dewey and Alfred North ATiitehead. He brands as
I
invalid the traditional separation of nature from ideas, althougli
he sees between the tv/o the sharuest antithesis v/ith v;hich con-
1
! temporary philosophy has to deal.^^ His alternative is ”a
thorough-going relativity of character and existence, a duality
of objects and events,
it is perceived. The quality is not an extra-mental object ex-
cept as it is perceived.
ists that the quality is objective
—
providing, however, that it
is perceived. In other v/ords the location of the quality—the
relative element, if such there be— is objective, but only v/hen
perceived.
iii. Perhaps the most outstanding spokesman for
a. Objective relativists concede to the dualists
that a perceived object has the quality perceived only because
b. Objective relativists concede to the objectiv-
195

This seeming contradiction disappears when one con-
siders that no one maintains that qualities can be proved to be
objective Vt^hen not perceived; on the other hand no one maintains
jat least outspokenly, that perceived qualities are not perceived
in relation to something other than the mind.
This relation becomes the essence of the object
knov/n. Follovang the realistic inclination of modern philosophy
'Objective Relativism postulates objects existing independently
of mind, and then forgets them for the objects of perception
—
the objects relative to the mind, but somehow objective.
Now v;hile qualities are relative to perception,
since color is perceived, the only guarantee that one man’s ex-
perience of color is the sane as another man’s experience of the
same color is the objectivity of the object experienced. It is
essential, to explain every day knowledge, to depart from the
Spencerian relativism, in which every subject might have ex-
periences entirely dissimilar from though harmonious arbitrarily
vdth everyone else’s, to make the qualities objective.
Y/hat v\re directly perceive are qualities
and any such quality is timeless in the
sense that it is repeatable and so far
universal. Its nature as quality is not
constituted by the circumstances of its
occurrence, and, hence we may call it an
’eternal object. ^5
Lurphy, Art 1, 200.
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1
This is another statement of the view that -essence
is timeless; it is distinct from existence. "If the essence is
truly the essence of the object, as it should be in order that
knowledge may be correct, the essence given and the essence in
the object are not two but one."^^
the
That/relative is objective may be stated thus:
The relation is an objective relation between a knovmng mind and
a quality, causing an objective relation possible only from the
standpoint at which the perception is possible. If the quality
did not exist independently of the mind, it would not be a term
in a relation between mind and object, end v/ould never become
present before consciousness.
c. It is nov/ quite clear why Objective Relativists
! limit the essences of the objects—that is the fundamental
1
universal—to qualities, or adjectives. The existence of objectsi
containing the qualities is denied, leaving a universe of inte-
I
'grated qualities, but no substances,
' iv. It would appear that knowledge in Objective
rRelativism is limited to sense knov/ledge, and that metaphysical
'
I
^dualism is excluded. Yet the function imposed on the physical
in perception— the experience of the abstract--would seem to en-
dow the human personality with some sort of a self independent
or at least substantial with the pov/er of perceiving. The mind
seems to be given a function not easily seen consistent v/ith the
theory of pan-objectivism or this new pan-relativism.
"^Ostrong, Art, 1, 241 Of, also Drake, ^rt . 1, 26,271
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V, llurphy denies the existence of substance as
I
' such in objects, although giving relations between subject and
I object an existence not far different from the ordinary meaning
of substance. In other words, essence is conceived in relation
and qualities constitute the v/hole of the object. Despite a
distinction between the object itself and the sura of its quali-
ties, the object remains a pseudo entity.
j
’’The qualities are not the existent, to be sure,
P 7
I
but they are its v/hole nature, and it has no other.”
vi . Objective Relativism seems to reverse the usual
Lockian relativism, that qualities are subjective, at least
secondary qualities, and are given to things by the mind, by
suggesting that qualities are objective and the substances,
'things, are projected by the mind. Qualities can be directly
I
.perceived but the subject of qualities has a unique, non-exist-
jent being.
vii. Objective Relativism is iraportant to the
scholastic because it reveals the impossibility of making the
ordinary datum
—
quality—universal. Qualities are particular,
limited by the essence in which they occur. The foundation of
the universal tree may be in the green tree, but green as a
universal is a distortion of thought. Green is a quality. If it
were the universal v/e should know green without knowing the green
\
tree, for green tree in itself would have no single nature.
^'^l-urphy, op. cit., 202.
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Recognition of the relative element in knowl-
I
edge and the absurdity of endowing quality, the datum, with
I
universality has been given by a leading realist of the school
i
of Critical Realism:
iOi essence is a universal this sense
,
viz.
,
that precisely the same essence
may conceivably be a datum of conscious-
ness over and over again. It is not a
universal in the sense in which the term
is contrasted with a particular. \/e have
spoken often of the data of perception
as * concrete universals.’ They are just
as particular, and specific, as they seem
to be.*^®
ix. All the difficulties of other theories of direct
knov/ledge are experienced in Objective Relativism, and the v/ay of
escape from the difficulties of erroneous knov/ledge is not clear,,
While the relative is the essence of the relation between the
mind and its object
—
quality, it is assumed that a standpoint is
taken for experiencing the object and in this standpoint some
element is not relative to the percipient. Love joy says:
i
!
1
i It is assumed that a standpoint is a
I
point for viewing something external
I
to the standpoint, and that many points
j
. of view may somehow have a common locus
of reference. From my point of viev/ the
penny may appear elliptical, from yours,
circular; but the phraseology implies
that the sane object, or at least the
same region of space or space-time, is
in some sense being viewed by both of
us; if this were not implied, the term
"point of view" would be meaningless.^^
^®Lrake, *T.rt. 1, 55.
2^Lovejoy, RAD, 120.
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a. The relativity of subjects as well as objects
—
in the reality of an organic unity of all creation— is treated
in the netaphysically-inclined epistemological doctrine of
’’perspectivity. ” This theory is that everyone occupies a certain
place in reality. This theory leads directly to idealism’s goal
of reconciling differences by stressing the subjective,
V/hat you experience is true from your standpoint
and to that extent is objectively true. From your point of view
the pennjr nay be circular; then it is circular
—
from your point
of view . To me the penny may be elliptical; this is an ob jectiv* ^
fact based in the relativity of the event. In other words what
is relatively true is objectively true because the relative is
objective; it is the fact .
Thus in attempting to reconcile the opposing ele-
ments in monism and dualism, Objective Relativism has dissipated
the real object which is essential to valid knov/ledge, vVhatever
is objective is relative to the person knowing; yet this is all
that can be attained. Therefore this relativity is the objectiv<
fact of reality. The hopelessness of such a position is readily
seen.
Had the Objective Relativist based his universals
in things—unchanging substances—instead of in the relative,
changing qualities, the conclusions of his reasoning would have
been greatly similar to if not identical with the scholastic
position,
b. Extending the concept cf fact to experience from
— ii&vi 2:13 to 0rf*i" .«
a ".r
' '^
*
.7^
ftsd-tjeid- '“Ila '^o YCf'iftCr !?l/£lfeH*xo rta *to &si^ ixi
to enttrcfoon icox'^olona^^'al'i© TB:^d£r'e<W al
eeiqiiooo ^no'^iav® ai 8 iff? " ivi^ooTS^^[’’^
^
Itio^ E’R3iIaa6i o^ tXi’oe-:Xt'' abBel Y'ioe;f:t .v^XIbbtl ttl aoalrr'
. OT tcfotff;yiJa advt 5*nia<3atJ^ ascaa^ttilb gnIIxoi5ooa.T[ to
V-*; I.
iUlPSJb^^^ fiint EX f>oit©i*ro.TXf uo^ ied\V
vro/LV LO Oot€ .yy'iJ‘;'^XaviJ'out,(Jo ai ^xtoJxo JBri;!’ od- bf^
,
. ,/v ''
JT.Xo'^ tiioY hotl—>*x&Itfi>*xXo si d-x ixerfd” jtXBXuo'rio* ®cf erfd-j
;*
(
i:‘v
if vl
• 4
v iddf.'.cTo ca ei aixfd” jXooM'iilXo ed '£«neq &d- ok oT .Wf>iv to
4
d-ortw a 5iow^*xoiUto ql oift to \it ivl:ra‘l‘e% odi ni oobbo ^oai
at oYiiriixBTt edd' Pfiaaodd suid- ^fovitooido si 3jj‘id YlavidalO’i ^si!
.
d^oA'i o.Xj eJt di ,. ; jjyJ:d3&Gda
-tjIo jiXiiacMt^o :'dd-/s''X ' oaobot o^> ;^:iid‘<ji'fodd'i? dl
budaqiasift «9i{ peivil riofl e/ld'o^^do ,koiXo6X)e l>fio Jt& lnci,t> til. ed«ei|j
ix)Yodaifi.'^ .o'^I)^r,Yor>£ diiov od laXd’aoeae el Juse'X /ar?d* *'
llB ax Birid do^ js^rtlv/giiO rtoe"x^i oi£d evljraXon ai ovldoo^dd al
vldfiatdo ©i{d t8c y^hrij.oXox eid^ :^'xotoiodT .oo'^riadda eJ n«o doi
_.
. I
‘
tXl‘»Bax al fioIvtfaofT a to a^afi£:ijsoIdqctff adT .^diXuai "iq los^
..,
* r
'
' .
^
j
I 4
4 :(»s?
T- i
alOEievliixJ nlii booiid dalvlduIoH -vltoo^idO- odd'
»*
,
«t
.
.oVidoXon odd- nl to fjBOdairi—200^Bdado& gxiisxQSdonjj—aaalrfd nl
07«J i>lx/cjw j)SlatfEfeG*x 8 lt£ to Qiiolaaioapo ertd ,a©ldiXaiip 3Jll 3R^IfllX^
oiis loiiaa- add XdlTr Xaoidepi>i don ti od -inllfilc yX^bst^ n&odflF"
• '
* r'^ . .noidleo^
Irio’fl ©OAoX*i!>qito *0d dost: > dqeofreo odd
.
Sn^fiodxk. .cf
P<
^n
"i •
i
’*
*
various standpoints—everyone has his ovm standpoint—leads to
monstrous conclusions, among them that a fact today nay be false
tomorrow. Going beyond pragmatism, which, in the ideal sense
bases its theory on the truism that what is true works, although
' it too has had the misfortune to judge truth solely by v/orkabil-
ity. Objective Relativism maintains that a penny is both round
and circular depending upon the standpoint.
Proof of the falsity of the view is logically im-
possible, since the question is based on empirical data and
defies reason. To assert that the penny is round would amount
to no 1x0 re than to say it is round from the standpoint to which
it appears round, but that to the standpoint from which it ap-
pears elliptical it would appear elliptical. Any choice of a
particular standpoint would be declared unfair and subjective,
as distinguished from the objective nature of validity.
G. PROOP OF THE SOHOIu-.STIC POSITION
The fore-going rapid survey of conflicting views
on the relativity of knov/ledge has shown that dualism and ideal-
ism are not alone in making all knov/ledge ultimately relative
to the huiaan mind. The reason is the evident discrepancy betv^eei;
data perceived and actually existing objects. The attempt of
Objective Relativism to reduce the relativity to a difference in
standpoint aoes no more than re-state the problem. That there is
relativity in knov/ledge must be admitted. Othervdse, knowledge
once acquired would be perfect. Error would be a non-entity;
change in thought would always be acquirement of new iaeas con-
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sistent v/ith all previous ideas. In fact, if truth is relative
to a standpoint, it is difficult to see how error occurs.
1. CAPACITY OF MIND
**
'luidquld recipitur secundum nodum recinientis
recipltur. ”
In this centuries-old axiom is contained the groundj^
for believing that knowledge is relative--but relative only to
the capacity of the mind. What is received is true; but not all
is received. There is a vast difference between the statement
that what is knovm is objectively true, but not all is knovm
.
i
I ^d nothing of the objective worlu can be knovm but our iaeas of
J*- O ' '
:
it.
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i, Rickaby quotes St. Thomas thus: "Intellectual
truth consists in the equation betv/een mind and reality in con-
sequence of which the mind affirms that the object really is
what it is..."^^
The object in this instance is the substance of the
being, the direct object of the mind. But material things are
made up of qualities as well as substances. These qualities
constitute the particular.
ii. Direct knowledge— in the purest form approach-
j
ing intuition, except that the process can be analyzed, --is of
1 the essence of the object; it is knowledge of the universal ex-
I
isting forraally (as a universal) in the mind and fundaraentally
I
(as an essence true of many and limited to no one of a class)
^^Rickaby, FP, 17.
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in the object. The entire material object is knovm indirectly
;i
by empirical examination and reflection. The process is similar
il
to the first step in the inductive process. The indirection is
|
of process; error is possible, but the data are in the object;
j
1
1
they are not mental phenomena.
It is evident that complete truth v/ill not be
achieved in many instances. It is contrary to man’s nature to
learn all about anything. But complete truth of certain things
in themselves is possible, although the relations implied must
ever be_ only partially knovm since man does not live long enough
to solve all the problems of the universe.^^
iii. I.Ian is able to receive only a limited part of
truth, but that limited part is truth of reality as it is. l/her^
previously we accepted knowledge as admitting of truth or error
the latter being incorrect knowledge, we now insist that the terij]
adequation means true relation of object to the mind. False pre-
sentation of the object is clearly inadequation, and adequation
between mind and object is essential to knowledge.
”It is not necessary .... that thought embrace the
entire object; to what extent there is conformity, to that extenl^
32is there logical truth,”
iv. Essence as it exists in the mind differs from
essence’ which exists in the thing only in that it is stripped of
material conditions. This does not affect essence as essence.
Slpoland, TT‘,78.
'^'^Poland, TT, 78.
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but simply bears out our axiom.
1 Essence in the material object is individuated, in
'the mind it is stripped of individuating notes and becomes im-
material .
Essence in a thing is relatively inferior to essence
in the mind; and both are inferior to essence in God’s mind.
In each instance the relativity is due to the nature of matter
which is opposed to knowledge.
a. In none of the three instances, however, is
essence regarded as essence. In the object, it is regarded as
substance of a material object; in the mind it is regarded as the
universal stripped of material conditions but thought by a mind
extrinsically dependent upon a body and, therefore, imperfect;
in God’s mind the essence is perfected.
b. All three instances are instances of essences
in relation or essence contained in something. But alv/ays,
essence as essence, is the same. It prescinds from existence.
It is the sane in the mind as in the object and as in God’s mind.
Kumerical identity is of essence, though existence may alter our
conception of it.
c. Essence is distinct from existence. Only in
God are essence and existence identical.
d. It is because essence and existence constitute
individuals that all truth is not immediately given in knowledge.
Sssence can be studied; a v/ide variety of qualities constituting
*
— Jm
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the essence can be considered without the existence of the object
Dn the other hand, one can say a gologosh can exist v/ithout
apprehending the nature of a gologosh. The term gologosh sig-
nifies an essence. All words are arbitrary signs. V»e can con-
ceive a nature not now existing and call it gologosh, and if such
a being, conforming to the concept, cane into existence it v;ould
truly have its own essence v/hich we choose arbitrarily to call
gologosh.
e. Thus, in knov/ledge of essence, that knowledge is
lirect. But it is not as perfect as God’s knowledge. It is true
but partial. That knov/ledge is not partially false; it is true,
but not completely extended. Farts may remain unknovm; what is
known is true.
f. Direct knowledge is relative to God’s knowledge
ivhich is all-inclusive. It is not relative to things; the es-
sence (object) is identical in mind and object. The mind has
become the object, the former with the abstract universal nature,
the latter limited to the individual. But essence qua essence is
identical in one with the other. The ...oue of existence is dis-
tinct from the question of knowledge.
E. IGTOV.LBDGE OF INDIVIDUiJ.S
i. Individual objects are composed of matter and
form. But matter is directly opposed to knowledge. Ilnowledge
is of iraii.aterial essence by an imraaterial agent, at least knowl-
3dge of universals which is the basis of science and knowledge
in its highest human form.
rsriBart. Art. 1. 23.
•
>
I
f
^
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1
a. Consequently, knowledge of individuals is
arrived at the intellect after reception of the universal
essence. The process is indirect, Knov/ledge of individuals is
I
in the forn of judgment, and judgment is the source of error.
^
b. Knowledge of matter in itself is impossible.
I
lie speak of chairs, tables, even electrons and protons, but each
I
!of these implies a form of matter. The form is the knowable
!
aspect. Hatter v/ithout form is inconceivable,
I
I
Vvhen a thing is knovm it is knovm as a
form; and anything further known about
it is known as dependent on this form.
Forra is the unit of being and of knowl-
edge. \ilien an object is perceived its
form is in the percipient as well as in
the object. Perception tells us that a
piece of gold is yellow, heavy, etc.
The underlying substratum in which the
qualities adhere cannot be perceived.
This means that matter is unknowable.
But the form is knovirable and the qualities
belong to the form.^^
We can see now that the root of dualism is in fail-
I
ure to recognize the component aspects of reality, matter and
form. If no form exists reality is unknowable. So also is the
reason for God’s more complete knowledge evident, God knows
matter directly, while we cannot even infer matter although v/e
are directly acquainted with form. We know matter exists, but
jlack the power to define it:
34
;;
Gf. Ante, 55,
^^Bart, ^irt. 1, 23.
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ulienever \ie state properties of a
body in terras of physical quantities
we are imparting knowledge of the
response of various laetrical in-
dicatprs to pressure and nothing
more
.
ii. Individuals of the sane nature, or essence,
exist and become objects of the mind. Direct knov/ledge, in
psychological as well as epistemological terras, is not concerned
v;ith the individuals, but v;ith the foria which determines then
beings of a certain nature.
a. linowledge of the individual thus is relative to
knowledge of the universal as contained in each individual and
formally existing, stripped of individuality, in the mind alone.
Thus is the individual an indirect object of the mind.
. b. Vvlien an object is perceived in the distance and
its nature becomes known, much remains to be knovm about the
individual. This additional data is learned by reflection, by
closer acquaintance. It vmll be clear that the relativity is due
exclusively to the psychological structure of the mind.
c. The psychological limitations are indisputable,
i/e have five external senses besides the internal comraon sense
which associates the data of two or more external senses. 7/ith
more senses v/e should know more about any object. In no case
would we know more about the essence, but it would be possible
for us to know more about the individual,
d. Despite the limitation, however, knowledge of
SG^ddington, NFJ, 303.
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individuals, provided by the senses, like knowledge of essence,
is valid as far as it goes. This naive realisix is the view of
coinnon sense. It is the uncomplicated, unsophisticated view
for v/hose rejection no reason is at once apparent.
In this sense, knowledge of the individual is
direct, since that knowledge conforms to the individual; it
acquaints the mind vdth the individual as it is and not in any
dualistic symbolism. True, because of limited senses, the
acquaintance is partial. Yet it is accurate as far as it goes.
In the wide and more important sense this is di-
rectness in knowledge. The fact that errors of the senses and
seeming untrustv/orthiness of non-intellectual functions of the
human personality are the cause of dualism and iaealism need not
deter us in defense of this doctrine of direct knowledge of
essence and direct acquaintance with the individual.
Many others, not at all in syiiipathy with scholas-
ticism, have defended the view: We may mention one: "To say
that sense experience is partial and provisional is true enough,
but need not lead to v/holesale distrust of testimony of the
senses .
"
e. The scholastic position is that under normal
conditions, the conditiorB of valid knowledge referred to pre-
’O
viously,'^^ the senses present the material world directly to the
mind. The mind, in its indirect psychological pi-ocess, may
iJ^Laird, 3R, 44
'^°Gf. ^nte, 46^

modify certain of the data. Thus the color blind man may not
insist upon the colors he attributes to an object.
The problem of error is no more difficult for this
• «
position—which is close to if not identical with naive realism-
-
than for any other. The hackneyed instance of the straight
stick appearing bent in the water is no problem to the scholasti 3
The data presented by the senses are correct: the stick appears
bent. The thinking human being av/are of elementary scientific
laws or even an intelligent observer of the phenomenon will then
understand the meaning of refraction. Other senses, touch in
ti is instance, correct the report of vision. In no case is
there evidence that reality deceived all senses and the intellec t
In the instance of the straight stick in the water,
the stick is the proper object of the sense of touch. Just as
j
one would not judge the perfume of the rose by the sense of
sight, neither should one depend on the sense of sight for
knowledge of an object not properly related to vision.
f. Unless the senses put us into direct contact
with real ty as it is; unless the senses are the organs through
which consciousness reaches reality, as naive realism has main-
'69
tamed, direct knowledge is an untenable hypothesis because
in the last analysis even the direct universal is abstracted
from the individual, although the individual as such is known
subsequently.
5®Cf. mte, 56.,
^^iwlpern, IIP, 256.
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This is v;ell expressed by a professor of episte
nology at Proviaence College
;
Direct universal is the very nature,
or v/hatness of a thing, inasuuch as it
is directly perceived by the intellect,
abstractly'- considered froii the principles
of individuation and from all material
conditions. In John^ v.g, ^ there exists
the whatness or nature by v/hich John is
a nan, and there are also the principles
of individuation by which John is this
man. The principles of individuation
are perceived by the sensitive cognitive
faculties, but since simple apprehension
is an act of the mind by which \ie know
what a certain thing is, when by simple
apprehension John is knov/n, v/e perceive
concerning him what he is, viz. his v/hat-
iiess, his nature separated from the in-
dividuation. That nature perceived in
this v;ay is called the direct universal.
I
Pather Galliher reasons that ’’The external senses
j
j
are ordained either to the perceiving of sensible external
objects or to nothing; but the second is absurd; ergo.”^
Regarding the senses:
The senses, v;hen in their normal condition
and exercised upon their proper sensible
objects, are jriteria of truth, under proper
conditions. (The proper conditions are that
the faculty be in its normal state; that the
proper object be suitably disposed; that the
medium betv/een the faculty and the object be
well proportioned, v.g. too rauch light blinds
the ey^-es. ).. .Errors arising from the senses
are not properly attributable to the senses
but to the intellect. Error is found only in
judgment. But senses do not judge; therefore,
the senses, properly speaking do not deceive
us. When they are diseased, or when any cause
modifies or impairs the sensation, the senses
cannot but receive the sensation so -modified
^I^Galliher, IJE, 9.
~^Ibid^, 50. nlso, cf. post, nddenduja> 169
»
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or so irapaired, and traiisrait it as
they receive it to the intellect.
Hence, the intellect should not be
precipitous in judging, and should
take into account any abnormal con-
ditions under which the sensation nay
be produced.
g. Gan there be any doubt that everyone kno\ms
v;hen his senses deceive hira, at least on some occasions? u^re
there not raany occasions on which we firmly believe the senses
give accurate knov/ledge? One looks more closely at a picture
through simple faith in the senses.
h. Another limitation of knowledge is due to fail
ure to think. The raind imraediately perceives essences, but
identification of the essence is dependent upon the mind’s
kno\7ledge. lust as the body needs physical food, so the mind
needs mental food. Knowledge is dependent not only upon the
power of the intellect but also upon its development.
3. IS A COGhITIVE UNIOH
i. To assume that the senses are stimulated to
certain responses by particular causes which are not directly
experienced by the senses is to provide a fundamental dualism
between sense and its object which cannot be overcome.
ii. That external qualities, differing from sen- .
sations in that sensations are the subjective expression of the
qualities, cause sensible knov/ledge is perfectly evident. To
adiiiit, hov/ever, that from this it must follow that our senses
42
Ibid, 51,32.

are soiaetiries deceived because sensations do not exist object-
ively is to slip into a theory of subjectivism which it is the
whole purpose of this paper to refute.
70
a. lvnov;ledge of individuals is indirect in the
sense that the mind knows first the universal nature and second-
arily the existence of that nature in an individual. At no tine
is the universal or individual inferred from a sensation or an
idea. The sensation and idea present the object to the mind,
somewhat as field glasses present distant objects to the eyes.
The mind may be unav/are of the glasses, just as it is unav^are
of the idea.
b. Sensations are related to the qualities v/hich
stimulate then in a process far different from the mind-essence
union. Identical essences may have various individual qualities,
and the mind in considering the qualities may need reflection.
In no case, hov/ever, is the essence inferred from the qualities-
-
it is the form of the object—although inference from the
essence as formally existing in the mind may modify the percept.
Percept here is used as distinguished from sensation by Brennan:
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Because of the objective and subjective
character implied in every sensation,
the psychologist distinguishes between
sensation, as such, and percept. Thus
v;hen we regard the modification of a
sense organ merely as a subjective state
or wheii we view the process simply as
issuing in consciousness of an affection
of the organism, we are dealing with
sensation, h'hen, on the other hand,
it is the external reality given in the
act of sensation that is indicated, or
v;hen the sensation is locali;<L.ed and con-
sciously projected into the external world
from which it originated, and associated
V7ith its appropriate object, then it j,s
a percept v.'ith which we are treating.*'^
Thus v;hen I drink water after eating ice cream, by
inference I realize that the sensation of v/arrath is not accurate ,
Strictly speaking a condition of knowledge—normal condition
of the senses—is absent.
4. Q,U.iITIES
i. It is clear now that qualities, primary or
secondary, are here regarded as attributes of things, knowable
as they are. The view presented is the direct opposite of
;
Locke’s view that "secondary qualities. . .are nothing in the
I
I
objects themselves, but the powrers to produce certain sensations
i
•
j
in us. .
.
"
Locke divides qualities into primary and secondary.
The primary are the mind-independent qualities such as solidity,
extension, motion, etc, and the secondary, having no existence
other than as the result of a pov/er in an object to cause certai i
45
sensations,
,
, Brennan
,
PSY
,
32
.
^^Locke, ECHIT, 94,
^^Alpern, MP, 181,
' "

Berkeley went farther than Locke, denying the
46
ob jectivitj'- of primary as well as secondary qualities,
ii. Adhering to the Thonistic doctrine of the ob-
jectivity of qualities and the theory that knowledge is a true
re-creation of reality, many modern scholastics maintain that no
distinction should be made between primari?' and secondary qualiti|0s
Thus vie find three reasons for belief in the ob-
jectivity of primary and secondary qualities as they are ex-
nerienced:
80
a. Because the grounds for admitting or
rejecting the externality of both classes
of qualities are the same: b. because
philosophers who proceed to reject the
secondary soon reject the primary also:
c. because ’impressions’ of color, sound,
taste, smell, etc. demand corresponding
external ’causes’ just as much as ex-
tension, or the^-J/primary’ or ’common’
sense percepts,
48
iii. The view is not universal among scholastics,
but it seems to be the only consistent view. Just as the formal
essence exists in the mind as a universal and only fundamentally
AQ
in the thing, so is there no distortion of reason to conceive
the same quality having a different mode of existence in sensa-
tion and objective reality. Surely, sensation is not objective;
neither, however, need quality be subjective, Quality can exist
in potency in the object and in act in the sensation. But the
quality is not thereby changed.
46;j.veling, GUI,
f'^Goffey, EPI,
Xf. ante,45,
46.
II, 108.
28Q.

Candy can be sweet without possessing the sensation
of sweetness. Sound need not be confused with the hearing of
sound. Sound may be vibration or waves when not in sensation;
it may be noise in sensation. But it is still vibration and it
is still sound vmether sensed or not.
5. DIRECT KIIOhXEDGE
i. There is no relativity in direct intellectual
knowledge of the object: essence in the mind is identical v/ith
essence outside the mind. Error nay arise in judgment when
knowledge goes beyond essence to existence. This is due to im-
perfection of the mind, nevertheless concerning essences there
is no necessary reason for error.
a. The universal, abstracted from the material
individual, is known first. This knowledge is most direct and
involves only the physiological process of receiving an im-
pression. The mind is united v/ith the essence in the thing.
The idea is born of this union, as an after-event.
b. The individual is known indirectly from the
universal, but there is no process of inference such as occurs
in formal reasoning. Llatter is opposed to direct knowledge
v/hich is a union of an immaterial mind and an immaterial form,
of a material object. The individual, therefore, strictly
speaking, is knovm directly from the standpoint of validity,
but indirectly from the standpoint of psychological process.
c. Judgments are relative because they affirin or
deny a relation. In valid judgments objective truth is asserted
m
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and objective reality accurately known.
d. ICnowledge, even direct knowledge, is not colx-
plete, and in this sense it is relative to the capacity of the
mind to knov\f.
e. ivlan is a substantial unit, i'ind and body form
the person. The functional nature of consciousness—so often
confused v/ith faculty psychology of which 3t. Thomas was not an
exponent—imposes limitations on knowledge in all men. Dif-
ferences in knowledge may be due to "individual differences"
among men.
f. In all men, as distinguished from brutes and
all other beings except God, an immaterial mind is directly
united to an objective form made up of the essence of an actual-
ly existing being. The essence is common to dll similar beings
This essence is directly present in the mind. Khowiedge beyond
that is relative to the operation of the mind. If the mind turn
immediately to the individual, knowledge is of the directly
present material being. If memory, imagination, or internal
senses are the basis of intellectual action, knowledge is in-
direct. It has besides the partial aspect Imposed on all knowl-
edge the further disadvantage of vagueness,
ii. Concerning qualities
a. Secondary qualities are objective, but object-
ively they are not identical with sensations. Sensations are
necessarily subjective, hliat is usually overlooked is that
qualities as qualities are not subjective creations but corre-
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(spond vdth sensations in a manner more productive of true know-
ledge than would be the subjective experience of the actual ob-
jective oualities as described by physics.
83
Each correspondence in every d etail, .. ,’:ould
practically be useless for knov/ledge
. . ,We M not v/ant to know
how m.any billion tim.es a second there is vibration (although
our ability to know is evidence of directness of presentatio
and this ability is possible only through use of senses)^®
but V'/hat in general are the qualities of an extended thing
which v/e \dshed to distingTiihh from some other thing. And fot
the purpose of distinction the ’oualities^ of sensation are
extremely efficient ,, ,Nor cen it be said that the senses de-
ceive us by leading us to believe that \/hat is subjective is
objective. If 3^ou asked the plain man what color is, he v;ill
repl^r it is a quality in the object, and that is true; for,
according to the scientists, it consists in tlie po\/er of the
object to analyze light by absorbing some rays and reflecting
others,..The plain man knov/s that colors are objectively dif--
ferent , . . .Even in regard to sensation there is a certain cor-
reppondence betv/een it and the qualities of objects, and \ierk
it greater than what it is the value of sensation as the
id quo percipitur vfould be lessened instead of increased 51
b. Since direct knowledge , actual presence of the objejitive
quality in the subject, \rould be a disadvantage rather than an
advantage, there seems to be valid grounds for the believer in
a loving God to maintain that knov/lec ge \/hich should be direct
is direct. The purpose of conditional fenov/lecge in the experi-
ence of qualities is evident, but correspondence as
Parenthetical Matter Mine.
51
V/alker, TK, 383-384.
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the only basis for knowledge of other objects seems to fill no
purpose. Mind and objective reality can be separate v/ithout
requiring a representative form of knowledge. It is desirable
in the knovi?ledge of essences and primary qualities simply that
we know them as they are. The ultimate elements of secondary
qualities can be reached by science.
But this at least is clear, that a theory
of perception ana perceptual knov/ledge which
is to meet the acquirements of modern science
will have to have something in its general
character very much like that of Thomas.
It will have to combine ... the tvra comple-
mentary positions that our knowledge of the
world about our bodies is mediated- in fact
by highly complicated processes of a special
kind and that as knowledge it is direct un-
modified apprehension not of ideag or images
but of actual, physical reality.
c. Perhaps no one has given more thought to the
problem of perception in the scholastic theory of direct knowl-
edge than has James li. Ryan. His conclusion is that epistemolo-
gists begin their study at the wrong point. Dr. Ryan minimizes
the importance of a sound theory of perception. In reply to
Professor Sellars’ attempted refutation of natural realism,
Ryan says:
^^Taylor, PS, 256.
^'^Sellars, PPP.
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No one q^uestions the fact that perception
is an intricate process nor that sense
illusions entail nuraerous difficulties for
a realistic theory of knov/ledge. But the
intricacies of perception and the difficulties
begotten by illusions are raatters for psychology
to investigate and pass judgment upon. The
existence of such difficulties leads no farther
than the conclusion that perception is a complex
affair, and every psychologist affirms as much.
They do not prove that the man in the street
is v/rong when he asserts he has seen a red
book.
Ryan illustrates his position v/ith the example of
the stick in the water, noting that perception "is mere awarenes:;,
it gives nothing beyond the appearances of things. But, he
continues, v/hether these appearances are whole or only part of
the reality perceived depends on an ulterior act, that of
judgment...” if there is any question about what the object is.^'-
d. We have be ai trying to bring out implicitly
v/hat will be considered in detail in the next chapter, namely,
that objectively reality is dualistic in the same manner as man
is dualistic. This means simply that real dualism consists in
the union of subject (matter) and form (essence).
If objects are not real beings, unified dualities
of matter and form, then the refutation of the natural realism
strav/-man is a major blow to all realistic schools.
If, however, as this wTiter interprets scholastic
epistemology in its relation to psychology and metaphysics,
particularly the latter, objects are not mere aggregations of
54
Ryan, Art. 1, 246«
^^Ibid. 251.
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qualities, but are substantial beings with deternined (naterial)
as well as detennining (formal) aspects, the fact of differences
in perception under different conditions is not fundamental;
it is a problem for psychology to consider, but not one for
! philosophy which seeks to study fundamental reality apart from
I
accidental, or superficial, phenomena.
e. Recall and recognition of objects, commonly
termed memory, constitute an act v/hich is regarded as a death-
blow to purely realistic systems, unless the system adopt the
extreme objectivism of Kev/* Realism.
Professor Sellars remarks:
The similarity between the datum of per-
ception and the datum of memory suggests
that both are internal and somehow bound
up with tbe indiyidual who is perceiving
and remembering.^
This is unquestionably true, but as Ryan points out
Every datum when perceived is taken up into
the mind and becomes mental. Llanifestly,
perception is impossible v/here the datum
cannot be taken up into the mind and made
one v/ith it by mental act for nothing can
be perceived until it is brought into cog-
nitive relations \¥ith the perceiver.
AssuT'iing, ho\/ever, that an object is related
to a perceiving mind does not change the
reality of the object, but. only our perception
of it...n datum need not be exclusively either
Internal or external, but may at one and the
same time be both.^^
57(-pSellars, op.cit.,52.
^Ryan, ^rt. 1, 256.
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The problem of how we remember or even more fun-
damental questions of hov; and "v/hy we perceive seem to be unan-
sv;erable . They are given facts just as are the data v/hich have
the capacity to be objective and mental at one and the sane time,
This is no concession to critical realism, for in that view
qualities which are determining principles determine nothing,
and the escape from idealism or extreme dualism is only verbal.
\'ie regard objects as something more than the "quality-groups”
59
of Critical Realism,
^^Pratt, Art. 1,91.
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CII^T^K VI
THE LIETi^PHYSIC^IL SITUATION
Unfortunately, St. Tlionas Aquinas, whose doctrines
fom a consistent basis for modern scholastic position, did not
consider the epistemological question of the immediacy of kno\7l-
edge in any complete treatise. As a matter of fact, epistemolog|-
had not been constituted as a separate branch of philosophy in
his day. Epistemological questions v/ere included in treatments
of metaphysical and logical problems. The tern epistemology
is believed to have been first used by J. E. Eerrier about the
middle of the nineteenth century,^
The fact that there was no formal epistemology,
hov/ever, did not deter St. Thomas or even his predecessors from
considering tlie questions involved, although solutions were
spread over many pages and could be assembled only after exam-
ination of discussions of numerous other questions to which the
epistemological implications \/ere incidental.
This has led to varying interpretations of St.
Thomas’ position and to differences among modern scholastics
who have based their teachings on the theories of the angelic
Doctor.
Besides the two idealistic and materialistic forms,
immediate knowledge has been given three interpretations;
"Rohrbaugh, NaP, 359.

T — —
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Now it would seera that what is iiu-
I
mediately present to the intellect in
conception must be either the mental
modification itself (from which a real
extra-mental object would be somehov/
inferred—by a process which, accord-
ing to Kant and others, never could
reveal to us this extra-mental object
as it really is); or else the reality
itself which has its real being outside
the mind, or independently or cognition,
’ but is made present to the mind through
, the mental modification; £r else a mental-
ly constructed object whose ultimate con-
stituent factors are re-productions or
represent actions of extra-mental reality,
and in which construction, therefore, the
intellect sees, or can see, without any
properly inferential process, this latter
reality. These alternatives appear to be
exhaustive.^
I
The first alternative is dualistic; the latter tv/o
I
are scholastic. In this thesis the writer rejects the third
I
alternative in favor of the second:
The. .reality itself which has its real being
outside the mind, or independently of cog-
nition, is made present to the mind through
the mental modification,
3
Authority for this view is given by Coffey, who,
v/ith a majority of scholastics opposes representative realism
as unprovable because the representations of reality may be
inadequate. He says:
^Coffey, EPI, I, 265.
^Loc, cit.
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If this arguiaent is intended to prove
that the entity which is present to the
intellect as a thought object, v-/hich has
a mental presence or esse ideale there,
is really other than the entity v;hich has
an esse reale
,
or a reality independent of
thought, that the former entitj'" is not
really identical v/ith, but is of course
a faithful if inadequate representative of,
the latter,—the arguraent does not seem to
us to be proved,'^
The scholastic position nov/ is clear; the real thin^;
is the direct object of the mind, b'e now proceed to an analytic
study of the reasons for the position.
A. THi: IhxTURS 01 THE CxIVEIj
The danger of. basing philosophy, especially a theor;'
of knowledge, on insubstantial data, i.e. sense data either as
objective or subjective, particular or universal, is clearly
illustrated in two directly opposed views to be discussed here
in introducing the exhaustive scholastic contention.
The question to be considered is the nature of the
given in knov/ledge: Is it the object as sense data? (Russell).
|
I
j
Is it experience based solely on response of the organism in a
1
manner acceptable almost by solipsists?^ (Dewey). Or is it the
extra-mental essence of the thing? (Scholastic).
We saw in the chapter on relativity that psycholog-
ical activity is a mediate process, that judgment is complex and
hence inferential. The imi.iediacy sought for in epistemology is
simply between subject and object. Judgment and reasoning.
^
Ibid.
,
267.
^ Rohrbaugh, NAP, 574.

memory, anticipation, abstract principles, etc., as we have
stressed before, have no place. Such knovfLedge is mediate. It
6is as Russell states, knowledge by description, a hearsay, eithe;:
from another or one’s ovm store of knowledge v/ithout the direct
presence of an object.
1. AGQ,UAINTAI^CS i^MD KiroV/LaiDGE
The right to call acquaintance knowledge has been
questioned but in the limited sense in v/hich it will be used
here there will probably be no disagreement. Any denial of the
knowledge element, of course, will not be a denial of acquaint-
7
ance but of knowledge.
I
The origin of the expression knowledge by acquaint -
ance cannot be credited to Russell, although it becaine coEuaon in
philosophy largely through his distinction betv/een knov;ledge by
acquaintance and knowledge by description. There is no objection
to his statement of knowledge by description provided that w'hat
1
has been said about sense knowledge in our discussion of relativ-
ity in knowledge is kept in mind. The scholastic viev/ includes
intellectual knowledge based in a metaphysical dualism far dif-
ferent from Russell’s viev/, but his insistence on the knowledge
quality in acquaintance is in sympathy with the scholastic
version here defended,^
%ussell, POP, 71.
'^Brightman, ITP, 83,98 (esp. 83n)«
^Russell, op. cit., 72,92.
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V/e shall say that v/e have acquaintance
v;ith anything of which we are directly
aware, without the interriediary of any
process of inference or any knowledge
of truths. Thus in the presence of ny
table I an acquainted vath the sense-
data that iiake up the appearance of ny
table— its colour, shape, hardness,
smoothness, etc.; all these are things
of which I an iriLi^ediately conscious
^
when I an seeing and touching ny table
.
Russell then points out that this immediate knowl-
edge is perfect and complete acquaintance with the sense-data,
and no further knowledge of then themselves , Iconsidered individ-
ually as color, shape, hardness, smoothness, etc., is even
theoretically possible.
2. DEv.TJY’S VIEW
Opposed to Russell's belief that acquaintance is
really knowledge is the view of Dev/ey expressed in the first
series of Paul Carus Lectures.
Dewey, a pragmatist, finds it impossible to tell
v/hat is immediately in consciousness--not because it is conceal-
ed in mystery but "for the sar.-ie reason that v/e cannot tell just
what sweet or red iriiiediately is: it is something had, not
12
comiunicated or knovvii."
'v/hereas Russell extends irinediate knov/ledge to
universals and self-evident truths, and identifies consciousness
1 n.',
of things with immediate knowledge of then,"^^
Ibid., 73.
-^^Ibid., 73,74.
Dev/ey, SAIT, 18 et
ISIbid.’ 307’
4-»^Russell; of).
passin,
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Devv^ey, following Hegel, presses his conviction that there is no
If an all-inclusive consciousness were
to exist it v/ould be a piece of esthetic
scenery, interesting or tedious as the
case night be, but ‘laving no conceivable
cognitive standing, °
3. RUSSELL NOT A SCHOL^iSTIC
It must not be deduced from these quotations that
Russell is expounding scholasticism and Dewey solipsism. The
I
scholastic tinge to Russell’s theory is its claim thht acquaint-
ance gives knowledge and if union of mind and object is direct.
On the other hand, Dewey is correct in stating that
an all-inclusive consciousness which is idea is unintelligible.
So overwhelming is such a concept that to understand it one would
have to be such an all-inclusive consciousness. How else could
it be experienced?
admissions confirming the limited nature of knowledge by simple
apprehension and sense experience—as admitted in the chapter-
on relativity in knowledge; and v/e have the further admission
that direct knowledge is either knowledge in the proper sense
(Russell) or something really "had” (Dewey). After allov;ing for
merely iimediate knowledge^^ to the conclusion that:
Thus from two opposing points of view we have
Dewey, op. cit., 322.
Ibid.
,
323.
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Dev/ey’s nilitant pragmatism and biological emphasis (reaction),
it is clear that each might be confirming the thesis here pre-
sented.
Scholastics agree v/ith bevvey, as far as he goes.
If man is merely a thinking animal, if sense, and not intellect,
is the distinctive attribute, and if the biological emchasis is
correct, then the hui.an organism seeks only its ovm well-being.
Senses truly are ordained to pragmatic ends,
\
The senses respond.
.
.not so much to give
us an exact picture of things as they
are in themselves, but rather to give
us the required data for proper manipu-
lation of the things for guiding us
properly in our environment.^^
B. am: coGiiiTiVE uiiion
In our definition of knowledge, v/e stated that
knowledge is a unique phenomenon indefinable apart from itself
17
and its process. So in any study of the union of mind and
object in knov/ledge, the process antecedent to the union must
be considered.
While direct comparison is impossible because of the
unique nature of knowledge, scholastics, aware that the immanence
of the object some way in the knowing subject threatens the
metaphysical dualism in the system as a whole, seek to define the
cognitive union by analogy. The result is indicative of the
soundness of the viev;, although no claim is made that the
T A
I.Iichel, Art. 1, 340,541,
-•n/alker, TK, 375.
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processes considered jointly are the sane,
1 . ASSILIILiiTION
In his physical aspect nan thrives through assini-
lation. The body assirailates food, retaining v/hat is needed
and rejecting what is not adapted for assimilation.
Similarly does the mind acquire its food—reality.
Food taken in by the body cones from the outside; knowledge
taken in by the mind cones from an extra-mental zone, lust as
the body rejects physical natter, not food, v/hich forms part of
the liiaterial assimilated, so does the mind reject much of that
with v/hich it is confronted to derive its proper object.
i. Animals, lacking intellectual capacity, can
never acquire the essences of things; can never universalize.
Acquaintance \/ith the material object is the extent of animal
knowledge
.
ii. llan has an intellectual as well as a physical
aspect. The concrete object knovm through the senses is divested
of its material elements by the mind, and the mind’s direct
object becomes the essence of the object.
e.g. The wood that constitutes a tree might as
well constitute a cabin. Change in the object is change in
form, not in matter. Yet it is the form which determines the
object to be what it is. The laatter in all things ultimately
is probably the saxae. Form is the determing characteristic.
No matter v/hat one’s theory of knowledge may be, no
one would maintain either that anything exists without form or
that form is identical v/ith matter. In the first instance, our
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1
inability to conceive forriless natter would make the assertion
absurd. In the second instance, if forn were identified with
natrer in an ultinate iianner, i.e. indistinguishable fron raatter
,
a present tree could not be a future cabin.
Hatter is deterninable . It can receive a variety
of forras. Thus an apple eaten by a nan loses its o\m form and
becomes part of the matter determined by the man’s form.
In knowledge, if the union of mind and object were
a material union, as in physical assimilation, the object would
lose its identity and become part of the subject, llaterialistic
pantheism, an untenable metaphysical hypothesis, would result.
2. ILliATELilAL UI^IION
i
I
In order to a-pprehend the object, then, an iniiiate-
rial union must be formed between the space-transcending forms.
That mind is space-transcending is obvious fron its functions;
that form is space-transcending is equally clear \7hen it is
noted that increase or decrease in matter has no effect on form,
provided the change is only quantitative. In fact, the theory
of form is based on the indifference of matter in itself,
i. The mind in apprehending the object assimilates
it by perceiving the form, i.e. by effecting in the object an
existential, not essential, change; what exists as a concrete
ISindividual, essence, is perceived by the mind as a universal.
That intellectual assimilation differs from physical assimila-
tion, indicating a difference in the objects united, is clear
ISThe essence is the same in mind and object, ex-
cept that in the former it is knpwi to^be applic-
-able to many ann i,n the latter, it is particular.
55
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v/hen it. is noted that in intellectual kno\7ledge the change is
existential, as distinguished iron essential, leaving the object
as it v;as, v/hile Tihysical change is essential. That the in-
tellect is competent to raise material objects to the level of
ini-iaterial perception is indicated v/ell in the elevation of
non-living natter to the status of living natter by the body in
assimilation.
ii. The same mind which knows the essence is the
mind v/hich is conscious in sensation. The sensation has as
i
object the species sensibilis which is in the thinfr. In choos-
!
j
ing this interpretation, the objectivity of sense data, ^.:e are
continuing in accordance with the principles and views of haher
and V/alker expounded in the chapter on the relativity of
19
knowledge.
Laher is very specific on the point, refuting the
comiaon conviction that scholastics believe sensation serves as
a mirror of reality. Ke says:
Rejecting the interpretation of species as
roving images, and every theory conceiving
them as representations mediating between
the object and the cognitive faculty, the
thought embodied in the doctrine is
thoroughly sound. , .There is not a merely
arbitrary connection betv/een the object and
its ajpprehension. The latter is a true,
though psychical expression of the former.
19
Of. ante, 56'; 57, and 83,
SOhaher, IJY, 53,54.

rarenthetically he says:
It should he unnecessary to repeat that
the nirror, picture, inpression of the
stai'.ip, etc. and all physical exanples
are utterl^^ inadequate to express the
mind’s action, and that these terms are
only used figuratively . 21
The clear conclusion to this reasoning is that sense
knowledge is not loiowledge of a immaterial element in the object
as the immaterial fon.i is known by the mind as the species
intelligibilis . It is known as -the material thing. Both are in
the object and immediately given to the respective cognitive
processes.
a. The various interpretations placed on the tern
species sensibills are due to St. Thomas’ original characteriz-
ation of it causing a spiritual change in the subject. Since,
however, animals have sense knowledge, but no iim^iaterial mind
comparable to the soul of man, it appears St. Thomas called the
change spiritual to differentiate it from natural change.
This can be illustrated in physical terns: when I
drink water, the water becomes part of me. The' change is a
natural change, i.e, a change in matter as well as form. On
the other hand v^hen I xnow water, I receive the form of v/ater
but not the natter. Since it is the form which determines the
essence, it is valid to say that I have the form of the v;ater,
^^Loc . cit
.
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a non-natural change in me and not destructive of the v/ater.
The tern spiritual is used to distinguish the cognitive passage
of a sense and object from potency to act, an instance of change
Under this provision, animals without intelligence can be said
I
I
j
to receive the same esse spiritual as that received by man.
I
I
To consider that which is received as in aterial and to suppose
I
that animals receive it v/ould be to postulate in animals a mind
similar to the human mind,
I
b. There is no real change in the object and no
real change in the subject; there is cognitive union of the two
which is unraediated, Ivnov/ledge results from the union, not from
inferences based either on sensations or ideas. There is ample
evidence that the point has been Eiissed by many who regard the
"change" as a creation of a representation of the object--its
mediate possession--or as a term applicable to the physical rep-
resentation of the object in the sense.
It Vv'as in answer to such theories that i.Iaher made
the explanation just quoted above. Such interpretations have
come from scholastics as well as non-scholastics. Witness:
"This spiritual change is the famous species sensibilis, v/hich
is consequently nothing but a passion or affection, of the
peripheral sense organs, a node of motion... "^2
^^Turner,®!"
,
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3. Yomi NOT SELF-SXIST'INT
xvlthough the species sensihilis
,
the proper object
of- knowledge
,
is the forra of the object, it does not exist extra
nentally as fom. It has the function of being the essence of
' p s
I
certain i-atter.'^'^
i. The intellect is able to grasp the form in a
purely inmaterial way; the senses cannot divest the object of
its Eiaterial conditions. The object of the i.iind then is the
species intelligibilis
,
and the object of the senses is the
species sensibilis . Both trul^'' are the object. Form in itself,
iiowever, is not limited; hence intellectual knov/ledge is of the
universal, Form in extra-mental existence is confined to matter
and cannot be separated from its existence.
ii. Since knov^ledge is applicable to a material
world, made up of individuals, knowledge of individuals is not
psychologically direct. Hatter is opposed to knowledge; knowl-
edge is of form. Only in the individuals are forms limited by
matter. Thus is the assertion valid that intellectual knowledge
of the fom--the universal— is pure and direct, approaching the
commonly accepted conception of intellectual intuition. But
knov/ledge of the individual, limited by matter, is indirect in
process, although, as has been shown above, the individual ob-
ject is the real object as it is.
iii. External senses, nerve processes, brain action,
'^V/alker, TK, 381.
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etc. are essential to knowledge of individuals. Strictly
speaking, ho'wever, absence of these entities is not the precise
reason why naterial beings do not know . The inability of
i
naterial beings to assimilate forms other than their own is the
basic reason. This is the supreme distinction betv/een mind and
natter. Only because of its irnr.iaterial
,
spiritual nature can
mind assimilate . other forms. The mind really becomes its object:
it assimilates the form of the object; an immaterial union.
The opposition of material being to knowledge is rooted in this
metaphysical fact. Knowledge of singulars includes besides
sense knov^rledge, elements added by the intellect’s concept:
in composition there is an absence of the simplicity v;hich gives
pure knowledge— intuition.
iv. ICnowledge is rooted in the iranaterial union of
the form of the object and the mind. The form as such, as known
by the mind, is divested of material constituents and is a
foriiial universal, belonging no more to the present individual
than to others in the sane class. The differences vmthin a
given class are not specific; they are accidental. Each class
is a class by reason of the species, different from other members
of the proximate genus in which it is a member.
V. The mind in assimilating its object raises it
from its material conditions to an imraaterial . form. Yet the
dependence of a mind on body for contact with reality limits the
direct object of the intellect to the form of material beings.
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:ience, man’s knowledge cannot be as high as G-od’s for whom all
reality can be elevated to the status of immateriality. God’s
mowledge is entirely intuitive because he is entirely immaterial
and psycho-physical interaction is absent. In man, psycho-
physical interaction is a single process, presenting the material
world as it is, but the material basis of sense knowledge, in
which form is perceived, renders knowledge imperfect.
vi. Hatter, as such, according to this view cannot
be known. The most minute analysis can only reveal the form of
matter. Our sense knov/ledge is of material form as it occurs in
individuals; intellectual knowledge is of the universal form.
This, of course, is in the initial state of knowledge. There is
no parallelism between mind and body. The same soul, or con-
sciousness, or intellect and will, is the active as v/ell as the
passive organ of knowledge of the real world as it is.
vii. Centuries after scholastics had first stated the
fact, the opposition of matter to knowledge was made the basis
of important and pov;erful philosophies. Dualism results from a
denial of the substantial nature of material beings- -composed of
matter and form; monism rests on the theory that assimilation of
real forms by the mind vrould change the mind substantially.
Thus dualism is defeated by matter, assuming it to be inpenetrablle
by the mind; monism, on the other hand, creates a gigantic Liachiiji|e-
w'orld in which the gears inter-lock without interpenetrating.
The consistency of the scholastic position with the
denial of the metaphysics implied by dualism and monism is
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valuable as a confirraation of its internal consistency.
But nost impressive perhaps is the internal consist-
ency of the scholastic view considered with two other views,
each of which has eminent defenders,
—
pan-psychism and organism.
The scholastic theory that the root-cause of the inability of
material beings to know is the inability of material beings to
assimilate other forms without being substantially changed— in
contrast to the human mind— is perfectly consistent with theories,
in which form is scorned, holding that there is an unconscious
1
intercourse (prehension) among the various constituents of real-
* ity. Except for regarding man as a unique being, scholasticism
is consistent with any panism.
viii. It has been the purpose of this section to show
that the existence of form in each material object as the determ-
ining principle of the matter is essential to direct knov/ledge.
If objects are merely collections of qualities, the mind has no
proper direct object, dualism is inevitable. Without presenting
ielaborate metaphysical proofs, including the transcendental
properties of unity, being, and singularity and the implied
j
j
constitution of singulars as consisting of a determinable (matter)
and (btanranirig ' (foriii) aspect, the present writer has attempted to
show that matter in itself is unknowable; it must have form.
:rorm is the object of the mind, and it is conceived as the univer"
;3al divested of individuating notes. Eorm as it exists in the
.singular is the object of the senses. In each instance, the form
is loiown directly, i.e. as it is.
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Real being is not restricted to actual being. Real
being consists of actual and possible being, giving the r.iind
Latitude for speculation and recollection v/ith dij ectness in
cnowledge. Only inpossible being cannot be a direct object in
the sense that its essential nature can be knov/Q* Inpossible
Deing is inconceivable because it has no form, actual or
potential
.
ix. Our conclusion then is that the object of knowl-
edge is the form—essence—of the thing, and it is the object
movm: knovm as it is when the immaterial union is formed.
VJhile we cannot agree with New Realism in reducing
^11 things ultimately to neutral entities which are neither
mental nor physical, v;e rriust stress that "a datum need not be
Exclusively internal or external
,
but may at one and the same
time be both.”^"^
Thus far vm have been concerned with the fundamental
itietaphysical situation on v;hich a theory of immediate knowledge
:.s founded. In the next chapter, v/e shall examine the actual
lEituation in knowledge: the function of the mind and the quality
f knowledge. V/e shall endeavor to show first that the mind is
iapable of immaterial union v/ith its object and secondly that the
.inion yields the directness freely asserted in this chapter.
f'
24
Ryan, Art. 1, 2b6.

CHAPTER VII
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT
The abiliti;- of nan to think is his distinguishing
characteristic. Whatever the pov;ers of so-called lov/er animals
may be, man has a superior power of reasoning. Han is a sub-
stantial unity of body and soul, being distinguished from other
animals by a pov/er to think. The nature of the soul is spirit-
ual, and this makes man a species apart,
^
This definition of man is given vathout proof for
the purpose of preparing the way for an exaiaination of the nature
and powers of the mind. The assertion does not militate against
the notion of personality in certain of the lower animals; if
I
I such be the case the sai'ie analysis here given is applicable to
those other personalities since they would then fall unaer the
species man rather than the species irrational animal in the
genus animal. Like nan theyVould be distinguished from otlier
animals by rationality, a specific difference v/hich vdth the
proximate genus would yield the definition rational animal.
Hov/ a being comes to have a mind and whether or not
other beings than men have minds are not questions to be consid-
ered here. The what rather than the why or hov; is the object of
investigation.
A. FACULTY
Perhaps no scholastic theory has been more universe]'
ly condermed than the faculty theory of the soul. The general
'rejection of the viev/ v;as based on a minunderstanding which
1 Merci er, liSP, 1, 2>lfe;.
. .s. J C-
-
I'
0
. I '
r
.3 ;J‘
i*y ii
'U 1
V-.ZvjC-. .
"OViiiJ
.
i< ‘ - 0x^^ J ; iv '. o ; r! ' :-:i' <.
Xtiih -If.
106
delayed for centuries recognition of the true theory of mind as
conceived by scholastics. There is justification for the state-
jment that "psychological research v/ithin the past few decades
i
would seem to indicate the soundness of the general concept and
O
the actual need of the revival of the (faculty) theory.”
1. FaGULTIHS imCTIOKS
faculties are not separate parts of the soul. They
correspond to the modern concept of functions. "The proposition,
’our soul possesses different faculties’, means nothing else
than our soul is a substance which is an active principle capable
O’
of exerting different species of energies.”^
Faculties, or functions of the soul, enable the minci
to perceive material, extended, and quality-enaowed bodies and to
perceive in them through action of intellect and sensation the
essence which is the direct object of the mind. It is convenient
to consider various functions of the mind separately and for thi£i
reason the different functions v;ill be considered as distinct
activities.
I
I
S. HIND DIVIDED
I
j
The mind is figuratively divided not only into sensei
i
faculties and intellectual faculties, but the intellectual
faculties are also divided into active ana passive. Follov/ing
Aristotle and St. Thomas, all scholastics are agreed that the
mind at birth is a tabula rasa . Knowledge is maae possible by
^Hart, TCI'IF, 136.
•^Ilaher, PSY, 36.
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operation of the senses, external and internal.
The active intellect is that faculty which illumine^
given objects and abstracts the essence which becones identical
in nind and thing, although not individuated in the nind in the
sane raanner of being as in the singular extra-mental reality.
Note: The psychological explanation of v/hat happen4
in the process of knowing is not very clearly treated in the scho!)Jastic
books consulted by this writer. Emphasis is so great on the
mediating process, which does not rise into consciousness, that
it would appear that what is supposed to be a direct acquaintance
with an object is no more than an analysis of a sensible rep-
resentation of the object in the imagination. The treatments
seem to imply nothing more than a correspondence between the
object as it exists in the imagination or a mysterious dual ex-
istence of the object in nind and thing as a physical being.
Haher says the schoolmen defined the active intel-
lect as;
a certain instinctive spiritual force or
energy of the nind, which acting sponta-
neously on the presentation of objects
in the imagination, generates species
intelligibiles of them or an active
faculty v/hereby the intellect modifies
itself so as to represent in a spiritual
or abstract manner what is concretely
depicted in the phantasm.'^
The difficulty seems to be rooted in the failure of
%aher, PSY, 308.
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medieval scholastics to consider
iLodern v/riters, of whom Ilaher is
I
the
one
epistemological problem,
have considered psycholog-
1
ical theories as they v/ere in the middle ages without considering
the epistemological consequences. The result is that the
psychological seems to refute the epistemological theory, and
to make inaccessible the reality described in the metaphysical
aspect
.
Therefore, the present writer is making his own
interpretation in modern terms, and is ignoring the heavy em-
phasis placed on the subjective location of the data. Scholastic
psychology, taken by itself, could yield nothing more than a
strictly dualistic epistemology. No doubt this was the reason
for Descartes’ extreme dualism which forced him into the most
insistent dualism. Descartes learned a scholasticism in which
epistemological problems were considered only in metaphysics
,
and psychology sought to prove principally the irmriortaliti'- of
the soul and its power to know the existence and nature of God.
The asserted unity of man v/as clouded by description of a being
I
composed of soul and body as separate entities.
I
! non-scholastic, apparently recognizing the
r
!
problem cited in this note and /realizing that a literal inter-
pretation of scholastic psychology would parallel Kant’s viev7
that categories of the mind classify reality, says.
rf
I
f
: , .s B ' i. ^ t’ ' J” i •
) .ir l.T' *1 '* >tJi~
C' 1
^ 1. true theory of hnov/ledge liiust treat
knov;ing of all hinas fron the outset
not as a process of "creating” but as
an aci-ventme of discovery. Me do not
put "the categories" into nature; we
find then there.^
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In other \/ords, the things known furnish the essence, the specie;
intellip;ibilis
;
the classification of the conponents of the
universals is in reality, not in the nind.
How to reconcile such a theory with the quotation
frora Haher above or Vvith the one immediately following here is
difficult to imagine.
fji object produces an impression on a
sensitive faculty. This results in a
sensuous phantasra in the imagination,
and here the work of the lower x^ower ends,
oince, hov/ever
,
in nan the sensuous
faculties of cognition have their source
in a soul endov/ed with intellectual
aptitudes, the latter nov/ issue into
action. The presence of the phantasm
forms the condition of rational activity,
and the intellect abstracts the essence;
that is, b^/- its o\ni active and passive
capabilities generates the concept v;hich
expresses in the abstract the essence of
the object.^
’^Taylor, PS, 25o.
%aher, PSY, 311.
This is x)lain dualism, but it is a description
typically psychological. It is not concerned
either vdth the location of the data or the
nature of the relation involved in knowing.
It is a description in loose, careless language
of what persons believe when they accept images
as "under the hat."
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In naintainin^ that the essence is abstracted fron
the phantasn and that lcno\.’led?re of reality is direct—the essence!
of the thing is in the iiind--the scholastic view seeris to be
extrenely close to Nev/ Realisra \/hich holds that subject and
object are nmierically one. This is an instance of the close
relation betv/een ITev/ Realisn and extreLie idealism referred to
previously. Unless this is the case, or unless essence has the
double function of being in an object and subject at the same
tiiie--a not inconceivable hypothesis because of the irniiateiial
basis of knowledge--it is difficult to see how direct knov/le^ge
can be claimed.
The premises lead to the inevitable conclusion that
in taking the phantasn as the: oasis of the universal, scholastics
mean to identify, at least functionally from the point of view
of the validity of knovi^ledge, the object in the mind with the
existent object. This is an implication not stated expressly,
but it seems to be the most important issue in the thesis.
On the basis of what has been quoted and inferred
from stuQ3'’ of the position, we can fairly accept the distinction
between essence and existence as substantiation of our theory
that there is no essential difference between the object known
and the ob ject-in-itself . There is, however, an existential
difference, or functional difference which is not ad rem here.
3. RUITOTIOKS OF LIIHD
The faculty then is the function of the mind at
certain stages of cognition. The different functions of the mind
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in the process of assinilating object? in their forms are class-
i
ified as faculties, but not in the sense that parts of the mind
j
j
are going about their respective functions. The nind becomes
I
the object in all its aspects, as a formal universal, as a
singular, as a material being, but always the Liirid is directly
related to its object. This is perfectly consistent with the
theory the.t error resides in judgment, because then tv;o objects
are involved and knov;ledge is mediate.
The first result of mental effort is the
concept. Isolated the concept is neither
true nor false, but in a certain sense,
neutral. In the act of ^udgment, the
concept is related to the subject by an
affirmation. Independently of the relation
formulated in a judgment there is, betv/een
the terras , --sub ject and predicate—a relation
due to the character of the terras.'^
Note: To be perfectly consi stent--to go the v/hole
way--it would seem that scholastic? should consider the new-
realistic doctrine of the externality of relations because the
problem of error seeras to have frightened scholastics av/ay from
a. very fundamental question. Since the mind's direct knowledge
Df objects so well accounts for truth—which idealistic dualism
cannot do—v/hy have not the scholastics investigated the object-
ivity of relations further? True categories are of reality,®
jut the study of relations in reality is limited.
Noel, mrt. 1, 142.
®Gf., Taylor, PS, 25S,257.
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B. THE PO'.fERS OF THE IKTELLECT
1 . ONE OBJECT
Although the intellect regards directly the im-
material object, as contrasted v;ith sermons knov/ledge of the
material object, the object regarded in each case is the same.
The essence of the material thing endov/ed vdth individuating
traits has been raised to the status' of a fundamental universal,
a direct, or metaphysical, universal. The intellect does not
take a different "point of view", it is only a function of the
'soul but it enjoys a superior capacity than the senses. In this
a'/ay, frora the same point of viev/, the essence of the object is
I
I
acquired.
2 . INTELLECT LHIITED
The intellect is limited because of- the psycho-
physical nature of man. Abstraction, while yielding immaterial
knowledge, knov/ledge of essence, nevertheless is dependent upon
the veracity of the senses. Thus is the necessity of abstrac-
tion—the elevating of the object to an immaterial form--an im-
perfection, and therein lies the difference betv/een God’s knowl-
edge which is of forms always, and man’s which is of things
composed of natter and form. Inasmuch as man has a body, howevei
,
the power to abstract adds something and is, therefore, a per-
fection. Intuitionists base their viev; on the imperfection of
abstraction.
I
)
I
1

PAoblVE i'UNCTICH•
The intellect,lEsides ftnctionihg as the abstractive
agent, intellectus agens
,
has a passive function. The passive
function of the intellect differs fron the ordinary meaning of
passive, receptive, in that its passivity consists only in its
inability to operate without first having the object presented
to consciousness illuidined.
It is in the passive intellect that the species is
intelligible. The species is present in the first act of the
::aind, apprehension by the passive intellect. The intellectus
agens must be conceived as instinctive or blind; it is the
Intellectus patiens which formally understands. It must be
remembered, however, that these are scholastic distinctions,
lair- splitting, and that the difference in faculties is really
a difference of functions of the same thing.
It is possible that the theory as it stands
only needs to be translated into the language
'
of modern physiological psychology .... to prove
the very truth of which the epistemologist of
the present moment is so anxiously in search.-'
4 . ESSSIIGE REVEi^^LEE
It is clear that simple apprehension does not yield
jtnov;ledge of scientific value; the essence is knovni, but in the
j/orld of things individuals are related not. only essentially but
I
;>y unessential qualities. Particularly is this true of men.
Taylor, Pb, 256.
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jConsequently, the only real purpose simple appre-
I
hension serves is as a philosophical hypothesis. Science must
I
~
still follow the method of induction, synthesis, and synopsis;
but in the theor\^ here set forth, scientists can rest assured
that the objects which they are investigating are as they are
knovni. llediate processes involving sense, imagination, active
and passive intellects do not destroy the direct contact with
Dbjective reality.
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CKrJ^TER VIII
i
j
TEE EFIETEfiOLOGIG^IL ASPECT
I
A. GOU.ION HISUI'lDEHSTiJTDIEa
i
j
A common modern error is the uncritical identifica-
jfcion of present day scholastic philosophy vmth the thought of
|3t. Thomas Aquinas. While it is true that the foundation of
:iiodern scholastic thought v/as laid by St. Thomas, it is a mistake
to suppose that he or any other medievalist fore-saw the problems
which have arisen in the present day.
No one vdll deny that there is a delight to a scho-
lastic in finding in St. Thomas recognition, and particularly
germinal solution, of a vital modern problem, but St. Thomas did
not wish to be, and certainly he is not, a last court of appeal
in the study of questions v/hich he did. not explicitly expound.
Lore necessary than in other fields of investigation
Ls it that epistemological problems be settled not by St. Thomas
but in their own right; first, because the term epistemology was
unknown to the Angelic Doctor, and, secondly, because 'his words
iDn* the question at issue need be taken only at their ovm weight
land not as an infallible criterion of truth. The fact that the
! q|modern scholastic solutions, and there are several, all claim to
I
iDe consistent with St. Thomas’ views as revealed in hi's statements
on other phases of knowledge, indicates only that theories of the
nature and limits of iLimediate knowledge have little hope of early
^Goffey, EPI, I, 265.
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I
solution, and demonstration is impossible.
The most that can be asked is that the thinker con-
sider the theory of iraiaediate knov/ledge more reasonable than the
theory of representative knov/ledge; to attempt to prove that
I
things and not ideas are first knovm is no simpler than to attemp
|to disprove solipsism. From the standpoint of one outside the
listing universe the problem might be vital, but vmthin the
universe coherence of thought is possible from the point of view
bf the believer in the relativity of knowledge as well as from
I
j':h^ point of view of the adherent of the theory of direct knov/1-
(jdge. This is not a retraction of our previous assertion; it is
nerely an admission that in itself the iiiimediacy of knowledge can
not be demonstrated. V/liether Y-:e believe the tree we see is knowTx
directly or as an experience of a self from which experience the
tree’s existence and nature are inferred makes no difference in
:>ne’s system of thought in any practical v/ay. The difference, of
:!ourse, viewed objectively in a v/ay not possible to huLian beings
s a real difference, but fortunately men need not be concerned.
The problem, it is evident, is one of the raost
Abstract and elusive in philosophical study and even though pointy
C'f view are changed by persuasion rather than argument, it is one
qf the most interesting.
All this paper aims to show is the consistency of
i:|he view that things are known directly, that v/hat I think about
s the tree and not my idea of it, that the world in v/hich I live
is as I see it, that each object is a compound of substance and
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qualities actually existing and kno\,Ti as they exist. In other
• •
vords, the scholastic position is close to naive realism’s con-
non sense philosophy; to New Realism’s objectivism; to critical
realism’s essences, and to the complete realistic explanation
)f the objective impersonal existence of the vrorld about us.
Hov; scholasticism avoids the errors of other real-
istic viev/s it is one of the chief purposes of this chapter to
show. Scholasticism has accepted the truth of the various stand-
)oints, but has stood fast against the errors. Despite the tenp-
sation to embrace other systems which substantially confirm the
realism of scholasticism, thinkers in the latter school have re-
fused to sacrifice vital facts to accept partial truth as the
:hol e truth
.
Before closing this historical sketch a further ex-
)lanation of our debt to St. Thomas is in order. V/hile failing
'jO treat the problem explicitly, St. Thomas did include in his
letaphysics a theory of knowledge v/hich is consistent with *the
riev7 defended here. Subsequently therefore, references to the
^reat medievalist will constitute not a self-refutation of the
)resent writer but only an incidental comparison of points raised
7ith knovm view's of St. T. omas on the s£ime questions, h'hat :..ust
)e borne in mind is that the present theory is a modern develop-
lent; it is regrettable to have to insist on this point, but
lodern prejudice against medievalists might otherwise lead to a
•efusal to listen.
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B. TIIE FRII/^iY I'ACTS
1. ExiRLY YimS
Early New Jcholastics, spending most of their time
within the spheres of thought outlined bj'- St. Thomas, failed ever
to consider the precise problem on which modern epistemology has
concentrated its attention: the nature of immediate knowledge.
They accepted as one of their three first principles the veridi-
cal quality of knov/ledge viewed subjectively or objectively.
The question of the possible relativity of knowledge to the knov/-
ing subject, the possible alteration of the object knovm by the
act of knowing, the possible misrepresentation of the object in
the idea v;ere considered extremely unlikely when considered at
all.
Hence, scholasticism v/as rightly excluded from the
world of modern thought because the three primary truths did not
approach the question occupying the thoughts of modern men. The
principles, the chief basis of modern rejection of scholasticism,
were first, that one’s ovm existence could not be denied; second-
ly, that immediate consciousness testifies to the ability of
huTiian faculties to knov/; thirdly that the law of contradiction
is self-evident .2
To the modern criticism that the second principle
was the one in question scholastics ansv/ered in a disjunctive
which they considered complete, namelj’’, either our knowledge is
objectively true, and this appears self-evident and not needing
%ickab3'', FP, 164,102.
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proof, or knowledge is impossible, and the very presentation
I
of questions concerning the validity of knowledge is absurd.
i
In connection with the latter point, which they rejected, it v/aS|
further concluded that if the validity of knowledge could be
questioned there was no solution to the problem and all thinking
was vain.
It must be adraitted that the present writer, as
indicated above, inclines to the last viev/ except that he feels
a complete examination of the facts v/ill give convincing, if not
demonstrative, evidence of the validity of knov/ledge and of the
direct presence of the object in the knower. In this view he is
encouraged by Kercier’s attempt to bridge the gap between scho-
lastic complacence and non-scholastic criticism by rejecting the
r?
three primary truths as self evident.*^
2
.
n.mTERi;dL uiaoN
i
Having seen that basically knov/ledge is an immate-
rial union of mind and object--assimilation of the object hj the
I
mind without alteration in the form of either essentially, and
!
having admitted a certain relativity in knov/ledge due to man’s
I
limited mental capacity and the opposition of matter to knowl-
i
edge, opposition which can be only partly overcome, v/e turn now
to the epistemological question se .
C. IviiL^dllNG OF SIGKOI^.:
The use of the term si gnuiii in scholastic philosophy
^I.Iercier, lISP, I, 3b9,561.
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has undoubtedly been the stumbling block to an interpretation of
the position. The reason is obvious, oignun means sign, and in
this day of emphasis on s 3nnbolisn cursory observers have clas-
sified scholasticism as a form of representative realism or
idealism.
1. Eb'JlLY VIi;V/
According to the opinion which generally
prevailed among the Peripatetic Philosophers
of the middle ages, our faculties of knov/l-
edge required for their activities a certain
representative medium, different both from
the mind itself and from the external object
of thought.^
This nininterprstation is not an uncoBiriion or un-
reasonable one; it denotes only a lack of familiarity v/ith scho-
lastic language and the restrictions placea on usage of certain
v/ords. The similarity of expression of the scholastic view and
• •
critical, naive, and nev; realisms, as well as the eclectic vievv
jOf Russell, which seems designed to abolish the distinction be-
tween mind and matter, would lead in a casual comparison to the
opinion that scholasticism is readily classifiable in any of
those schools. As a matter of fact there is a close relation,
but it is by no means a ground for identification.
i. Thus, most scholastics will agree with the nev/
realist that knowledge cannot be identified with the process of
knowing; conception •i r id quo (that by which) not id quod (that
. 5
whi ch ) is known
.
ti.eid, '^iorks, 952.
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ii. In considering essence ns objective reality
and content of the riind in simple apprehension, scholastics holdi
that the essence is neither singular nor plural but capable of
being either. It is under this aspect that fundamental univer-
sality (in the thing) and formal universality (in the .mind) are
asserted. Essence is neither singular nor plural. It is im-
material form. It is not a thought, but object of a thought.
As content of the intellect and as the objective thing its statu;
is not greatly different from that of neutral entities in the
nevv’’ Realism, and non-mental, non-physical being of Bertrand
7Russell. In each instance the essence, whether it be the form
of the being or that in the being which is related to its univer-
sal, identical nature, is a unique singular something independeni
of the mind’s activity and actually existing imr.iaterially as the
determinant of matter.
2 . 31GIJUI.: DEEINBD
The term signur.i designates an unconscious process
which yields knowledge. Signs are generally of four kinds, all
but one of which is representative or implicative.
i. ^ natural sign ( implicative) may be the basis of
inference of knowledge about something. Thus ice on a pond
implies that the pond contains frozen water. The sign and the
thing aie indistinguishable; hence direct knov/ledge of one is
direct knov/ledge of the other.
®Ibid., 3G6,372.
'^Russell, POP, 142,157.
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a. This may be a simple, natural sign, as in the
example cited,
b. It may involve a proces of reasoning the result
of which is just as iranediate as the principle on v;hich the
j
reasoning operates. Thus by the lav/, or principle, of cause and
I effect, it is knovm that the presence of a watch found in the
I
woods implies the existence of someone who made it.
Ontologically natural signs yield immediate knowl-
edge once the form of the object has been assimilated. Through-
out the process, hov/ever, the sign itself is present in con-
«
sciousness, and there is a certain mediacy, at least psycholog-
ical v/hich destroys the complete directness of v/hat is known by
formal signs, (See iv,
)
ii. An arbitrary sign is the type ordinarily con-
sidered in symbolism. It is the type of sign v/hich satisfies the:
dualist, the coherence theorist, and the skeptic. Thus, R is an
arbitrary sign for the ten.i relation although it night also stand
for radius, red, or any other object.
iii. iui instrumental sign is one closely related to
a natural sign, except that the relation is not intrinsic. Thus
a pen is an instrument for v/riting. It is a sign of v/riting
although it nay never be used. It lacks the intrinsic connection
jwith that which is signified, but it cannot be classified as an
1 arbitrary sign.
Note: It v/ill be seen that although all these are
signs they are themselves objects of the mind in the knov/ledge
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processes. They are instruiaents to further knowledge. They
constitute the basis of inference. ICnov/ledge of these signs
is no more direct than knov/ledge of other objects.
Nevertheless, the errors of those who consider
scholasticisr.i a form of the copy theory of knowledge have in-
terpreted the species intelligibles as a natural or instrumental
•
sign. For example, a modern historian of importance says:
In their doctrine of the ’species intel-
ligibles,’ the two Realists have alike
followed. ... the old Greek idea that in
the knowing nrocess cony of the
latter arises, whicn is then apprehended
and beheld by the soul.
8
As a matter of fact, scholastics discussing knowl-
edge deliberately avoid the copy theory for two reasons: first,
it is limited to so-called sense knov/ledge; secondly, it is in-
jCapablb.'of proof as a theory of knov/ledge, although correspondenc
must be admitted if any scientific knowledge means anything.
This will be considered in greater detail in dis-
cussion of sense knowledge.
iv. A formal sign, exemplified by the species
intelligibles
,
is one which reveals the thing signified without
itself being a representation of the thing or a conscious medium,
It cannot be denied that in a loose sense the specie
intelligibles is an instruiaent to knowledge. It stands as the
relating link between the mind and object, and it may itself come
into consciousness upon reflection. It cannot come into con-
sciousness, however, without first revealing the essence of some
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other object.
I
a. The theory seems to many either as a form of
i
symbolism or a hodge-podge of meaningless vrardage. Yet its
soundness, due mainly to the "common sense" point of viev/, makes
I
it easily confirmable.
Sullen one speaks of a representative, or average,
man, one is expressing a concept of an entity which exists not
as an individual, but as a species. Representative is not
applied to an arbitrary subject; it is not used as a guide in
the search for an individual; it is not used, strictly speaking,
as implying a complete set of characteristics. Rather, v/ithout
any picture of the "average man" one can find the coraraon traits
of men and from them directly construct the concept of the
"average man." In no way does this mean that the average man
can be defined as a rational animal, although this obviously is
true. It means that there is a concept, objectively grounded,
which is revealed after direct acquaintance vfith the constit-
iuents of an average man or average men.
I
Perhaps a better example, one more properly illus-
trative of the point, is the traditional instance of the man
looking through field glasses. He can know another man at whom
he looks without ever being conscious of the glasses. On the
other hand, by reflection, he can become aware of the glasses;
but it is still the same nan at which he is looking.
In this exaiaple, the glasses are not a natural sign
of the man because a man need not be seen; they are not arbitrary
signs because they do not arbitrarily stand for the man; they
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are not instrunental signs in an epistemological sense, because
the man could be seen without then and because nothing is infern;
from the glasses. The relation is betv/een the one seeing and
the seen.
d
The nature of the object seen is not affected by
a formal sign, although, naturally, it may be affected by an
instruraental sign and need in no way conform to an arbitrary
sign. Since it is the nature of an idea to serve as a formal
sign, the true nature of the object is presented to consciousness.
b. The view is the view of common sense. To de-
duce from the statement of the knowledge situation that meta-
physics is made dependent upon epistemology^ is self-refuting,
since such a deduction is not based on a metaphysical view of
I
the situation. That the epistemological theory conform to the
I
metaphysical scheme of reality is necessary, but this does not
I
give the epistemological theory a priority of nature. The facts
of each theory are jointly true and contemporaneous, but nec-
essarily they are consistent one v/ith the other.
V. The pessimism of modern science, based on sub-
jectivism, is evident in the words of its spokesmen. The com-
mon man’s escape from this pessimism by justification of his ovvn
common sense experience in philosophical form is offered by the
scholastic
.
a. The mind is necessary to an understanding of
nature and natural laws. The mind is the only being necessary
in the special science of logic.
'^Marvin, Art. 1, 49, 5Q
'ji jooc .
,
8 Xsoi' ' . [oj :
n
t X X^ J“i*‘^1'Uj'i ^nx Joii i
‘ill 'ii.uitorr t»<;.j:. 'i*:a :xoi^c^X,. iQOR 9.' '.jLuoo aoil
' .;•' nc :obS oi:o : > • .-• 3i .:_: ^ CO'I SJK.’ . oif.t ’k0;t7
. r.ooa e
•.•: ;?b Dx'rx/i :--iT ex nc.oe • \ Jc o.<^ 'ri'J
IS'
;•.;> ;.'J
r ,.r
..X. '1 j iwi.i .i ' ) ->:. .ro ...i i'"' '-' '-- *i' --‘Wtil'
“
'JS'I-'fliii
r •,;••. )'j ! 33>, ;.“ ."» '.- - • 't v 0 *ir' • .11 'Jiiv 2 .? 1 • L*"!
K . . ! iei»OG ''
*'
-• .
,, S . .. .'2 tlQIpU^Ip^ .
-' *
•' t'uJ -X " - •X
-,:
.
r
: . . ISiMJSlz - X'. ' -' uJ-^ ;>rf^ EU i ‘ OOlXb
’
"fj"- ..--^r''* ; N ' ^•’: '.olf- - .-J iO'J .T;iO .Sb!’ OX* OOJPt i . .oi.2 X.‘
/iv i. ;^iJT^:rJ3J'erl ’ -> -cei-jJ :*oa c;X •
•'
• .:C- r- ;;r'::ia
: .L* '...r .i'loX:.''- .'Xo. -X;
'
' " j . ' j '.xl^
d’Otf
' vx lO -: I
<-o G o X
r
.
i • oj
,0 i f*;
*
’
.
' :»* X xOx A
-yon . 'A
.
..[•••) Vii^ .J'- • --0 ••..X '.cn.-'o . .
-X.X-: rro bf' ,'.’»i'''yc r:'-,: o.i xc ' X. i'r..'- 3q . -v
•
.
.;-:vo:-r -Xi o -1 J-ro xv :t
^3 o * j'r ' L’ - • '.X ',[i. . *ui ‘.'.-ijE'X'- . I'-vX I
,:di \ii ttT^ 'y.o ?.i * 'I0‘1 XyoXi.i.C'
;
i.! oo..^ i'l-.-
'
i .t yoiiS
ir.x-'XtoO',
'
r
' :ioH!
r.Cu. ;0
loab*
'>J
.
‘ t J ..5
n 'j..iod vX:10 o:"- <' i i.'.i.- - . J.i'l'. in
.iAk. ti rV'T . '.i
^
'
x:
II
126
b . On the other hand, however, the nind is not
essential to the vrorking of the extra-nental
,
physical world.
The iiind, by definition, is essential to knowledge of the v;ork-
ing of the universe. That is Vi/hat is meant by science, and in
this sense science is of the mind. But the direct objects of
scientific investigation are inn .ediately present in consciousness .
vL The dominance of the subjectivist thesis in
modern science is evident. The status of science as science, a
subjective explanation of extra-mental events by a process of
reasoning, is confused v/ith the actual occurence of the events.
vii. The fact that the direct object is an extra-
nental reality, not the nind itself as an idea, is confirmation
of the thesis that the mind does not know itself directly.
Knowledge of self is inferred from the activity of the nind. It
consists in reflection upon ideas, -f the nind were known
1
I
directly, subjectivism could not be averted. Only by realizing
that ideas are only forraal signs, knov/able by reflection, can
agnostic dualism be averted.
D. EI^ORS OF REALISM
V«Tiile fundamentally opposed to idealism and extreme
epistemological dualism, scholasticism cannot be identified v/ith
the New Realism or Critical Realism, despite the efforts of both
to avoid the errors scholasticism seeks to avoid.
^°Holt, I®, 474.
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1 , KCTREI-li: OBJSCTIOKISL
Nev7 Realism in its zeal to escape subjectivism,
goes to the other extreme and becomes objectivism. Rs idealism
had no room for distinction between mind and thing, Kew Realism
has no room for distinction betv/een thing and mind. The extreme
monism is contrary to experience . ilind is different from things
Identification of mind and object as object, if, indoea, it can
12be identified as one rather than the other, fails as completely
as iaealism to explain the distinction between mind and object
and the direct presence of object to the mind. Only by consider'
ing the problem of universals, the presence of the object’s form
in the mind, can the dualistic reality be explained in terms whic
yield objective truth.
The distinction between a knowledge pro cess (percep-
13ition and conception) and its object (the extra-mental thing),
!LS a perfect statement of the scholastic position: knowledge
process is not its ovm object, but is rather the means by which
'jsome other object is known.
2. /dIBIGUCUD
The language of Critical Realism, in which such termj^
las essence and Intellect and essence known to the intellect , etc.
,
pccur, would seem to indicate a close affinity to scholasticism.
Jritical Realism denies the dualism of form and matter, but
jasserts blankly:
IT
Holt, HR, 11.
12
Love j oy , RiiD , 254
.
Dralift.ECR. 4,

”To know the thing is not to the thing.... It is the recognize
possession by the mind of the ’’form of the thing, that is, -its
position, size, structure, causal capacities, etc”. Such,
hov/ever,-is not the case since the essence in Critical Realisn
never is a substantive, but rather is the terra used to describe
sense data.
128
Nevertheless, the siioilarity in view, and agreement
of realists generally on the fundaraental thesis, that the proces
lb
is different from the object, is clear.
i. The identity of the form in the raind and the
foria of the object is the fundamental tenet of scholasticism.
Naturally, the form of the thing is in the mind only when the
object is experienced. The object is in the subject knowing
only in the act of knowing. The identity of the tvro is not ab-
solute. It is an identity of fona.
I
' It is, therefore, true that the foria in the mind is
!
not the fom directly knovm. That is the mental form available
in the absence of the object. It is the sane in nature as the
I
,
object and is the explanation of memory.
IfSellars,, Art. 1, 118. Cf. also, Drake, ITP, 132.
^^Santayana, Art. 1, 166.
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This foiTii is not itself the object knovm;
the object knovm is directly and iaraediately
the real being. The form united to the knov/-
ing subject is an ontological reality, but a
reality which is there only to make knowledge
possible and to carry consciousness to the
object, V»Tien I.Ir, Strong says that the psychic
state is not itself knovm, but is the vehicle
through which the "essence” is given, we are
almost in agreement with him. But v/e would
go a step further, and make a distinction
between the material side of the psychic state
and its form. The form has an esse intentionale
in the subject and through it, the psychic state
is united to the subject knovm.
ii. The unity of mind and object is similar to the
unity of body and soul, llan has vdthin him the "not-self" (body
17
which is denied in idealistic dualism. The mind is a function
of the soul and the same soul informs the whole man in all his
conduct, voluntary and involuntary.
The same essence which exists individualized in the
object exists in the mind for the purpose of knov/ledge
E . BEK3E KliOhLEDGE
The mistrust in epistemology of the same senses
v;hich are considered accurate in the study of scientific in-
struments v/ill be considered in conjunction v/ith the scholastic
theory of sense knowledge.
1 . aEHSiiTIONS iiCCUIlATE
The correspondence of sensations with certain
qualities which together constitute the object of collective
sense knowledge is not disputed convincingly by anyone. The ob-
jective status of such knowledge, however, has been given a wide
129
Bart ,Art .1,23.
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variety of interpretations,
2. 0BJ^GT;0 GIVU
*
Sense knowledge is av/areness of qualitative and
quantitative data furnished by objects through sensations.
i. Sensation, the vehicle of sense knowledge,
resenbles its cause. Sense knowledge, like intellectual knowl-
edge, is effected through a nediun which itself is not cognitive
Yet if the sensation itself v/ere not like the corresponding
object it could not furnish the basis of empirical investigation
ii. Differences in sensations are due to differences
in nervous impulses, which in turn are due to differences in
objects. The sensation itself is that indubitably subjective
state which arises from activity of nerve impulses. But dif-
ferences among sensations in any individual are due to difference
in the extra-mental causes. This much will be granted quite
generally.
3. SDNSiYflOW 3UB1DCTIVE
It would be folly to speak of sensations as objec-
tive. Sensations are of the subject, vv'e cannot have hearing in
the object, but this does not mean that sound cannot be objective
i. As far as we know, v/e do not hear waves; we hear
sounds. The exact constituents of this subjective sound, the
elements of the psychical, the conscious aspect are not analyzable
as are the extra-mental phenomena.
ii. Pragiiiatism makes itself decidedly felt in this
investigation. It is easy to join the pragmatist and assert
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that we know objects of sense in a way in which they can be used,
But to join the pragnatist is to beg the question; it is to
accept what seeris obvious and workable v/ithout questioning the
validity of sense knov;ledge.
iii. It is true that color has been shown scientific-
ally to be different "objectively” fron v;hat it is as experience L
through the senses. To conclude fron this fact that the senses
I
are deceived, however, is to accept one dogria in place of another.
i One condition of knowledge at least, proper dis-
j
!
position of subject and object, is nissing. \«hen the condition
of knov;lt;dge is changed it is unquestionably true that what is
knovm seens to be changed. But this does not alter the fact
that the senses perceive the object as it is and according to
the condition. The extra-nental object is not altered, and cer-
tainly the senses are not altered. Rational consideration of
the condition—v/hich here nay be considered as a nediun to direc :
knowledge of the thing—will yield the truth.
4. obJuUctivt: truth
blien an ordinary rian asserts a tree is green, he is
asserting an objective truth. The gree. ness need not be the s.ame
as the sensation of green unuer all conditions; but unaer the
conditions of ordinary, valid experience it is as it appears a
quality of an objective tree, b'hat it is outside experience,
no one can know, but there is no valid reason for asserting that
it is different.

i. So-called scientific descriptions of green,
exemplifying the appearance of green under extraordinary circura-
stances, do not alter the fact ' ‘ of the extra-mental differ-
ences 'among colors. Consequently, in confirmation of our con-
tention that green objectively is the green knovm v/e have only
to* recall our self-evident postulate that whatever is received
is received according to the nature of the receiver. The senses
seem ordained to put us. .in touch \/ith extra-mental reality as it
is. That tliey succeed is attested by the experience of everyone
ii. Colored-glasses, color-blindness, etc, do not
affect the objective nature of color. That nature is the nature
sensed, sensed not in a way opposed to purposeful use of it, as
would be the case if color v/ere sensed as the phenomenon of
absorption and reflection of light rays. Ihiowledge of colors as
knov/ledge of essence and knowledge of objective sense stimuli
generally is not complete. One aspect, that .knowable by the
subject, is revealed.
The scholastic position has been well summarized by
Laird, a Non-gcholastic
,
in this passage: ”To say that sense ex-
perience is partial and provisional is true enough, but need not
19lead to a wholesale distrust of the testimony of senses."
Sense knowledge needs to be tested by intellectual
knowledge.
19Laird, SR, 44.
132
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5. IL^ PKOPiilt OBJ^Gl
Each sense has a proper object, and ezaiiples of the
imtrustworthiness are due to efforts to have one sense report
facts for another. Thus when soraething "looks good to eat", one
should not judge by that criterion. Rather, two other senses,
smell and taste, should be eraployed.
i
In acquiring sense Icnowledge, the intellect is aided
I
by an internal sense called the "comnon sense." It is the com-
I
non sense v/hich groups the various aspects ofan object and re-
veals the physical nature.
6.
PCGIu-xTIC ^SBERTIOITS DEICIED
Dogmatic assertions concerning sense knowledge are
denied not onlj'- scholastics but all other philosophers because
of the very nature of the problem. Disproof of naive views is
in terns of other sensible evidence. The same senses which
report the tree to be green, sugar to be sweet, etc. report ligh1
to be colorless rays, taste to be the result of stimulation of
taste-buds, or other simple structures, by an object taken into
the mouth
.
7.
accidents are objects
Accidents (quantitiT", qualities, relations, etc.) are
objects of sense knov/ledge . This knowledge is not complete or
rational since it lacks the essential basis of intellectual
j
knowledge and is like knowledge in animals.
i
i
' V/e have seen that sensation corresponds with the
j
stimulus, that green objectively, regardless -of the material
• j;c „ • £ ,/ ,
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I
elements composing it, has the form of green. Therefore, sense
i
I
knov/ledge, under normal conditions, is valid. It would be of
little value, cognitive or otherwise, if color v/ere perceived as
so many light waves. The form of color perceived by the senses
is the same in the mind and object. The mode of being is not
altered by the mode of perception, and the node of being is as
perceived.
8. 3ii;i:8E8 DO NOT JUDGE
Throughout this section it has been readily adiaitted
that sense knowledge is relative in its imnediate status. The
senses do not judge. The mind, functioning as the common sense,
differentiates betv/een normal and abnormal conditions. In no
event is the objective material object taken into the senses.
Nevertheless, the form on which the knov/ledge is based is the
true form.
Sense knowledge is not essentially different from
the object of sense. It is the form of the object as presented
to consciousness. There is no symbolism or arbitrary representa-
Sense is the avenue to truth.
No datum of consciousness is more clear
and universal than its assurance of the
objectivity of sense— impressions. As
we are under a reign of truth, our senses
must be veracious in assuring us of the
existence of objects exterior to our-
selves. Eor the sane reason, the im-
pressions received from exterior objects
must be a true expression of their essen-
tial natures. This is confirmed by the
analogy of our o\m ego, the interior acts
of which are recognized to be the natural
tion.
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expression of its ovm nature. As all
phenomena are a true expression of the
essential natures of nounena in which
they inhere, form, color, sound, and
taste are no less objective realities
than v;eight or cohesion The
scientific explanations of the mechanism
of sense-perception do not in any way
throw doubt upon the objective reality
of the phenomena perceived, but merely
elucidate one aspect of the process by
which we become cognizant of them.^*^
9. QUALITIES 0BJEGT3 OF SEITSE
We conclude this section vdth a consideration of
qualities as objects of sense experience,
i. Primary qualities are those knowable by more
than one sense. Secondary qualities are those perceived by one
! sense only, although two senses may have the qualities as objects .
I
j
I
a. Size is knowable to the same extent by touch and
' vision.
I
b. Candy may be sweet-tasting and pleasing in ap-
I
pearance, but the knowledge derived by one sense is not the saiae
as by another.
ii. h’’hile some philosophers have denied the reality
of all qualities, others have rejected only the secondary, hold-
ing they are subjective creations
.
V/e choose here, however, to follow Coffey who says
both primar 3'' and .secondary qualities are real and that both are
direct objects of sense perception, Coffey declares that the
^^Snell, me, 10.
^-‘-lllflckiiitoshj PBKf 328.
II
objectivity of primary qualities is no more evident—and the
relation to senses no more direct—than in the case of secondary
qualities; also, that consciousness of sound, color, taste, and
smell are just as certainly due to extra-mental reality as are
22
impressions of extension, weight, etc,
iii. The metaphysical concept of potency and act, so
characteristic of scholastic metaphysics is a basis for the
theory that perception is a direct perception of quality. The
unperceived quality is a potency; when perceived it is a con-
stituent of perception.
This is the justification for the assertion that
sound and color are objective qualities, although their percep-
tion is subjective. The tree is green when not perceived, just
as it is green when perceived. There can, of course, be no per-
ception without a perceiver; nor can there be perception without
a ’’perceived.” In instances of perception, if, as scholastics
hold, it is to be true, it ^lUst be direct, not inferential or
distorted, and, in no case, arbitrary.
There is nothing contradictory in the theory that
green as experienced is objectively real in the tree. To exclude
the sensation in defining the cause of the sensation is to remove
the fundamental condition of the investigation. It would be no
different in method from taking temperatures without a thenaomet^tr.
^Coffey, EPI, II, 108, Also, Murphy, ^rt, 1,201
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F. SGHOL.^TIC EFISTia-IOLOGY
iSimple denial of the identity of viev/s between
scholasticism and its theory of direct presentation of objective
reality to consciousness and other monistically grounded systems
cannot offset striking similarities which will be stated in the
next chapter. It is well here, at the completion of the pre-
sentation of the view, to take cognizance of a philosopher whose
views in part parallel those of scholasticism and whose inter-
pretation of Thomistic doctrines is excellent.
, , . .The union of realism and intellectualism. .
.
is seen in the doctrine of truth of the
Aristotelian scholastics ... ."v/here comraon sense
and the influence of Aristotle prevailed
reality and ordinary appearance tended to be
identified The statement of Thomas Aquinas
that ”to knox-J the truth is to know the agreement
of knowledge with the thing knovm” presented no
difficulties, for while the realism was not
carried to any one-sided extreme (as in the case
in the Nev; Realism) ,23on the other hand there
was no absolute epistemological dualism to be
transcended. ^
A
Parenthetical matter mine.
24 ilackintosh, POK, 391.
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CHAPTER IX
1
j
SmiPiRY CONCLUSION
A. EPISTSIvIOLOGY IS AN ASPECT OF IjETiU-HYSICS
Separation of epistemology from metaphysics has been hailed
as a major service to the development of modern thought. Thus
v/e read
:
Epistemology is not a logically fundamental science
epistemology cannot furnish us v/ith a theory of
reality. . . .metaphysics ov;es logically neither its probleij(;
nor their solution to the theory of knov/ledge . . . .and
though the verdict of history has not been delivered,
there is strong evidence that criticism has seriously
hindered as well as helped metaphysics during the past
tv/o centuries,"^
The present v/riter cannot share this opinion. Throughout
the history of philosophy, thinkers have considered the questions
treated in epistemology, and they have considered them not as
separate problems but as aspects of the greater, the metaphysicaii
riddle of the universe.
Epistemology cannot exist by itself. The problem of know-
I
j
ledge is not restricted to the nature of a particular set of
i
phenomena existing apart from all else or even conceivable in
I
'terms of its own nature. The problem of knov;ledge is a three-
' sided indivisible problem, and upon the unity of the problem, as
‘found in the relation betv/een the mind and object, rests the pos-
sibility of solution.
Attempting to isolate a particular knov/ing, or, in fact,
all knov/ing, from the setting of its occurrence may be interest-
ing recreation , but the data examined are themselves involved
1
Marvin ,^rt .1,95,

in a unique unity of mind and data v/hich renders consideration
in isolation impossible. One might as v;ell consider a man
sv/allov;ing his ov/n head as to consider studying knov/ledge in
isolation.
On the other hand, there is ^ralue in studying the pro-
cess called knov/ledge as a unifying link bet-^/een mind and object
J
I
just as one might examine the space that makes possible the fit-
ting together of gears. The mind and objects, just as all other
unified parts of reality, fit together into a smoothly working
v/hole. In studying gears, especially in designing them, the
limitation of parts is to enable the gears to work. Yet, measure-
ments, strictly speaking, are not of the m.aterial things but
rather of the space outside the parts.
No engineer 'v/ould admit he is dealing in empty spaces,
and in the larger sense he is not. Hence, when we speak of know-
ledge as a separate part of reality, v/e are not losing sight of
the fact that as an independent fact it cannot exist.
(In the metaphysical theory of this v/riter, conscious-
ness, the essence of knov/ledge, is synonomous vrith knov/ledge
but is only one characteristic of the person. The person is
a being of body as well as mind, and whether or not consciousness
enhances values, considered purely objectively, is a quite debat-
able question. It is admitted that values must be experienced,
that is they must be subjective, to be meaningful, but that
they are grounded objectively cannot be denied. Just as elimina-
tion of intervening space in a changing machine would have ad-
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vantages so also would elimination of consciousness from the
universe have its advantages. Consciousness implies free and
spontaneous use of data h3’- finite, fallible beings. A completely
determined universe, directed by a Divine mind,v/ould exclude
irrational activity. It v/ould be completely integrated and,
consequently, completely coherent to an all-v;ise mind regarding
j
!
it from outside reality. Until knov/ledge is used to restrict
the freedom conferred by consciousness, until individuals lose
their self-sufficient feeling to become rational elements in
God's activity for a completely integrated universe, conscious-
ness—the awareness of one's ability to compete against as v/ell
as to cooperate with his fellow-men-j-—v/ill remain the chief
impediment to progress. Perhaps this is the basis of the classid
denunciation of intellectualisDi and a plea for recognition of
intuition, spontaneous action, as the really fundamental link
uniting man with reality. This digression may be unjustified, bui;
it aims to illustrate that metaphysics is the all-inclusive
science, and theories purporting to be independent of the v;hole,
even though reconcilable v/ith it, can be objectively effective,
at least first, only apart from the more important facts, Episte--
mological theories must be implicates of metaphysics in v;hich the
are rooted or the danger of rationalization is ever present.)
ViThen consciousness is identified vdth knov/ledge and also
with the person, there is an internality of the relation betv;een
self and object v/hich cannot be overcome, Yilien, however, as this
writer chooses to suppose, knoiJrledge is merely something that
happens to a psychological-physical dualism, the relation is
y
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external. It is a new fact in reality, no more detemining the
knov/er than the known. True, kno\;ledge apart from a person and
object is nothing, but, for any working or related purpose,
neither is the space between gears, V/hat we are really coneerne4]
with is the relation between two things, mind and object, and we
measure the nothingness-in-itself which stands between them only
by understanding the natures of mind and object.
That there is nothing between interlocking gears before
they interlock, except space
,
possibly empty space, need not be
asserted. It would add little v;eight to the argument because th^
inalogy is drav^n arbitrarily. Nevertheless, the principle is
important to an underStanding of this writer’s view of reality
and the function of knov;ledge.
Knowledge is nothing more than the fact that the human
Imind is united to something external to it. The mind does not
begin its activity with an examination of a datum self— for theij
it could never get beyond itself-- but rather it begins with in-
teraction with an external object v;ith consciousness revealing
that object directly
. We think trees, stones, boxes, etc, V/e
Ido not think ideas.
It is true that the mind has the pov/er to project into
a setting, as yet inadeq^uat&ly defined, facts recalled from the
past and events anticipated from the future. But is this indicat3))ve
of some unexplored internal world ? Rather, it w^uld seem that
these phenomena are more rightly judged to be part of the extern-|
|al world than part of some internal, elastic
,
and altogether high-[
ly mysterious mirage. It seema to this writer that his thought^-
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extend far beyond any internal state, v;hich cannot really trans-
cend space, to the farthest outskirts of reality, although it is
freely confessed that no clear knowledge is held and probably
0
much information is lacking.
The problems of psychology, in \.^hich are included many of
the riddles of epistemology, must be answered ' by analysis of
observed data alone, since v/e start \/ith a realization of our
our inability to collect all the date; they must be solved by
the implications of sound metaphysical theory. Reality must
be viewed objectively with the fallacy of ego-centric predicamenj:
clearly in mind; other^/i se
,
speculation is worthless and solipsism
must be honestly accepted.
The existence of the stick in the water as both straight
and bent, v/hich this writer by no means sug-^ests is true, never-
theless does not seem so repulsive today as it v/ould have some
years ago. In fact, the existence of such diversity of views--
and the popular notion that all vie\/s have a germ of truth— lenf
v/eight to the growing conviction that reality is sufficiently
broad to allow for the correctness of all views, provided they
are regarded from the proper perspectives. Our difficulty seems
to be immaturity of mind v/hich prevents conquest of the proper
standpoints by one person. This, without assuming too much from
the little understood field of psychology, would seem to be a
limitation of man rather than a limitation of the truth of any
assertion.
Our first conclusion then must be that the separation of
epistemology from its setting in the metaphysic of reality is
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not a service but a dis-service. It creates the danger
ihat the process and not the terns of the process will receive
[lost of the attention of thinkers.
1. SOUL BODY DISTINCT
The scholastic vie\7s the soul as distinct but not separat
from the body. This constitutes the chief difference between the
Nev; Scholasticism and the New -t^ealism: for the latter, human per
sonality is nothing but an aspect of the objective v/orld. All
things subsist as neutral beings; there is no real difference
objectively betv/’een the illusory and the real. can accept
the pluralism of l^ev/ Realism and go even farther to include
man as the limiting agent of consciousness and deny that con-
sciousness is merely an aspect of t' ings
,
a something which
selects parts of reality in which to occur.
It is unfortunate that Nev/ Realism fell into this error
becii.use an auspicious start had been made towards the attain-
2
nent of truth in the emphasis on metaphysics. Yet, a new
realist reveals the source of the error to be, ironically
enough, in a subjectivist misconception.
I refer to the assertions: "the true is an object of an
actual or possible belief." And: "I shall use the term ’sub-
sistent^ to denominate any one of the actual and possible
4
objects of thought."
2
Marvin.Art .1 .passim.
0
Montague
,
Art . 1 , 252
.
4
, PR?;.
1
i
i
1
i
1
1

In recognizing the scholastic division of the real into
actual and possible beings, the author did not see an escape frotti
the subjectivism which would require dependence of being for its
possibility on conceivability , In a rush to objectify everq^thing
as ’•subsistent”
,
making actual beings no different from possible
beings, the author ^s mind failed to grasp a fundamental scholastic
distinction that conceivability depends on possibility, not vice
versa . It is clear that the scholastic view implies the existenc
of actual being, and it should be noted that subsistence of pos-
sible being in the real order is perfectly consistent.
The author at one point seemed to recognize that the
scholastic distinction bet\/een the real and acttial held the only
solution to the perplexing metaphysical problem;
144
The doctrine (New Realism) is v/rong in claiming an
actual external existence for every experienced object, but
it is right in holding to a possible external existence for
such objects, and in maintaining that, as the presupposition
for such possible existence, all the objects of experience
have a nature or meaning^that is independent of their pro sen
in anjT'body's experience.
lie
An object is real if it exists or can exist. It is an
actual being when it does exist. Hence, the only objects that
are not real are impossible objects, and no impossible object is
conceivable. Therefore, error is involved only in the question
of existence. The existence of an object is a matter of judgmen
Consequently, the immediate object, externally presented, is nev^r
the basis of false apprehension. It is, actually or possibly, as
presented. Error , if any, resides in judgment,
5
Montague, VflC, 296,
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Thus far we have seen a distinction betvreen essence and
existence and hetv/een real and actual beings, Je can, in the
light of these distinctions, see that bod^r and soul,while con-
stituting one being, may yet be distinct. Possible men become
actual by the union of form (soul) with matter (body) v/hich
unites also the distinct realities essence and existence.
’’Finite being is constituted by tv/o principles really
gdistinct, essence and existence. ”
The doctrine of the distinction bet\7een possible and
real beings has been exaggerated to a doctrine of separation by
critical realists. Not only are possible beings separated by thei|:i
from actual beings, instead of being simply distinguished from
them in the real order, but possible beings are included in the
ssime class with impossible beings.
7
”I may think, for example, of a round square.”
The scholastic ansv/er to this emphasizes the monistic
epistemology. It is impossible to conceive of a round square for
the simply reason that a round square is me taphysically impossible
it cannot exist or subsist. To define a round souare as a geom-
etrical figure v/hose sides make a sruare and a circle is really
give tv/o definitions. And if a round square cannot be conceived
because it is impossible, the critical realist claims to experi-
ence a given v/hich is false. The metaphysical possibility of an
object determines v/hether or not it can be given. iVnd whatever
McMahon, Art, 1,246.
7
Drake ,Art , 1 , 54
.
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is given is verifiable as to existence, v/hen the metaphysical
scheme includes the possible in the real, leaving the question o:
'
existence as the source of error, the clear scholastic doctrine
of direct presentation of the object is seen.
It is on this metaphysical rock, v/ith man as a substant-
ial unit in keeping v/ith the dualistic nature of all reality,
that a true theory of true knowledge must be constructed. Truth
finds its support therein and error its explanation. But nothing
in this interpretation leaves the v/ay open for a dualism which
requires representative idealism for its explanation.
2. MAN IS A UlTIT
Man is a psycho-physical unit capable of knov/ing direct-'
ly and indirectly. Proof of this theory is far more satisfactory
than verbal agreement and actual doubt:
In veridical perception we are aware of the external
thing, or some feature of it; the datum of our awareness
is , identically, the very thing, or character, that exists
jvhat more in the way of epistemological monism
could we possibly get ? There is no closer relation be-
tween datum of ^ov/ledge and external thing conceivable
than identity.
If this meant exactly what it seems to mean there would
be no distinction between this view and that of scholastics. But
unfortunately, the author is making a mental reservation that
essence is subjective, or, at most^ relative in the objective
order. Also, his use of conceivable instead of possible is a
striking illustration of the place of emphasis in his thought*
8
Drake
,
Art . 1 , 54
,
I
i
i
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B. KlIOV/LEDGE RELATION IS REAL
Knowledge is a relation "between mind and object. As we
have seen, true knowledge corresponds to reality. This does not
mean that an idea in the head is a copy of a thing outside. It
means that the knov/ing subject becomes part of a unity which
comes an element in a pluralistic reality. Knowledge is the
characteristic, or product, of the direct union of mind and
object. Knov;ledge, or consciousness, is the resultant of direct
union. This is intellectualism, but it is an elaboration of a
more fundamental intuitionalism.
1. dualistic monism
Man, a unified dualism, stands in relation to objects
unified in matter by form and known by the mind in its two
functions , sensing and conceiving.
i. The knowing subject is not something apart from
reality. It is a part of reality and held to it by the ties of
class membership. It knov;s other parts of reality, in which it
occurs, by the direct relation of consciousness.
Consciousness is a unioue phenomenon through v;hich the
form of the known object is assimilated. Intellectual light,
as it v/ere
,
is cast upon the kno’-n object, but that object is
in no way dependent upon the knowing subject for its existence
or its kno\;ability. It is dependent upon the subject for its
being known, but not for its being , either its essence or
qualities.
ii. The relation called knov/ledge is not subjective; it
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is a manner of being, an objective fact just as truly as the
collision of t\/o automobiles is a direct external relation be-
tv/een two independent beings.
Hence knov/ledge is a manner of being, an onto-
logical enrichment of the knowing subject, which is nov/
what it was not before, and may become, in some measure,
anything v/hatever , . . .Of course the thing knovmi is not recei'
into the subject just as it is in itself; such intrusion
would exclude kno\/ledge. Its form is received apart from
its matter,^
The point here is that a person knoilng becomes some-
thing known. That is, a person v/ho learns a multiplication table
possesses the table vlthout altering it, and thus becomes some-
thing more than before knowing it.
2 , PURE MONISM
We have mentioned that man errs because he fails to
identify the object experienced as the really existing one, but
instead attributes existence to an object which is only possible
Further, there are mistakes in judgment in which inferential
processes become complex.
It has been made clear that man is an imperfect being
in whom a two-sided nature must face a dualistic world. This is
a source of error,
Nov/ if the distinctions v/e mentioned, such as matter
and form, were eliminated, all knowledge would be direct and
true. It is on these distinctions that man understands his
inferiority to God.
9
Keeler, Art.l, 27.
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vVhat chiefly constitutes a Christian philosophy is
precisel;''' this: The doctrine that in God there is an
identity of essence and existence, in creatures a real
distinction,
In God alone there exists complete, direct knou'ledge,
C . TilS CASE FOR RE.aiSM
The tendency of modern phSilosophers to confuse psychol-
ogy with epistemology and to regard epistemology as a separate
entity instead of as a science close to metaphysics, has created
innecessary doubts as to the va^ue of knowledge,
1. SELF NOT-SELF
The extreme dualistic point of view, idealistic but
rejecting extreme idealism, is expressed in extracts from a
discussion of the given:
.the exnerienced fact ,v;henever there is give:
experience, that every item of that experience belongs to
the self which is the whole context it rejects the
proposition that acquaintance v/ith m.y given se^f is know-
ledge of that self, for knowledge is description and is
mediation, dualistic in structure.
i. This means simplj^ that knov/ledge is of self, but the
datum self does not constitute knowledge. The world is knoim as
it is experienced, each datum- self being integrated into the
12
whole self which is made up of present and past experience.
The coherence or incoherence of the resulting content is the
measure of the value of the datum self or the rest of experience
Coherence is the criterion. This view obviously assumes a harmo;
10
McMahon
,
Art . 1 , 250
.
11
^gBrightman, Art.l, 266.
Bri ghtman - MT. 79,.
4
1
L
tv

between conscious experience and metaphysical reality, although,
just as obviously, it could not be proved.
ii. This viev/, however, is not v/ithout its adherents
sven among luke-v/arm realists. (In so classifying Mr.Donald C.
iVilliams, this \7riter confesses to considerable confusion concerr
Lng Ivir. V/illiams’ general views. It would seem that he fits some-
(Vhere between critical realism and idealistic dualism, although
lis attempt to reconcile dualism and monism is expressed in words
13
seeming to justify either view,
)
In an admission of misunderstanding of Brightman’s view
v/hich he confused with extreme idealism, V/illiams eiaphasizes
that an object need not be given to be known; at least in his
opinion’; ’’The transcendence of the object would not make know-
14
Ledge impossible.”
He then, however, proceeds to refute arguments agains?^
realistic monism bj’’ replying to the principal objections to it.
Jsing the example of a man mistaking a stump for a bear, he says:
The monistic theory does imi require that the
man is immediately aware of an object which is act-
ually a stuiip, it does not require that the man be
cognitively av/are that the object actually is a
stump,^^
This is evidently a middle course be^/een Brightman’s
dualistic idealism, which v/ould require empirical investigation
vVilliams ,Art . 2, passim.
14
Ibid.
,
432.
15
,
45a.« ^
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and testing by coherence before knowledge could be asserted, and
aritical realism which^ sufficiently monistic to capitalize on
man
the phenomenal data, in the form for reactions of the/under mis-
apprehension, as evidence of the objective relativity of know-
ledge ,
iii. Self is the subjective element in knowledge; the
object is the not-self. Apart from knowledge, self is the unific
being made up of body and soul; the thinking, eating, moving subr
ject. All else constitutes the not-self.
d
2. TIIE V/ORLD 0? OBJECTS
Inclusion in any theory of the notion of substance
immediately creates in the mind of the hearer the impression of
a static, stagnant philosophy. This criticism cannot be leveled
at the New Scholasticism.
i. The fact of change, the formation of new substances,
the transformation of other substances have been recognized by
modern follov/ers of St .Thomas Aquinas v/ho himself held to the
view of being as ens mobile.
Thus in the union of sodium and chloride, there is
not only the movement of the atom or electron, but also
the new phenomenon, whose production must be accounted for
,
And further, there is unification of the phenomena in
objective perce^Jion; these make up the object, the only
object vre know.
ii. Certain moddrn scholastics go very far indeed in
step v/ith the present day emphasis on change. Almost a modern
16
V/alsh, Art.l, 53.
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1
»
Heraclitus is a French scholastic; "It (ens) is as such etern-
1
ally flov/ing A permanent and radical becoming actuates it,"
This view is by no means universal among scholastics,
many of who have failed to heep pace v/ith modern thought, but
it is clear to most new scholastics that any object known is
known according to its status v/hen knovm, and that subsequent
reflection and abstract thinking must be concentrated on the
nature of the object as it v/as v/hen knovm and not as it might
10
be at some subsequent time,
3. THE WORLD OF REALITY
How far dovm the highv/ay to modern thought the scholas
tic parade has come is exemplified in the scientific outlook of
the movement's spokesmen on epistemological and metaphysical
questions.
This consistent system of thought, v/ith 'the truths
applicable in every field, is more fundamental than most
philosophies because it reaches the roots of reality in contrast
to empirical systems, A common current criticism that scholast4
icism treats problems not of general interest fails in two
points: (1) It is not shown that the lack of interest is
justified ; (2 ) It reveals a lack of acquaintance v/ith scholastic
doctrines of today.
i. The fundamental reality in the universe is co-
operation, It is found in every sphere of activity. It is not
17
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,
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going over to radical pan-psychism to assert that the knov'ledge
situation—fundamental to all living— is a cooperate situation,
ii. It is such a misunderstanding that has divorced
scholastic thought from that of great thinkers of the day, of
v;hom Dewey may be cited as one. For in any system in \;hich co-
operation is basic, the pragm.atic implications cannot be
escaped. Similarity of thought can be il'^ustrated in these
quotations
:
IZnoY/ledge is not something separate and self-
sufficient, but is involved in the process by v/hich life
is sustained and evolved.
St, Thomas points out that the intellect per-
ceives the individual as having the common nature of the
species to which it belongs, but sense perceives the indiv-
idual only as an object of desire^or as some kind of thing
that arouses emotional activity,"
iii. The t\/o aspects of reality in each of its phases,
matter and form for material things, and soul and body for liv-
ing things, is not unlike the general view of the New ^^ealism
which is, perhaps, the view closest to Nev; Scholasticism's
world view.
I
No matter how we take \/hatever it is in the uni-
verse, it has t\/o phases. Now the scholastics say that
these are two phases of one thing. Not that thej^- have gone
over completely to the New Realism; but on the very issue c
mind and meitter, they maintain that man is a substance com-
posed into one being, one complete substance, ^
19
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Yet it is not on the material side that scholastics loo
for knov,'ledge of the v/orld. 1'he form of the object is assimilated!
by the form of the subject, and then there is true knowledge,
In knov/ledge, the kno\/ing subject and the
kno\m object must be one; this unity iap^ttained’ by
an assimilation based on immateriality.
4. THE CONCEPT OF SUBSTiJCE
Probably nothing has been more unjust to the scholastic
theory than the characterizing of its doctrine of substance as
a theory of an inert being much like the substance discussed by
Descartes, The real scholastic viev/ is not unlike that of many
non-scholastics v;ho regard the subject of qualities in an object
as just as real as the oualities, and who regard substance as
that v/hich exercises the qualities,
".Whenever v/e refer to a fact of experience v/e refer
23to someone thinking something .
i. The concept of substance as made up of matter and
form removes the possibility of setting up a priority of conscioj.
ness v/hich is the chief bone of contention betv/een idealism
and realism. Scholasticism does not succumb to either side, ^
medio stat veritas.
The exponent of the New Realism believes that if
he can show the priority of consciousness to be a false conce|
tion,the stronges;J^^arguraent . . .for internality of relations
goes to the v/all.
22
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The reason is that the New Realism does not believe
epistemolog3’’ is ultimate, but, like the Nev/ Scholasticism, is
more concerned v/ith a world viev/ based on an objective pluralisr
and external relations which are as real as the objects themselvj^s.
An able commentator, well acouainted v/ith the New
Realism and New Scholasticism, sees an identity in the views to
a marked extent. "To the nev/ realist, the universe is a totalit
26
Ox all the entities of reality.” This pluralism is similar to
that of scholasticism.
The author quoted indicates that the concept of being
in New Scholasticism is similar to that of neutral entity in
Nev/ Realism. At least we may grant that the primary matter of
scholasticism is similar to the neutral entity of New -^^ealism
inasmuch as primary matter iS determinable and depends exclusive
Ij'- on form for its essence.
iii. The difficulty caused by the supposed relation
of a non-physical mind to a physical being is really due to a
misconception of phj^'sical being as purelj" material. Physical
being is made up of matter and form.
..lien a thing is known it is knovm as a form; and
anything further knov.Ti about it is dependent upon this form.
Form is the unit of being and of knowledge, \ihen an object
is perceived its form is in the percipient as well as in
the object.^'
25
26
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a. Unless, of course, physical things are really made
up of matter and form as well as of essence and existence, a
real difficulty does occur. ”If objects are not real but mere
combinations of quality groups, the difficulty ,v/e must admit, be-
28
comes a real one.” Essence, the doubly located v/hatness of
any object, then v/ould be absent from both substance and accident
there is no essence possible except in the mind, if substance is
not composed of matter and form, and an essence existing only in
the mind would be determined by unknowable causes which created
sensations and ideas.
b. This vievz finds support in the opinions of a non-
scholastic :
156
The physical things of common sense are not
merely sense data or collections of them. They are contin-
uants in time, and sense data are fleeting, intermittent
things. They preserve the same recognizable sj^ cial contour
for a considerable time ... .Physical things, age. in, are suppos
to have causal relations v/ith other physical things. Soap
dissolves in water, and it will stop a leak in a gas pip^*
This language could scarcely be used of mere sense data.'""^
(3d
c. The similarity of the views of critical realists
to the position here described has often been recognized. The
differences are due largely to the refusal of critical realists
to accept a subject of qualities. Approval of the matter and
form metaphysical theory v/ould be a long step in reconciliation
of the general views:
28
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Critical Realism is on the ric::ht track \;hen
it rejects the dualism of Descartes and asserts that an
existential foundation for cognition must he acknov/ledge4 •
The existent v/hich v/e must accept , however
,
is external to
cognition itself; it cannot he a mere logical identity or
^
a projection outside the mind of 'v/hat goes on in the mind.'" :)
5. iaiOV»T.EDGE 0? SUBST.INCE
i. It is perhaps well to begin this final statement on
knowledge of substance with the ’,/ords of a non-scholastic:
Knov/ledge is not the recognition of the agree-
ment or disagreement of ideas,: hut the direct experience of
things. It arises in the interaction between a percipient
organism and a thing perceivgj. In its simplest form, it is
mere av/areness of an object.
ii. The intuitive nature of sense kno\;ledge and the
non-intellectual character of direct knowledge of essence give
a decidedly mystical tinge to the scholastic's realistic view.
The mysticism surely is not the self experience of idealism. It
is a metaphysical hypothesis, demonstrable as consistent object-
ively.
This character is vitally important . It is not our
purpose here to prove mystical experience occurs, but it is in-
deed gratifying to kno\/ that knov/ledge is based on immaterial
unity, and that mystical experience can be grounded objectively.
a. Examined coldly it v/ould seem to imply that mystical,
experience is not only possible but factual if the natural theolo
of scholasticism is true. Thus we find "mysticism is not opposed
31
gy
Ryan, Art.l, 258
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1 to scholasticism, but rather organically united and connected
I 32
with it.”
b. Scholastic mysticism is not different from other
foms
,
except that the union of the mind with God is understand-
able and objective. It conforms v/ell to Evelyn Underhill’s
view of mystical experience as the "establishment of conscious
relations ^.dth the Absolute” \/ithout requiring the intervention
33
of ideas,
c. The constant change of Bergson, in i/hich the mind
34
.
intuitively tunes itself in ;/ith reality, is consistent with the
scholastic concept of mind and its knowledge of objects which im-
plies that mystical experience ” is a direct contact of the soul
35
\;ith Transcendental Reality.” The experience is rooted in a
purely imiaaterial union v/hich cannot be described. Since God is
ipure form, it is readily clear that man might experience Him if
I
sense activity could be reduced to the vanishing point.
I
iii. Cartesian dualism has .had a disastrous effect on
1
tall views v/hich include the concept of substance. The separatior.
I
jof mind and matter and classification of objects as matter led
to the extreme epistemological dualism current toda^/-. The return
!
lof scholasticism to the scene and the advent of New Realism have
somev/hat lessened the opposition to present theories of direct
knov7ledge
,
32
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4
’’After more than three centuries of idealist spec-
alation, \7e have in neo-scholasticism a neo-realism once more,
a doctrine which refuses to fall in \;ith the method foreshadov/ed
by Descartes
,
iv. Althou^ ^'^ev/ Scholasticism has heen on the scene
longer, credit for throwing light on the particular problem of
this thesis must go to the school of ^^'ew Healism.
The notion of immediate and direct realism was
admirably restored to its rightful place in philosophical
theory some years ago by the neo-realist school, ^/hen Professe
Perry made public his "epistemological monism” his exposition
of it might have been subject to discussion, but the notion he
suggested is, in my opinion, fundamental in any realist
theory.'^
The fact emphasized by Perry, that knowledge is direct,
found a warm welcome among scholastics v/ho intermittent 13^ for
seven centuries, and rather noisil3’- during the preceding half-
century, had preached the same doctrine. The rise of idealism hac
ended, and minds um/illing to accept direct knov/ledge laid the
foundation for the present school of critical realism,
A deeply-rooted prejudice which involves the far-
reaching assumption that knowledge is essentially relative,
and as such esGentiall3’’ modifiable, has come to color all spec
lation on the knowledge problem even where it has notoShaped
our views concerning the nature of knowledge itself,
V, The manner of knov/ing an object in itself is of
primary importance although ue adhere to the assertion that a
36
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theory of perception is not essential- to solution of the epis-
temoloe^ical problem v/hich is concerned with v;hat vie knov/, not
how v/e knov; it.
As far as epistemology is concerned, the starting
point is all-important, V/e must begin v.dth facts em-
pirically obtained and tested. To begin v/ith a theory
as so many epistemOlogists have done, is to involve
oneself ;i,n heartbreaking difficulties and end in
despair
Or as one of our non-scholastic philosophers has said,
”It is hard to see v/hy the history of perception should be al-
40lowed to correct or to supersede the description of it,”
Theories of perception have no place in the problem of
epistemology. They should be referred to psychologists. Our
explanations are given to furnish a complete viev/.
a. In maintaining that truth consists in a correspondent
between knov/ledge and objective fact, v/e have borne in mind that
this correspondence is not that of representative idealism or
representative realism. V/e have seen that knowledge begins \/ith 4
concept which is true essentially, although there may be some di
harmony existentially.
The first result of mental effort is theconcept.
Isolated, the concept is neither true nor false, but
in a cer-bain sense neutral. In the act of judgment ,th<i
concept is related to the subject by affirmation. . .In-
dependently of the relation formulated in a judgment
there is,betv/een the terms
,
sub ject and predicate, a re::
lation due to the character of the terms themselves,
39
Ryan ,Art . 1 , 244 , 245
,
40
Laird ,SR,16
,
41
Nogl, Art,1,143. _
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b. To obtain truth, the relation, which is independent
of the mind, must be formulated by the mind. Otherwise, there is
error. In any judgment, for example. That object is a green tree
,
the subject is a primary fact; it is a given fact, while the pre-'
dicate is another kind of term, something in the mind v/hich is
busy in fomulating. Thus, such terns as this , that , and the likei
are independsELt of judgment, but are adequate expressions of
existing entities.
No v;ord is needed to express that object . It can as v/el],
be indicated by a nod, a pointing finger, etc., and it is evident
that that object
,
the immediately given datum, is different from
the predicate. It should be equally evident that error consists
in the affirming of a wrong predicate of the given subject. The
subject is clearly an extra-mental reality; it is experienced as
such, and it is experienced as something decidedly different froii
the resulting mental process which promotes to consciousness
the term green tree. There is nothing decisive about green tree :;
the words might be any others. The content of the this or that
objec_b, however
,
is unalterable; it is notan arbitrary selection
i
of sounds; it is the object tree as it is expressed in terms of
a relation to mind.
c. The sub ject , namely, that object , is an ontological
reality not created or formulated by the mind, not a result of
a reasoning or thought process, but a given, objective reality as
it is; the green tree , unlike the that object , cannot be unam-
biguously expressed except in \;ords ; it is a result of mental
process; it is a concent selected from memory. In its ap^licatioi :
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to that object lies the possibility of error as v/ell as of
truth.
V/hat is given, however, is the object, and error is due
to psychological processes, absence of proper conditions, or soiiii
other cause. That the ontological object was given as it v;as
remains true. The object in itself, like the subject of the
judgment, is neither true nor false in itself but is given to
the mind in all its innocence from somewhere outside the mind.
vi. Critical -t^ealism comes to the door of New
Scholasticism, but leaves v;ithout v/alking in.
Critical realists do not admit that the immediate
data of consciousness are real,Even from the epistemological
point of view they consider immediate realism as the result
of insufficient analysis of knoV/ledge. Conscious data, thesy
say, are not the object. The object is not intuited, it is only
known beyond the data by affirmation. It is revealed by tlie
data, embodied or clothed by them. It is not itself direct4|y
given, but only believed or affirmed. Data are * essences*
not * things.*
NoSl hastens to add that Nev/ Scholasticism does not of
a theory of intuition such as Bergson might sponsor. ”V/hile the
sense datum is given intuitively, being is given through the
fer
sensible intuition in a way that is not intuitive.”
43
vii. hTiat the critical realist means by essence
.
the
scholastic means by " uidditas
,
v/hatness
,
essence
.
with the
important difference that for the scholastic , essence is object-
ively in the thing regardless of any relation to any standpoint
42
No61,Art. 1,142, 143.
43
Ibid., 143.
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t
We may say that the nuidditas is referred to the
real thing by v/ay of affirmation, but the affirmation itself
is founded on intuition and justified by it. There is, there-
fore
,
some^^mmediate knov/ledge of the real in all human
knov/ledge
.
6. THE PROBLEM CE QUALITIES
Epistemology is an attempt to explain v/hat we know and
its v/orkability. It is not directly concerned \/ith psychological
or metaphysical aspects of the question. The fact is. Me know .
that object to be a green tree. Vvliy we knov; it is a question
too ultimate to ansv/er. It is like asking \:hj we kno’./ anything, \fihy
knowledge occurs. The fact is that v/e do knov;,^nd we know things,
The emphasis on the subjective side of qualities has
caused quite a general rejection of the theory that secondary qja ties
have existence in objects as they are experienced. According to
scholasticism knowledge is based in the duality of objects, the
form being the content of direct kno\7ledge
,
Consequently, the real existence of qualities in things
implies that each has an essence. This interlocking of metaphysid
and epistemology is allov/ed because there can be mo inconsist enc 3c
between the two in a coherent system of thought
,
although neithe||i
need be the stand, rd by \7hich the other is judged.
In undertaking a study of this section, ''..hich v;ill be
the closing one, it must be kept prominently in mind that the
3xistence of psychological difficulties does not lead any farther]
ihan to the conclusion that perception is a complex affair.
163
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They (the difficulties) do not prove that the man
in the street is vnrong vhen he asserts he has seen a red
book. It is v.-lth this simple fundamental fact of every day
experience that v;e
,
as epistemologists
,
must start and it is
to this same fact that we must return as the final criterion
for judging the truth or falsehood of any theory whatsoever
about the fact,'^^
i. That knowledge of qualities, like all knowledge, is
relative in the sense that it is related to the knowing subject
applies to perception onlj’’ to the extent that whatever is per-
ceived must be perceived by senses. This constitutes an analysis
of the knov/ledge situation.
There is,hov/ever, another situation to be considered, a4i
that is the objective content of the sensation. This, indeed, is
aot sensation, because sensation is, by definition, subjective.
But there is an ontological status for the object of sense knov/-
Ledge:
The data of perception. . .if viewed ontologically
,
are the intrinsic qualities of things, not ^merely data*
v/hich arise in the percipient organism under certain conditioiis.
To be perceived these data must be brought into relation with
the perceiving mind. This means that the data must be made onis
cognitively vdth the perceiver; it need not mean that the data
must be immanent to or totally dependent on the perceiver, nof
that
,
because of the relativity of the perceptual process,
what we really know are our own sensations. Moreover, that
vision is accompanied by a feeling of externality cannot be
denied.
ii. It is important that the scholastic doctrine of
j’eal essence be recognized as applicable to qualities as v/ell as
45
46
Ryan ,Art . 1 , S46
.
Ibid
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to substances. Although qualitj'- or any other accident is depen-
dent on substance for its existence, nevertheless, quality has ar
essential nature by v/hich one quality differs from all others.
Epistemologists of a dualistic turn of mind stress the variance
between the accounts of qualities given by physics and sensation,
but the different nodes of qualities are not due to essential
differences in the modes of any particular oualit 3'', but to the
double aspect of things. The problem at best is one for psycho-
logy.
Quality qua quality is present in the external
object; it is present there in its essencd. St. Thomas does
not hold that ouality is merely present in the object in
such a way as to be the„cause of an effect altogether dif-
ferent from the cause.
The essence of quality, like the essence of anything els
bas a double location, one subjective, the other objective. Ob-
jectively, the essence is v/hat the quality is; subjectively,
it is what the quality means to the percipient. From either
standpoint, the essence is one and the same. "The essence is the
answer to the question, V/hat is it ? It is defined as id quo res
48
id quod est. In a later treatise on the same subject, the
i/riter remarks, "Everj^ man who has been kept in blissful ignoranc
of modern metaph3?‘sics , or who ceases to be baffled by them, be-
49
lieves in the objectivity of sensible qualities.’^
47
Halpin ,Art .1,146.
48
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49
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• That the mode of being of qualities, in fact of
,
differs from that of substance cannot be denied,
independent; accident is dependent.
The fact that St .Thomas teaches that "an i
accident should be described as of something rather than as
something" does not mean that he v/ishes to cast any
shadov/ of doubt upog. the reality of the being of accidents.
Since accidents can be defined they must have an essence,,..
However, their definition is incomplete for they cannot be
defined unless a subject is brought in in defining them.
Neither do accidents cause the primary existence of the sub- i
sisting being, but only a secondary existence, that is, by '
means of accidents a subject is reduced from potency to act. '
Nor does the union of accidents and subject produce a new
j
substantial unit. '
iv. The seeming '.dllingness of many thinkers to ac-
cept the objective reality of primary qualities , size , shape
,
and
the like, but to reject secondary qualities, strikes the present
v/riter as inconsistent. As we have suggested throughout this
thesis, if any of our knox^ledge falsifies actual things, if v/e do
not know them as thejK are, then no knov/ledge can be called direc:
.
B-qI it is on the SEime grounds that the objectivity of primary as
v^ell "S secondary qualities must stand or fall.
It has been v;ell said by a non-scholastic: "Our knov/-
ledge of primary qualities is equally dependent upon the reactioi],
of the organism. The primary qualities are only relatively less
51
changeable than. the secondary." Without accepting Leighton’s
epistemology, \ie can call attention to the internal truth of
the statement.
50
Ealpin ,Art . 1 , 154 , 155
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51
Leighton, MAC, 188.
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V, The relation in v/hich the subject knowing and the
object knov7n stand is external. Neither depends on the other,
and the knov/ledge resulting is direct, whether it be of qualitie
or of the object itself. V/e shall bring this paper to a close
s
with a pithy , comprehensive quotation from one of the world ^s
most distinguished scholastics:
An object is known when it is present in a cer-
tain way in the knov.lng consciousness ... .linowledge does not
result merely from the thing; but rather, the thin|^ knov/n
and the kno%/ing subject cooperate in the production of the
phenomenon. This intervention of the knowing subject shows
us why the scholastics re jected ^nalve realism^ which dis-
regards the action of the knov/ing subject, and considers the
object knovm as projected in our minds like an image in a
lifeless and passive mirror.
Thomas insists that this sense impression is not
knovm directly. \/hat is present to sense consciousness, v/hat
we attain to is the thing itself.. the oak tree. The impres-
sion \/hich it produces in men is loioi-zn only by a process of
reasoning.
5E
53
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The repetition of facts and views in this thesis is
due to the several approaches to each of the major conclusions,
and it was feared that certain carry-over notions mic^ht other-
v;ise have heen lost. Nevertheless, this writer is aware of the
tiring effect on readers of such a style, and he apologizes.
From our survey of the New Scholarjticisn by itself and
in relation to other systems of thought , certain conclusions have
be-’n drawn. That they are consistent internally is the belief o
this v/riter. But no theory of knowledge can stand alone or, in
a strictly theocentric viav,as atruth onl^T- of philosophy. To show
the consistency of these vie\/s with others far more important is
the chief purpose of this section.
1. Scholastic theodicy proves the existence of a lovi
and all-powerful God who neither deceives nor is deceived. The
theory that knov/ledge is direct is consistent with the theory of
such a God.
hg
2. It is admitted that God does not reveal ever3''thing
to the huiian mind; His purpose is to have man merit eternity.^
But those truths known to be attainable only through faith are
religious truths on the attainment of which nothing reallj^ de-
pends. They are truths of dogma, and the criterion of acceptance
or rejection is the human conscience v/hich may be justified even
in error.
1
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The existence of religious mysteries, because they
do not fall within the scope of reason, can be interpreted as
part of God^s purpose. The fact that there is reason to class-
ify as mysteries certain truths accepted on faith attests to th^
ability of the human mind to distinguish betv/een attainable and
unattainable truths. Knowledge of the world about us does not
seem to belong to the category of mysteries.
3. God gave man senses and intellect. That He made
them disproportionate to their respective objects is less reasoi|
able than the belief that He made them to give direct knov/ledge
of things about us. There seems to be no purpose in having man
live in one vrorld and loiov; another.
4. The prevalence of purpose is opposed to the theoJ^
of epistemological dualism. The distinction between mind and boq
in man is a counterpart to the distinction between form and mat
ter and to the distinction betv/een essence and existence in
the external v/orld. The fact that each dualism forms a composite^
whole strengthens the reasonableness of the theorj^ of direct
knowledge
.
The process of knowledge may be complex. Conscious-
ness does not become existentially one wdth the object known. Ye1|
New Realism is correct in asserting that wiiat is known is exist
entially one with the independent reality.
Substance exists as it is conceived, as nature of
the object; qualities exist as they are perceived. By definitior
Holt,NR, 34.

.sensation is excluded from all "but subjective existence. It is
an experience resulting from a direct relation \:ith reality, a
I
relation characterized by cognition.
I
The vrorld about ms is knov/n directly. li^ov/ledge of
!
ideas follows knov/ledge of things. Certain truths are known only
mediateljr, but the data are given from the real order. All know-
ledge originates in God-given and accurate senses. ICnov/ledge
above that directly gained is based on infallible and valid
knowledge by accuaintance v/ith reality. Truth, real objective
truth, can be attained I
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